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The Circumstances of the Offence: 
The Post-Ipeelee Sentencing of Indigenous Offenders for Manslaughter  
in the Superior Courts 
 
 
                  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Precisely how section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code – the so-called Gladue provisions – is meant 
to apply to the sentencing of serious and violent crimes has remained an open question for two 
decades. This paper utilizes a comparative analysis of the sentencing of Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders for manslaughter in the superior courts of Ontario, western Canada and the 
territories in an attempt to answer that question. It compares the outcomes for Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders sentenced for manslaughter in the six years following the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in Ipeelee to determine whether there is a different sentencing regime in 
operation for Indigenous offenders with respect to this offence and, if so, what outcomes that 
regime produced. The central conclusion of this paper is that a beneficial outcome attributable to 
the operation of the Gladue provisions occurred primarily in manslaughter offences where the 
intoxication of the offender played a central role. This suggests that sentencing judges found their 
way to applying the Gladue provisions most frequently where the offences themselves fit a pattern 
aligning with prevailing views around Indigenous offending and the consumption of alcohol or 
other intoxicants.  
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Lay Summary 
 
There is perceived to be a crisis of over-representation among Indigenous people in Canada’s 
prison population. In the mid-1990s, Parliament added section 718.2(e) to the Criminal Code in 
an attempt to address this by encouraging alternatives to incarceration for Indigenous offenders. 
This section of the Criminal Code is commonly referred to as the Gladue provisions, after the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision that first interpreted its application. How the provisions are 
meant to apply to offenders sentenced for serious and violent offences has remained an open 
question for sentencing judges. This paper attempts to answer that question by comparing 
sentencing decisions for manslaughter between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders over a 
six-year period following the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent decision related to the 
provisions in R v Ipeelee. This research examined superior court decisions to determine if 
Indigenous offenders were treated differently at sentencing and, if so, what differences in sentence 
outcome arose as a result. The central conclusion of this paper is that Indigenous offenders are 
most likely to see a beneficial outcome result from the application of the provisions where 
intoxication played a central role in the commission of the offence.  This suggests that sentencing 
judges applied the provisions most frequently where the offences themselves aligned with 
prevailing views around Indigenous offending and the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicants. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Jamie Tannis Gladue, James Wells and Manasie Ipeelee were all intoxicated when they 
committed the crimes that eventually brought them to the Supreme Court of Canada. Alcohol was 
a factor each time the Supreme Court has entertained the application of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal 
Code to sentencing. Alcoholism among Canada’s Indigenous peoples has destroyed communities 
and countless individual lives. There is nothing fresh in that observation and this research 
contributes nothing to addressing that problem. What it does suggest is that where an offender has 
consumed large amounts of alcohol or other intoxicants, sentencing judges will be more apt to see 
a path to allowing the Gladue provisions to impact upon sentence. 
In brief, the research conducted for this paper suggests that incidents of manslaughter that 
are defined to a substantial degree by an offender’s state of intoxication will tend to receive more 
favourable treatment at sentencing. Through an analysis of nearly two hundred sentencing 
decisions in Canada’s superior courts over the preceding six years, this research indicates that 
those manslaughters committed by an offender in a state of serious intoxication are both more 
likely to produce sentencing decisions that are conducted in such a way that they address an 
Indigenous offender’s heritage and more likely to produce lower sentences than comparably 
situated non-Indigenous offenders. This diverges from manslaughter sentencing where the 
presence of intoxication is not seen to be a major factor in commission of the offence. In those 
cases, Indigenous offenders not only see a reduced likelihood of an Indigenous-focused sentencing 
methodology, they are also more likely to attract longer sentences than similarly-situated non-
Indigenous offenders.  
While this is certainly a benefit to those Indigenous people who were intoxicated while 
they committed an act of manslaughter, it does not serve to further the remedial aim of reducing 
the overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in prisons more broadly which was the goal of the 
Gladue provisions in the first instance. Thirty years ago, a report prepared originally for the 
Canadian Bar Association summed up the proposition that arguably still informs the sentencing of 
Indigenous people today: 
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Put at its baldest, there is an equation of being drunk, Indian and in prison. Like 
many stereotypes, this one has a dark underside. It reflects the view of native people 
as uncivilized and without coherent social or moral order. The stereotype prevents 
us from seeing native people as equals. The fact that the stereotypical view of native 
people is no longer reflected in official government policy does not negate its power 
in the popular imagination and its influence in shaping the decisions of the police, 
prosecutors, judges and prison officials.1 
 
This is a stark assessment of the criminal justice system’s view of Indigenous people in Canada.  
The truth can be ugly, particularly in a country that prides itself on being enlightened. Thirty years 
later attitudes towards Indigenous peoples have improved, but stereotypes remain durable. In the 
sentencing courts today, it may not be assumed that all First Nations, Inuit and Métis offenders are 
amoral and driven by substance abuse. However, this research suggests that the stereotype persists. 
The figure of the ‘drunk Indian’ who was once condemned for his inability to control his actions 
while intoxicated is now more likely to see a benefit, at least in sentencing for manslaughter. The 
sober Indigenous offender by contrast loses that benefit. It appears that the path to the application 
of the Gladue provisions to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime continues to 
run through old stereotypes. 
 
2. Central Question  
 The central question this paper addresses is how the courts are treating Gladue when they 
are sentencing offenders for serious and violent crimes. How the Gladue provisions should 
manifest themselves in the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime has long been an 
open question. Since the Parliamentary debates on Bill C-41, the provisions have been viewed by 
some critics as little more than an attempt to “sneak through the back door a parallel system of 
justice for Aboriginals.”2 This paper seeks to answer the related questions of what methods the 
courts use to address Indigenous offending in serious and violent crime and how precisely these 
methods manifest themselves in sentence outcomes. In order to address these questions, this paper 
employs a comparative analysis of manslaughter sentencing decisions between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous offenders as well as different categories of manslaughter. The aim was to assess 
                                               
1 Michael Jackson, “Locking Up Natives in Canada,” (1989) 23:2 UBC L Rev 215, at 218. 
2 Carmela Murdocca, To Right Historical Wrongs: Race, Gender, and Sentencing in Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2013) at 60-61. 
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whether there was an identifiable difference in sentence outcomes for Indigenous offenders 
compared to non-Indigenous offenders sentenced for the same offence. If such a difference was 
evident, the project sought to resolve the questions of whether that difference was attributable to 
the operation of the Gladue provisions and how precisely such operations manifested themselves. 
As noted above, the evidence analyzed here suggests that across the different categories of 
manslaughters identified there is some difference in sentence outcomes for Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders and that a beneficial operation of the provisions is more likely to be found 
where an Indigenous offender was intoxicated while committing the offence.  
 At the outset of this research it was assumed that in cases of serious and violent crime, 
where the Gladue provisions were found to impact sentence, this would be in the form of a 
reduction in sentence. The research has borne this out to an extent. The most frequent manifestation 
of sentence impact attributable to the operation of the Gladue provisions did come in the form of 
a reduction in sentence when compared with non-Indigenous offenders and with Indigenous 
offenders who appeared not to have benefitted from an impact of the provisions. This was not the 
only manner in which the provisions were found to impact upon sentence outcome. There were 
also decisions in which the judge determined that in order for the provisions to have their intended 
remedial effect, the offender would be required to spend time in a penitentiary so they could benefit 
from the programming in the federal system geared towards Indigenous offenders. In the course 
of writing this paper, the definition of what constitutes an impact upon sentence expanded to 
address the evidence derived from the decisions themselves.  
 
3. Methodology  
This paper approaches its subject matter from the doctrinal school of legal research.3 The 
purpose is first to analyze how the Gladue provisions are designed to function by the legislation 
that created them and the Supreme Court jurisprudence that interpreted them and second to 
determine how the provisions were being applied in practice to sentencing offenders for serious 
and violent crime. Indigenous peoples and their interactions with the criminal justice system in 
Canada is an expansive topic. Even the question of sentencing Indigenous persons potentially 
invites inquiry into a wide variety of historical and sociological phenomena such as settler 
                                               
3 Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law,” 83 
Erasmus L Rev 130 (2015) at 131. 
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colonialism and institutional and systemic racism.  The potential exists to bring in interdisciplinary 
approaches from varied fields of academic inquiry ranging from feminism and criminology to 
history and critical race theory.  This paper is not concerned with those broader questions, as 
interesting and important as those areas of inquiry are. It opts instead for a narrow focus on how a 
particular provision of the Criminal Code aimed at ameliorating the levels of Indigenous 
overrepresentation in Canada’s prisons has functioned in practice for those offenders who have 
been convicted of serious and violent crimes.  
The first part of this paper deals with the jurisprudence and scholarship around Gladue and 
its application in theory. The core of this paper is a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 
effects of the Gladue provisions on sentencing manslaughter in the trial courts. There is value in 
quantitative assessments of sentencing decisions. The Supreme Court in Wells cautioned that 
“[t]here is no sense comparing the sentence that a particular Aboriginal offender would receive to 
the sentence that some hypothetical non-Aboriginal offender would receive.”4 While this may be 
true in terms of determining a given sentence, in analyzing the practice of sentencing such a 
comparison does have a merit. Clayton Ruby has written that “few crimes are truly original” and 
“their characteristic features repeat themselves with appalling regularity.”5 That idea underlies the 
research conducted for this paper. The Indigenous offenders in this study are being compared to 
actual rather than hypothetical non-Indigenous offenders to determine whether there are 
differences in sentence outcome that can be attributed to the Gladue provisions. 
It is trite law that sentencing is an individualized process and that the determination of a fit 
sentence is to be made with reference to the circumstances of the particular offender and the 
particular offence. With that in mind, there are only so many ways in which any crime can 
manifest. Despite the fact that each offender has walked a distinct path to arrive where they find 
themselves at sentencing, the similarities between offenders and offences are frequently striking. 
This analysis is premised on the idea that given sufficient numbers of offenders - both Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous - sentencing decisions can be examined comparatively and generalizations 
can be made about sentencing outcomes. The information derived from a large scale comparative 
sentencing analysis can be used to answer the broad question of what outcomes are being produced 
                                               
4 R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para 86. 
5 Clayton Ruby, Sentencing, Ninth Edition. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2017) at 239. 
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from the application of this particular Criminal Code provision to a single offence at one level of 
court across Canada. 
 
3. Organization 
 This paper is divided into six chapters including this one. Chapter two deals with the 
legislative and jurisprudential framework that gives the Gladue provisions their form. It then 
examines the scholarship and earlier empirical assessments of the operation of the provisions. This 
chapter concludes with a survey of the operation of the provisions in practice across Canada 
examining Gladue Reports, the application of the provisions in the courts, community alternatives 
for Indigenous offenders, the correctional system, and provincial and federal prosecutorial 
policies. Chapter three deals with sentencing in general and manslaughter sentencing in particular. 
It begins with an outline of the structure of the sentencing regime in Canada. The balance of the 
chapter deals with the sentencing of manslaughter in Canada with a particular focus on the different 
regimes operating in the provinces and territories under discussion.  
Chapter four outlines the plan of the case study in detail and provides a general overview 
of the information drawn from the manslaughter decisions. It then breaks down this information 
by analyzing the different categories of manslaughter and the different jurisdictions, it concludes 
with a comparison between the sentencing of the two largest categories of manslaughter and the 
treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders in those categories. Chapter five deals first 
with answering the question of how different methodologies manifest in the sentencing of 
Indigenous offenders and their rates of occurrence. It then considers how the Gladue provisions 
impact upon sentence outcomes before concluding with an assessment of why different 
methodologies are employed and different rates of sentence impact are found among different 
categories of manslaughter. This paper concludes in chapter six with a brief assessment of how 
different actors in the criminal justice system might ensure that the remedial aspects of the 
provisions have a greater impact on sentence outcomes for Indigenous offenders.  
The central conclusion of this paper is that where an Indigenous offender is sentenced for 
a manslaughter involving serious intoxication, they are both more likely to be sentenced according 
to a different methodology than non-Indigenous offenders in that category and they are more likely 
to see the Gladue provisions impact upon sentence outcome than those Indigenous offenders 
whose crimes were not defined by intoxication.  
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Chapter Two: The Landscape of Gladue 
 
1. Legislation and Jurisprudence 
 The Gladue principles have their origins in Bill C-41 introduced in 1995 with the aim of 
codifying sentencing practices in Canada. Part of this legislation was section 718.2(e) of the 
Criminal Code – the Gladue provisions.1 The provisions require:  
 
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the 
following principles: 
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the 
circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community 
should be considered for all offenders, with particular reference to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.2 
 
Since its passage this provision has expanded into many different areas of criminal law such as 
bail,3 parole,4 extradition5 and review board hearings6 but its initial interpretation extended only to 
sentencing.7  
 The Supreme Court of Canada first interpreted the provision in the course of a sentence 
appeal from Jamie Tannis Gladue for the manslaughter of her common-law spouse in 1999. In R 
v Gladue,8 the Court determined that Indigenous people face distinct circumstances compared with 
non-Indigenous people and Parliament had determined that they should be subject to a different 
method of determining sentence. The Court took Parliament’s intention to be a remedial one and 
understood the provisions as meant expressly to reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous 
offenders.9 Writing for a unanimous court, Cory and Iacobucci JJ determined that there were two 
considerations peculiar to sentencing Indigenous offenders:  
 
                                               
1 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
2 Ibid s. 718.2(e). 
3 R v Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205. 
4 Twins v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 537. 
5 United States v Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, leave to appeal to SCC refused. 
6 R v Sim, [2005] OJ No 4432. 
7 Jonathan Rudin, Indigenous People and the Criminal Justice System: A Practitioner’s Handbook. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2019) at 146-194. 
8 [1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue]. 
9 Ibid at para 33. 
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(A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a role in 
bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the court; and 
(B) The types of sentencing procedures which may be appropriate in the 
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal 
heritage or connection.10 
 
Section 718.2(e) would be applied in light of these considerations: systemic and background 
factors and appropriate types of sentencing procedures and sanctions.  
The Supreme Court held that sentencing judges had no discretion as to whether or not the 
provisions would apply. Instead their sole discretion lay with the determination of a fit sentence 
for the individual before the court.11 As a corollary to this limitation on discretion, the degree to 
which an individual was connected to any particular Indigenous community would not be a bar to 
the application of the provisions as Indigenous people living off-reserve continue to be closely 
connected to their culture.12 At sentencing, the duty to adduce evidence of the relevant factors for 
the consideration of the sentencing judge lay with counsel and should counsel fail in their duties, 
it would fall to judges themselves to ensure that the information was brought before the courts.13 
 Though the decision did not contain specific procedures for determining sentence or 
suggestions for alternative sanctions, it was straightforward: the determination of a fit sentence for 
Indigenous offenders was a bifurcated process and was universal in its application. However, there 
was one paragraph in the decision that would be used frequently by sentencing judges and cited 
disproportionately by appellate courts in applying the provisions.14 The Court added: 
 
Yet, even where an offence is considered serious, the length of the term of 
imprisonment must be considered. In some circumstances the length of the sentence 
of an aboriginal offender may be less and in others the same as that of any other 
offender. Generally, the more violent and serious the offence the more likely it is 
as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment will be closer to each other or 
the same, even taking into account their different concepts of sentencing.15 
 
                                               
10 Ibid at para 66.  
11 Ibid at para 82. 
12 Ibid at para 91. 
13 Ibid at paras 83-4. 
14 Kent Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal,” 54 Crim LQ 470 
(2008-2009) at 472. 
15 Gladue, supra note 8 at para 79. 
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The Supreme Court would later clarify that this “was not meant to be a principal of universal 
application.”16 Regardless, until 2012 when the Court in R v Ipeelee17 dispensed with the notion 
that the provisions would not apply to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crime, 
sentencing and appeal courts would continue to cite that passage for the proposition that 
Indigenous status did not need to be considered for such cases. As detailed below, after the 
Supreme Court held that Gladue considerations must be analyzed in every case, there remains 
uncertainty among sentencing judges and appeal courts as to which alternative sanctions might be 
applied to sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. This remains one of the primary 
conceptual hurdles in the exercise of the provisions and no convincing answers have so far been 
supplied by the courts.  
 In summarizing its conclusions in Gladue, the Court made several other points that 
continue to inform the interpretation of the provisions, in particular their direction that where 
“there is no alternative to incarceration the length of the term must be carefully considered” while 
cautioning that “it not to be taken as a means of automatically reducing the prison sentence of 
aboriginal offenders.”18 With respect to the Indigenous worldview of crime and punishment, the 
Court ended its judgement by suggesting it was “unreasonable to assume that aboriginal peoples 
do not believe in the importance of traditional sentencing goals such as deterrence, denunciation, 
and separation, where warranted.”19 
 The year after the Gladue decision, the Supreme Court returned to the question of how s. 
718.2(e) was meant to apply in Wells. The Court stated that “the guidelines set out in Gladue… 
are not intended to provide a single test for a sentencing judge to apply in determining a reasonable 
sentence in the circumstances. Section 718.2(e) imposes an affirmative duty on the sentencing 
judge to take into account the surrounding circumstances of the offender, including the nature of 
the offence, the victim and the community.”20 Of key importance in Wells, were the effects that s. 
718.2(e) was meant to have on the outcome of sentence. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court, 
emphasized in his reasons “that s. 718.2(e) requires a different methodology for assessing a fit 
sentence for an aboriginal offender; it does not mandate a different result.”21  This meant that trial 
                                               
16 R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 [Wells]. 
17 2012 SCC 13 [Ipeelee]. 
18 Gladue, supra note 8 at para 93. 
19 Ibid at para 93. 
20 Wells, supra note 16 at para 41. 
21 Ibid at para 44. 
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courts were obliged to sentence Indigenous offenders differently not necessarily to arrive at a 
different sentence. As established in Gladue, in order to engage in this process judges would 
require information about the offender and their background. Here, the Court determined that there 
was an affirmative obligation on the part of the trial judge to inquire into the relevant circumstances 
of an Indigenous offender in the event that counsel fails to do so.22 
 In response to the apparent reluctance of the judiciary to apply the considerations to the 
sentencing of offenders for serious and violent offences, the Supreme Court addressed these issues 
once more in Ipeelee. This decision has been seen as a repudiation of judges who had restrained 
the application of Gladue and limited its application to non-serious criminal matters.23 The 
Supreme Court admonished sentencing judges that they “have a duty to apply s. 718.2(e).”24 The 
application of the provisions was a statutory duty and declining to consider them:  
 
would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the 
fundamental principle of proportionality. Therefore application of the Gladue 
principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender… and a failure 
to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention.25 
 
The Court justified this by saying that the consideration of background and systemic factors in the 
first plank of Gladue dealt with the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The effects of 
colonialism wrought on Indigenous communities would inform this consideration. The Court 
explained held that:  
 
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability only follows 
from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations 
of social and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited options 
for positive development. While this rarely – if ever – attains a level where one 
could properly say that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving 
of criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances may 
diminish their moral culpability.26 
 
                                               
22 Ibid at para 54. 
23 Jonathan Rudin, “Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in R. v. 
Ipeelee,” 57 SCLR 375 (2012) at 381. 
24 Ipeelee, supra note 17 at para 85 [Emphasis in original].  
25 Ibid at para 87. 
26 Ibid at para 73 [Emphasis in original]. 
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The Court, in their restatement of Gladue, held that the provisions must be considered for all 
Indigenous offenders and the background and systemic factors speak directly to the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender. 
 The Supreme Court emphasized that s. 718.2(e) was aimed at the over-incarceration of 
Indigenous persons. As a consequence, the framework from Gladue required that alternatives to 
incarceration be employed wherever possible. Sentencing judges, the Court wrote: 
 
can endeavour to reduce crime rates in Aboriginal communities by imposing 
sentences that effectively deter criminality and rehabilitate offenders. These are 
codified objectives of sentencing. To the extent that current practices do not further 
these objectives, those practices must change so as to meet the needs of Aboriginal 
offenders and their communities.27 
 
This indicated to judges that to comply with the second stage of the Gladue framework, they should 
look to develop alternative sentencing procedures for Indigenous offenders in order to give form 
to the provisions.  
 While establishing the principles from Gladue with greater clarity, Ipeelee failed to provide 
guidance for its application at sentencing in respect of either serious or non-serious crimes. The 
Court declared that section 718.2 (e) did not “create a race-based discount on sentencing.”28 
Neither did it provide further guidance for its application or suggest what form appropriate 
alternatives might take. It is evident from the decisions that the Court did not want to create an 
Indigenous sentencing framework. Absent action from Parliament on this issue, the justices 
seemed content to return the issue to sentencing judges and appellate courts to work out the details.  
 
2. Scholarship 
This is a narrow area of study and one dominated by a handful of law and criminology 
professors. There is scant scholarly opposition to the provisions as most writers favour them, 
however many question the manner in which they have manifested in practice. Most prominent 
among these scholars are Jonathan Rudin29 and Kent Roach.30 Between them they have authored 
                                               
27 Ibid at para 66.  
28 Ibid at para 75. 
29 Program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto and law professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University. 
30 Law professor at the University of Toronto. 
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a third of the articles discussed here. If there is an opposing school of thought, it is the sentencing 
judges who cannot see how to apply the provisions to the sentencing of offenders for serious and 
violent crime in practice. Scholarship is largely concerned with this failure and how it can be 
improved upon. This is supplemented by limited empirical research conducted to determine the 
function of the provisions in practice. Early scholarly reactions to Gladue discuss many issues that 
continue to trouble their application to serious crime. Some considerations in these early works 
are moot, as there are now more limited options since conditional sentences were made unavailable 
for serious bodily harm offences.31  
Roach and Rudin offered their first assessment of the Gladue decision in 2000 where they 
identified most points of contention going forward.32 They argue that the decision holds promise 
for remedying the over-representation of Indigenous persons in the prison system but see barriers 
to its implementation. First, there are a lack of community resources available to aid in the 
rehabilitation of Indigenous offenders and a similar lack of culturally-relevant correctional 
resources; second, there is lingering uncertainty about its application to the sentencing of offenders 
for serious and violent crimes. 
Rudin and Roach suggested that the limited nature of Indigenous-specific programming 
available, particularly within Indigenous communities themselves would restrain the ability of 
judges to offer innovation and result in a continued reliance on custodial sentences.33 For a 
specialized regime of Indigenous sentencing to function properly, they argue, resources will have 
to be increased at the front end to allow counsel and court workers to handle the new regime.34 
Finally, Rudin and Roach were troubled by Gladue’s implication that the provisions were not 
intended to apply to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes, arguing this violated 
proportionality which the Criminal Code identifies as the fundamental principle of sentencing.35 
This paper was remarkably insightful, correctly identifying most of the pitfalls subsequently 
encountered by the criminal justice system in practice. 
                                               
31 Safe Street and Communities Act, SC 2012, c. 1, s. 34. 
32 Kent Roach; Jonathan Rudin, “Gladue: The judicial and political reception of a promising decision,” 42 Can J 
Crim 355 (2000). 
33 Ibid at 361-2. 
34 Ibid at 375-6. 
35 Ibid at 366; Criminal Code, supra note 1, s. 718.1. 
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In a similar vein, Renée Pelletier36 argued that the legal analysis provided by the Supreme 
Court failed to recognize the provisions’ distinct purpose of furnishing alternatives to incarceration 
and would therefore limit its effective application.37  Pelletier contends that the distinction between 
serious and non-serious crimes is inappropriate and does not exist in law.38 She argues the Court 
is wrong in suggesting  that denunciation and deterrence are aligned with Indigenous concepts of 
justice or that Indigenous people agree with many of the purposes of sentencing outlined in the 
Criminal Code.39 Pelletier criticized the Supreme Court for its failure to appreciate the impacts of 
colonialism and argued that the situation would worsen by relying on traditional aggravating and 
mitigating factors at sentencing.40 In her view, counsel are inadequately trained to deal with these 
issues and will receive no help from a system where Indigenous-specific pre-sentence reports are 
not available and where funding for them is unlikely to be forthcoming.41  
These criticisms, like those of Rudin and Roach, proved prescient. Pelletier’s analysis of 
the failure to focus on colonialism is apt and remains a substantial issue even post-Ipeelee, however 
her insistence that no classification of crime as serious can exist without Parliamentary approval 
is specious. Given the broad discretion provided to sentencing judges and the wide range of 
activities covered by individual Criminal Code offences, seriousness is clearly a consideration in 
virtually any sentencing, notwithstanding the absence of a formal legislative classification. In fact, 
Justice Iacobucci noted in Wells that “whether a crime is serious in the given circumstances is, in 
my opinion, a factual matter that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.”42 
 One of few critiques of the provisions themselves came from Phillip Stenning43 and Julian 
V. Roberts44 in 2001. In a controversial article they suggested the crisis of Indigenous 
overrepresentation was a fiction and that the Supreme Court had failed to offer evidence of a causal 
relationship between sentencing and overrepresentation.45 Interpreting various studies, Stenning 
                                               
36 Currently managing partner of Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP. 
37 Renée Pelletier, “The Nullification of Section 718.2(e): Aggravating Aboriginal Over-Representation in Canadian 
Prisons,” 39 Osgoode Hall LJ 469 (2001) at 471. 
38 Ibid at 479. 
39 Ibid at 474 and 480. 
40 Ibid at 475-6. 
41 Ibid at 481. 
42 Wells, supra note 16 at para 45. 
43 Criminologist, University of Cambridge. 
44 Criminologist, Griffith University. 
45 Phillip Stenning; Julian V. Roberts, “Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, and the Sentencing of 
Aboriginal Offenders,” 64 Sask L Rev 137 (2001) at 155.  
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and Roberts argued there was no evidence that Indigenous people received more or longer 
sentences, suggesting instead that they received shorter sentences in spite of longer criminal 
records.46 They contend that the social conditions outlined by the Court in Gladue affect other 
groups equally and should be ordinary considerations in the sentencing of any offender.47 In their 
view, this attempt to redress historical injustice “amounts to hijacking the sentencing process.”48 
While they argue that the provisions were meant to have no effect on serious crimes, in their view 
the only way for them to manifest is as a sentencing discount, particularly since the Court has 
provided judges with no guidance to steer their implementation.49  
Stenning and Roberts’ final assessment of the provisions and the decision is bleak, arguing 
it offers “little more than an empty promise to Aboriginal people and a bitter pill for sentencing 
judges who struggle to do the right thing, but become daily more aware of their powerlessness in 
the face of a situation far beyond their control.”50 This blunt assessment is the harshest offered by 
any scholar but elements of it remain apparent in the frustrations of many academics. Despite their 
dismissal of the scope of the crisis, Stenning and Roberts properly diagnosed the practical issues 
with the decision and its application.  
 In reaction to Stenning and Roberts, there was a special issue of the Saskatchewan Law 
Review in which other scholars responded to their views. Jean-Paul Brodeur51 took issue with their 
statistics but reserved his harshest criticisms for their refusal to acknowledge the unique nature of 
Indigenous social issues. Taken in their proper context, he argued, it is clear that Indigenous people 
are the most adversely affected by these issues, their communities are the most forlorn and 
devastated and they have suffered from the longest history of discrimination of any marginalized 
group in Canada.52 
 In the same issue, Rudin and Roach also rejected Stenning and Roberts’ claims. They 
argue that limitations in their data rendered meaningful conclusions impossible.53 That sentencing 
is not the cause of overrepresentation is irrelevant to Rudin and Roach, who point out that 
                                               
46 Ibid at 147-151. 
47 Ibid at 157-159. 
48 Ibid at 160. 
49 Ibid at 162-164. 
50 Ibid at 167. 
51 Criminologist at L’Université de Montréal. 
52 Jean-Paul Brodeur, “On the Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders: A Reaction to Stenning and Roberts,” 65 Sask L 
Rev 45, 52 (2002) at 49-50. 
53 Jonathan Rudin, Kent Roach, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Robert’s Empty Promises,” 65 Sask 
L Rev 3, 34 (2002) at 7-12. 
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sentencing is traditionally used to resolve issues not themselves caused by sentencing.54 For them, 
colonialism should be central to any consideration of the rationale behind section 718.2(e), since 
its purpose is to reduce overrepresentation in the prison system.55 Finally, they argue that if the 
desire is to reduce incarceration of Indigenous people, the focus should be on restraint in 
sentencing.56  
Another avenue of criticism of the Gladue factors relates to their philosophical 
underpinnings. Following Ipeelee, Jeanette Govikoglu57 criticized the Gladue framework arguing 
that the emphasis on sentencing ignored the wider societal problems bringing Indigenous people 
before the courts.58 She claims the Supreme Court denies power and autonomy to Indigenous 
peoples by constructing them as victims and reducing the voluntary nature of their conduct.59  By 
concentrating on an Indigenous offender’s reduced moral blameworthiness, she contends the 
Supreme Court is suggesting that voluntariness is reduced by trauma and so frames Indigenous 
peoples in the same manner as youthful offenders and the mentally ill.60 In what she calls a “new 
essentialism,” Gevikoglu argues that these ideas serve only to reinforce historical stereotypes.61 
By conflating Indigenous concepts of “healing” with restorative justice, she maintains that the 
Court is making Western concepts part of the Indigenous worldview. She suggests that real 
solutions to the issue are properly located in addressing claims to self-government and Indigenous 
approaches to criminal justice.62 In her view, these concerns are rarely remarked upon by scholars 
and judges.  
 Ten years after Gladue, Kent Roach analyzed its interpretation in the courts of appeal.63 
With the initial controversy over, the provinces and territories were in the process of erecting the 
infrastructure to implement the decision.64 Roach noted substantial regional variation but identified 
some commonalities. In his view, the courts of appeal were unwilling to extend the application to 
                                               
54 Ibid at 15. 
55 Ibid at 17-21. 
56 Ibid at 30. 
57 Public Prosecution Service of Canada. 
58 Jeannette Gevikoglu, “Ipeelee/Ladue and the Conundrum of Indigenous Identity in Sentencing,” 63 SCLR 205 
(2013) at 206. 
59 Ibid at 218. 
60 Ibid at 219. 
61 Ibid at 223. 
62 Ibid at 221-225. 
63 Kent Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal,” 54 Crim LQ 470 
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the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. He credited this phenomenon in part to 
successful Crown appeals restraining innovation by trial judges.65 Roach identified a near-
universal unwillingness by appeal courts to extend alternatives to imprisonment to serious 
offences.66 While this analysis was conducted pre-Ipeelee, his subsequent research indicates that 
there has been little innovation related to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent 
offences in the intervening decade.67  It may be unfair to place too much criticism at the feet of 
appeal courts. After all, they are tasked with applying the law as it exists and if trial courts are 
unable to produce decisions that satisfy the relevant aspects of the law, appeal courts will not 
endorse them. 
 In his own assessment after a decade before the courts, Jonathan Rudin suggested there 
was reason for optimism, though reliance on incarceration continued to treat symptoms rather than 
underlying conditions.68 While acknowledging that Gladue was not useful in crafting a different 
sentencing methodology, Rudin argues that this ignores how law reform is done.69 He suggests 
that legislatures have abdicated their responsibilities to the courts and this, combined with public 
indifference, limits the potential for change.70 Judicial creativity will not be possible without 
increased resources and for sentencing methodologies and procedures to change, governments will 
have to allocate resources to alternatives and the courts will have to modify procedures to 
recognize a different reality. This paper addresses the core issue in respect of the sentencing of 
offenders for serious and violent crimes. Courts are extremely limited in their capacity to create 
sanctions not outlined explicitly by law and absent actions by government, there can be no 
meaningful law reform based solely on a suggestion to reduce over-incarceration in one section of 
the Criminal Code.  
 In 2019, Kent Roach again examined the impact of Ipeelee in the courts of appeal.71 He 
argues that one “of the purposes of Ipeelee was to bring greater national uniformity to sentencing 
practices,” but that the independence granted to appeal courts “combined with the deference given 
                                               
65 Ibid at 479.  
66 Ibid at 505. 
67 Kent Roach, “Ipeelee in the Courts of Appeal: Some Progress but Much Work Remains,” (April 5, 2019). 
Available at SSRN. 
68 Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepresentation Post-Gladue: A Realistic Assessment of How Social 
Change Occurs,” 54 Crim LQ 447, 469 (2009) at 447-449. 
69 Ibid at 453-4. 
70 Ibid at 455-6. 
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to trial judges allow considerable divergence in sentencing practices.”72 Professor Roach found 
that outcomes were “mixed but run to negative,” explaining that: 
 
On the one hand, the increasing willingness among some Courts of Appeal to relate 
Gladue background factors to an offender’s moral blameworthiness follows from 
the Court’s clear signal in Ipeelee and is in my view a positive development. At the 
same time, however, the appellate engagement with moral blameworthiness 
analysis has generally been superficial in the sense of failing to explain exactly how 
Gladue factors can reduce moral blameworthiness and not explaining how they 
affect the sentencing purposes of deterrence, denunciation and incapacitation that 
judges generally stress in serious cases. In addition, much of the application of 
Ipeelee at the appellate level still relates to rehabilitation which will often receive 
less weight in serious cases. Finally appellate courts have not approved (or 
disapproved) of alternatives to imprisonment informed either by Indigenous law or 
by restorative justice. All of these findings are consistent with overall conclusions 
that Gladue is applied differently in different parts of Canada and that it continues 
to fail to reduce growing Indigenous overrepresentation in prison.73 
 
Roach analyzed the application of Ipeelee in each of the provincial courts of appeal and offered 
his assessment of how the principles from the case were being applied.  
 Professor Roach found that the British Columbia Court of Appeal related background 
factors to moral blameworthiness “though often not without fully explaining how factors relate to 
each of these purposes.74 He suggests that the Alberta Court of Appeal jurisprudence demonstrated 
“some recognition of the relevance of Gladue factors to moral blameworthiness, but a reluctance 
to relate them to the punitive purposes of deterrence and denunciation and corresponding modest 
reductions in sentences on the basis of decreased moral blameworthiness.”75 With respect to 
Saskatchewan, Roach found that the court of appeal recognized and elaborated “on the relationship 
between Ipeelee and moral blameworthiness,” however, “in most of its cases the Court of Appeal 
has not found reduced moral blameworthiness” and when it has “the reductions in sentence have 
been modest.”76 
                                               
72 Ibid at 1. 
73 Ibid at 2-3. 
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 Professor Roach argues that the Manitoba Court of Appeal is reluctant to make findings of 
reduced moral blameworthiness and “may with the exception of cases where Gladue factors relate 
to rehabilitation be the most resistant to following Ipeelee and in appropriate cases relating these 
factors to moral blameworthiness.”77 He credits the Ontario Court of Appeal with leading the way 
in the expansion of Gladue beyond the realm of sentencing78 but suggests that while there were 
indications in Kreko79 that the court recognized the connection between background factors and 
moral blameworthiness, “it did not fully explain how this would be achieved and this may help to 
explain a series of subsequent cases where the Court of Appeal seemed to assume that Gladue 
factors will not be relevant to the objectives of deterrence, denunciation, and incapacitation.”80  
 Professor Roach summarizes his findings of the impact of Ipeelee in provincial appellate 
courts by arguing that: 
 
This concern about the generally under-developed and under-theorized relation of 
background factors to punitive sentencing purposes is re-enforced by the frequent 
reference in Court of Appeal decisions about background factors not being an 
“excuse” or providing a “discount” for a sentence. This implicit but often 
unexamined assumption in such conclusions is that length of imprisonment must 
increase with the need to punish, deter or denounce serious crimes and to 
incapacitate offenders. Indeed, the failure to relate background factors to punitive 
purposes of sentencing and the new slogans of no “excuse” or “discount” have 
produced new shortcuts that have replaced the old shortcuts for not applying 
Gladue in serious cases that the Supreme Court attempted to correct in Ipeelee.81 
 
Roach concludes by suggesting that half of the provincial courts of appeal have related background 
factors to more blameworthiness in their analysis but even those courts require further elaboration 
on the subject if they are to inform the actions of trial courts.82 
 David Milward and Debra Parkes83 argued in 2011 that the successful implementation of 
the Gladue provisions in Manitoba are hampered by three myths: that they were not to be 
considered for serious crimes; that prison works for Indigenous people; and that Indigenous 
                                               
77 Ibid at 20. 
78 Ibid at 20. 
79 R v Kreko, 2016 ONCA 367. 
80 Roach, “Ipeelee in the Courts of Appeal”, supra note 67 at 23. 
81 Ibid at 28. 
82 Ibid at 28. 
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overrepresentation was an intractable problem.84 They argue that continued emphasis on 
denunciation and deterrence in violent crime has limited the effect of the provisions and runs 
counter to Gladue.85 As a result, the reliance of the courts on incarceration has compounded the 
situation as prison is ineffective in rehabilitating Indigenous people. They suggest that the lack of 
culturally-relevant programs in communities and the correctional system means that recourse to 
incarceration only aggravates what it is meant to alleviate.86 Milward and Parkes argue that the 
problem is intractable when seen through the lens of sentencing alone. Increased funding for the 
criminal justice system will not address the problem unless it is supplemented by resources for 
addressing social problems.87 The authors are correct that continued emphasis on denunciatory and 
punitive aspects of sentencing law are substantial barriers to the aims of the provisions. Unless 
judges can reorient their thinking toward a different methodology, innovation in sentencing for 
serious crimes will founder on the traditional common law and statutory principles of sentencing.  
 Julian V. Roberts and Andrew Reid88 studied admissions to custody since 1978 to ascertain 
changes in the rates of Indigenous incarceration. They determined that remedial reforms had been 
ineffective and the problem has become more serious.89 Roberts and Reid argue that there will be 
no progress in arresting the crisis unless federal and provincial governments make greater efforts 
to ensure their application, create a more ambitious sentencing methodology and recognize that 
neither of these will address the underlying social conditions.90 They argue that section 718.2(e) 
and Gladue are insufficient and it is beyond the power of courts to address the crisis. They 
recommend five possible approaches: (1) a separate sentencing code for Indigenous people; (2) a 
strengthening of the provision itself – possibly with a rebuttable presumption against 
imprisonment; (3) requiring that certain criteria be met before imprisonment is imposed - similar 
to youth criminal justice reforms; (4) adoption of an Indigenous sentencing guideline; or, (5) 
adoption by Parliament of reforms that are general in nature but would benefit Indigenous 
peoples.91 It seems unlikely that Parliament is interested in creating potentially unpopular revisions 
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to the Criminal Code; instead it appears that this issue will remain the purview of the courts. 
Nonetheless, they are correct that if the Supreme Court continues to be unwilling to step in and 
outline the parameters of a different methodology, Parliament may feel compelled to provide that 
guidance.  
 Brent Knazan92 offered a view from the bench on how the provisions should function. In 
his view, Gladue was a departure from the orthodoxy that everyone is treated equally and without 
bias by the courts and this requires a changed legal environment for sentencing Indigenous 
offenders.93 Knazan does not specify the contours of such a changed environment, but this 
presumably refers to the idea of a different methodology for sentencing Indigenous offenders 
discussed in Wells. This different method of analysis to determine a fit sentence is particularly 
relevant to traditional aggravating factors. For example, where a prior criminal record is a 
statutorily-recognized aggravating factor, Knazan believes it should qualify as mitigating for 
Indigenous people.94  
Knazan is concerned with crafting alternative sanctions while recognizing that they can 
still include a punitive element. He believes that alternatives to imprisonment do not mean that an 
offender effectively escapes punishment but rather that some alternatives could be provided that 
both punish the offender and aid in their rehabilitation. Knazan bemoans the lack of resources and 
argues that until they are in place, community sanctions and alternative sentences will not be 
possible.95 Without alternative sanctions, he concludes that the project of sentencing Indigenous 
people differently is an unrealistic one. 
 
3. Empirical Studies 
 There have been four empirical studies conducted to ascertain the effects of the provisions 
to date. The first was undertaken in 2008 by Andrew Welsh96 and James Ogloff.97 They analyzed 
691 randomly selected cases pre- and post-Bill C-41 to determine the weight given to different 
aggravating and mitigating factors and their relationship to an offender’s Indigenous status. They 
concluded that seriousness of offence and length of criminal record were the factors most closely 
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linked to longer sentences, while plea agreements and pre-trial detention were the mitigating 
factors most closely linked with shorter sentences.98 While Indigenous offenders are more likely 
to have a criminal record and to be charged with a violent offence, this study suggests there is 
otherwise no difference in the probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.99  
 Their sample set was randomly selected from Quicklaw and compared cases before and 
after the passage of the reforms in 1996. They excluded cases involving minimum sentences, 
dangerous offender applications, and Gladue Reports100 since their purpose “was to evaluate the 
section 718.2(e) provision and not, specifically, the impact of the R v Gladue decision.”101 After 
controlling for other variables, they determined that “Aboriginal offenders were neither more or 
less likely to receive a custodial disposition by virtue of their Aboriginal status.”102 Welsh and 
Ogloff conclude that a balance between considerations of Indigenous status in combination with 
the presence of aggravating factors may account for the absence of an effect on sentencing 
outcomes.103  This study is useful in its methodology but its focus on the effects of the Criminal 
Code provisions to the exclusion of the decision in Gladue is too narrow and the comparisons 
between pre- and post-reform sentencing does not account for the wider overhaul of practices 
undertaken at the time. By sampling without regard to offence, it is difficult to appreciate the utility 
of the custodial/non-custodial sentencing divide in their study.  
 A second empirical study of the impacts of section 718.2(e) was conducted by Gillian 
Balfour in 2012.104 This study analyzed 168 decisions dealing with serious personal injury offences 
(61 of them appeals) between 1996 and 2004.105 She acknowledges that the data set is limited to 
decisions made by reporting services and that the absence of sentences reached through plea 
bargaining is also an issue for her analysis. However, she argues that since reported decisions are 
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those considered by judges, these cases form the “dominant sentencing discourses.”106 The data 
suggests that there is variance between provinces, with those jurisdictions with large Indigenous 
populations seeing an increased likelihood of custodial sentences for Indigenous offenders, 
particularly in the territories.107  
 Balfour notes that no aggravating or mitigating factors were mentioned in 70% of cases 
and that a defendant’s Indigenous background was only mentioned in 19% of cases, most often in 
sexual assault cases where the offender was male.108 The aggravating and mitigating factors most 
commonly cited by judges for Indigenous people were those most frequently cited for all offenders. 
Those mitigating factors identified as applying to Indigenous people in particular, such as 
economic deprivation, cultural dislocation, family breakdown and systemic racism, were not 
subject to judicial notice in the decisions she examined.109 The most common aggravating factor 
cited in relation to Indigenous offenders was the risk of re-offending, which she found in 30% of 
all cases. Denunciation and deterrence dominated considerations and restorative justice goals were 
least likely to be cited.110 Balfour believes this is evidence of an inability on the part of sentencing 
judges to move beyond the accepted common law principles of sentencing when dealing with 
Indigenous offenders convicted of serious and violent crime.111 The study provides a useful 
framework for assessing the operation of mitigating and aggravating factors in decisions. 
However, it suffers from the same flaw as Welsh and Ogloff in that the data set is drawn from both 
pre- and post-Gladue decisions. This creates an additional variable complicating the comparison 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Her concentration on serious crimes is useful 
because it allows a closer examination of the thorniest practical aspect of the application of the 
provisions which this study also looks to examine.  
 The most relevant of the empirical studies to this project, as it deals with analyzing 
Gladue’s application to manslaughter sentencing, was conducted by Anna Johnson112 and Paul 
Millar113 in 2016. They studied all reported manslaughter sentencing decisions from Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan for two periods, the first between 1989-1997 and the second between 1998-2012. 
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The cases were drawn only from QuickLaw and produced 105 results. After removing those with 
life sentences, 95 cases remained.114 The cases were analyzed to determine sentence length, 
imposition of a conditional sentence, Aboriginal status, gender, prior history of violence, and trial 
type.115 This was done to determine the effect of these variables on sentence.  
While they found that sentences were longer for Indigenous offenders, the difference was 
not statistically significant. They concluded that efforts at reducing the rates of incarceration for 
Indigenous persons have not succeeded.116 However, the authors admit that in light of the small 
and incomplete sample size combined with a lack of Indigenous identification in earlier cases, they 
were unable to determine whether an offender’s Indigenous status played a role in determining 
sentence.117  While this study is interesting and closely in line with the one conducted here, its 
limitations are evident. A purely empirical analysis of sentence length only serves to illustrate one 
aspect of how the provisions and case law are implemented. While numbers on their own are useful 
in determining outcomes, they should be contextualized through a critical reading of the decisions 
to ascertain how the provisions are being understood and applied by judges.  
 The most recent study was conducted by Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau118 and Marie-Ève 
Sylvestre119 and examined the application of the Gladue provisions in a selection of decisions from 
trial and appeal courts. They argue that innovative sentencing practices for Indigenous offenders 
are discounted by judges leading to what they term a “judicial resistance” to the Supreme Court 
meant to protect the state’s monopoly on punishment.120 This paper randomly sampled 635 
decisions released between 2012-2015 from three databases,121 dealing with the sentencing of 
Indigenous offenders post-Ipeelee. The decisions were analyzed with respect to the sentencing 
court’s adherence to the two steps in Gladue: the unique background and systemic factors and the 
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types of sentencing procedures appropriate in the circumstances.122 The research found sixty-one 
decisions deeming the provisions inapplicable altogether because the offence was serious.123 
 With respect to the systemic and background factors, this paper distinguished between 
cases where they were applied satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily. Unsatisfactory decisions were 
those where the logic of the considerations could not be understood. Satisfactory cases were those 
where a minimal recognition of the factors could be discerned. This was determined to be the case 
in only 20% of decisions.124 The authors believe that one major difficulty limiting the application 
of the provisions was the inability of judges to conceive of how moral culpability could be limited 
by the systemic and background factors.125 
 This study determined that sentencing judges barely attended to the second stage of Gladue 
at all. Denis-Boileau and Sylvestre argue that the types of penalties employed have not changed 
since Ipeelee and that trial judges continue to prefer incarceration for Indigenous offenders in 87% 
of decisions.126 Moderation as a principle was applied satisfactorily in one case in five, seven of 
those were cases in which “the judge attempted to adapt the type of sanction and the procedure to 
the Indigenous heritage of the accused,” and only three of those resulted in sentencing circles.127  
The authors credit these limitations to many of the same sources as earlier studies, such as a lack 
of community resources, a lack of judicial resources, a dearth of Gladue Reports, and the volume 
of files.128 However, they go further in their criticism, suggesting that despite these limitations, it 
is the inability of judges to move outside punitive sanctions or consider legal pluralism with respect 
to Indigenous legal traditions that causes the analysis to be set aside in serious cases.129 
 Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau and Marie-Ève Sylvestre suggest these failures are partially 
a result of the Supreme Court declining to provide guidance for crafting such sentences. In practice, 
they suggest that many judges cannot see how to apply the provisions and “some judges simply 
include the expression ‘Gladue factors’ among the mitigating circumstances in their judgments, 
or, failing anything better, lean towards a reduction of the sentence handed down.”130 In their view, 
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the second stage of Gladue is an invitation to rethink punishment and the process of sentencing 
altogether. They argue this creates a contact zone for legal pluralism where judges can engage with 
alternatives and acknowledge Indigenous legal orders.131 The paper concludes that judges should 
look to Indigenous legal orders and Indigenous communities in developing innovative sentencing 
practices.132 This study’s narrow temporal focus is useful and it has produced an admirably in-
depth analysis of the considerations at play in these cases. However, their examination of whether 
decisions produced custodial sentences or not is complicated by the variety of offences covered by 
the 635 decisions studied, many of which would not necessarily have carried a presumption of a 
custodial sentence.  
 
4. Gladue Reports  
 The difficulties encountered by the courts in applying Gladue lies partially with a failure 
to provide courts and justice system actors with the information required to craft appropriate 
sentences. In the immediate aftermath of the Gladue decision, critics pointed out that in order for 
this new regime to function further resources be made available to the courts. This was particularly 
true with respect to Indigenous-specific pre-sentence reports, the preparation of which would 
require paying someone.133 These criticisms were prescient, both for recognizing that Gladue 
Reports would materialize but also for anticipating that funding for them would not and any 
funding that did would be piecemeal.  
 There are no formal processes for the production of Gladue Reports in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.134 
Alberta is the only jurisdiction that directly assumes responsibility for these reports by funding 
and assigning them.135 In other jurisdictions where they are available, Gladue Reports are produced 
by a network of independent contractors or local organizations with funding and therefore supply 
limited. The province of Ontario has twenty-five full-time Gladue writers producing some 750 
reports annually. These are funded in part by the Ministry of the Attorney General, Legal Aid 
Ontario and the federal government but the workers themselves are drawn from a collection of 
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non-profits, First Nations, and Indigenous organizations.136 The small numbers of reports produced 
annually in Ontario means that they are not widely available, with one study finding that Gladue 
Reports were only mentioned explicitly in one third of sentencing decisions involving Indigenous 
offenders.137 
 As a consequence of this scattered and under-resourced approach to furnishing judges with 
information, the necessary preconditions of crafting individualized sentences taking into account 
the Gladue factors are not consistently available. This is in spite of the requirement that the 
Supreme Court placed upon counsel and judges to procure this information.138 This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that, unlike pre-sentence reports, there is no Criminal Code section 
providing for Gladue Reports. Consequently, some judges do not feel able to order their 
production.139 Courts are forced to rely on the limited capacity of non-governmental entities to 
produce reports in those jurisdictions where they are available at all. This state of affairs, while 
not fatal to the functioning of the provisions, represents a serious impediment to their effectiveness 
as, across the justice system, a lack of money is causing serious problems. 
 
5. Application of Gladue in the Courts 
 The application of the Gladue provisions in practice demonstrates the difficulties for the 
courts in considering background and systemic factors and crafting sentences incorporating them. 
The Gladue provisions were adopted with the intention of reducing the overrepresentation of 
Indigenous people in prison and so far they have not achieved this aim. Indigenous people 
accounted for 30% of all admissions to sentenced custody in 2014-5 while accounting for only 4% 
of the population.140 This figure is interesting when compared with earlier ones. Following the 
Gladue decision in 2000-1, Indigenous people accounted for only 15% of admissions to sentenced 
custody,141 at a time when they represented 3.3% of Canada’s population.142 The continuing 
overincarceration of Indigenous people may be partially explained by demographic factors, in that 
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the Indigenous population is generally younger than the population overall,143 although this is not 
sufficient to explain the general failure of the provisions to reduce over-incarceration. 
 Despite the passages dealing with the need to consider background and systemic factors in 
Gladue and Ipeelee, the Supreme Court provided scant guidance for crafting appropriate sentences 
to accommodate them. The Supreme Court is ultimately limited in its capacity to offer in-depth 
guidance to sentencing judges without real alternative sanctions to which sentencing judges can 
refer. Parliament, as the author of the country’s criminal law and the provinces and territories as 
its administrators, have largely failed to build and fund widespread alternatives to which trial 
judges can direct offenders. 
The provisions have been applied differently by courts in different provinces. It is accepted 
practice in Canada that different jurisdictions will have different approaches to sentencing.144 Kent 
Roach views the issue of regional variation in the application of Gladue as troubling given that 
section 718.2(e) was designed to remedy overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples across 
Canada.145 In his most recent study of the impact of the provisions in the courts of appeal, Professor 
Roach found that different jurisdictions tended to concentrate on different aspects of the 
provisions. Professor Roach found that: 
 
The Alberta and Saskatchewan Courts of Appeal have provided the most sustained 
analysis of how background circumstances can reduce moral blameworthiness 
while making only modest reductions in sentences on such basis. More recently, 
the BC, PEI and the Quebec Courts of Appeal appear more willing to make 
significant reductions of the type seen in Ipeelee on the basis that Gladue factors 
have reduced moral blameworthiness. The Manitoba and New Brunswick Courts 
of Appeal emerge as those that have been the most resistant to applying Gladue in 
serious cases. None of the Courts of Appeal have systematically related background 
factors to the effectiveness of deterrence, denunciation or incapacitation in 
responding to offending. This suggests that judicial engagement with how Gladue 
factors can affect moral blameworthiness has been generally superficial. 
 
Many Courts of Appeal including the Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador 
Courts of Appeal continue to stress the rehabilitative purposes of sentencing in their 
considerations of Gladue. Although consistent with the Supreme Court’s original 
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message in Gladue, this discounts the Court’s recognition in Ipeelee that 
background factors can reduce moral blameworthiness and may lessen the use of 
Gladue in more serious cases where courts will stress the punitive purposes of 
sentencing.  
 
Finally, almost none of the Court of Appeal decisions applying Ipeelee dealt with 
creative alternatives to imprisonment involving victims and communities. This 
does not mean that such sentences are never used especially in cases where the 
Crown supports alternatives to imprisonment, but it does mean that Crowns and 
trial judges have not received positive signals from their Courts of Appeal to 
encourage such experimentation.146 
 
Sentencing decisions are based in the jurisprudence of the relevant court of appeal and a lack of 
direction in sentencing will determine the range of sentences that trial judges view as acceptable 
for similar crimes and similarly situated offenders.147 The Supreme Court in Ipeelee stated that 
sentencing is a highly individualized process in which the sentencing judge is given a high degree 
of deference.148 This is true in respect of all offenders who are sentenced, Indigenous and non-
Indigenous alike. However, judicial sentencing determinations are based on submissions from 
counsel and are drawn from similar cases considered by the court of appeal.  
 The reluctance of appeal courts to stray from conventional sentencing has likely caused 
trial judges to limit the originality of their decisions. This problem extends beyond concerns with 
appellate intervention. Despite Ipeelee, research indicates that the types of penalties imposed by 
judges have not changed and incarceration continues to be the preferred response to crimes 
committed by Indigenous offenders.149 These offenders may be less likely to be understood by the 
courts as subjects for rehabilitation and retributive factors prevail in sentencing.150 
 An inability to understand and apply the provisions continues to be a particular problem 
with the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. It has been argued that traditional 
sentencing considerations override Gladue considerations in such cases and limit their impact.151 
Many judges appear unable to conceive of how an offender’s moral blameworthiness can be 
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reduced with reference to the systemic and background factors.152 In one study, denunciation and 
deterrence were most frequently mentioned in respect of serious crimes and restorative goals least 
frequently, leading the author to conclude that sentencing judges were incapable of moving beyond 
common law principles in determining sentence.153 It has been suggested that this is the result of 
an outsized emphasis on individual responsibility and a refusal of judges to consider the context 
of the individual in their decisions.154 It has also been suggested that attempts at alternative 
approaches to sentencing are “confounded by staggering rates of interpersonal violence and the 
lack of community capacity” within Indigenous communities to deal with these issues reveals the 
“limits of law reforms… in the space of profound deprivation.”155  
Whatever the judicial reasoning, it appears that judges are reticent to set aside traditional 
considerations in sentencing serious crime and fall back on the established methods employed for 
non-Indigenous offenders.  Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau and Marie-Ève Sylvestre have suggested 
that this is evidence of a judicial resistance against the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ipeelee and 
Gladue conducted in defence of the state’s monopoly on punishment.156 This is only true in the 
sense that judges have frequently abided by traditional considerations in crafting sentences but it 
points to a combination of genuine confusion and a dearth of resources rather than to active 
resistance. If there were more resources available to the judiciary, there could be more judicial 
creativity.157 Sentencing decisions suggest that judges would like to utilize more creative options 
and would like the Supreme Court of Canada to provide additional guidance as to what forms they 
might take but believe they have failed twice to do so.158 
The Supreme Court’s lack of guidance is itself a reflection of the limited resources existing 
for non-custodial sanctions for Indigenous people. In the immediate aftermath of Gladue, this 
weakness was identified as one of the main impediments to the successful application of the 
provisions, particularly within Indigenous communities themselves.159 In reflecting on the practice 
in his own court, Justice Knazan also argued that greater community resources would substantially 
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increase the options available for crafting meaningful sentences.160 Those programs that do exist 
are few, underfunded and resourced, and vary greatly by region.  
 
6. Community Alternatives 
Placing blame at the feet of the Supreme Court for failing to outline appropriate responses, 
in Jonathan Rudin’s view, ignores how law reform works in Canada.161 It should be remembered 
that Parliament and the legislatures have not responded to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
section 718.2(e). Having passed the provisions into law, Parliament was largely satisfied to have 
the provisions themselves do the work of reducing overrepresentation. Parliament has made no 
further innovations with respect to the Criminal Code’s sentencing provisions dealing with 
Indigenous offenders and the legislatures of the provinces and territories have not built a 
sophisticated infrastructure to provide culturally-appropriate alternatives to their jails.162 
 Scholars have recognized that there is a deficiency in culturally-appropriate resources 
available in communities.163 A lack of options for sentencing offenders outside the correctional 
system constrains judges and increases the likelihood that they will rely on imprisonment to 
achieve the goals of sentencing. It is hardly ground breaking to suggest that the criminal justice 
system lacks resources, its attempts to respond to the ruling on delay in Jordan stands witness to 
this but resource limitations nonetheless plague the system at every stage.164 We have already seen 
the piecemeal availability of Gladue Reports at sentencing, where most justice system participants 
report that culturally-relevant information is still brought forward mostly through pre-sentence 
reports.165  
 The problems in crafting culturally-appropriate sentences result from of a lack of resources 
in the community. The Department of Justice Aboriginal Justice Strategy (“AJS”) is a cost-sharing 
program directed by the federal government which provides financial support for Indigenous 
community justice programs “grounded in principles of restorative justice and Indigenous Legal 
Traditions… designed to reflect the culture and values of the community in which they are 
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situated.”166 In 2015-16, this program provided $15 million in funding for roughly 200 community-
based justice programs serving 750 rural and urban Indigenous communities.167 These programs, 
while they vary in size and scope, are designed to provide pre-trial diversion programming as well 
as culturally-appropriate sanctions and are accessed by way of police and Crown referral.  
 A Department of Justice survey of the program found that half of Crown attorneys said 
they were “a little,” “to a small extent,” or “somewhat” aware of the programs in their region. This 
lack of awareness of programs is a significant impediment to accessing them. However, even 
among Crown attorneys familiar with the programs, there was reluctance to recommend their use. 
Crowns were split evenly between those who viewed the sanctions as culturally appropriate and 
recommended their use and those who did not and refused to recommend them.168  
 The Department of Justice assessment also found that the programs were troubled by a lack 
of quality and consistency, insufficient and unstable funding, and high staff turnover. Communities 
were often unable to supplement federal grants with additional funds, the level of training for staff 
and volunteers was inconsistent due to a lack of stable funding and resources which in turn led to 
high turnover, and there was a “lack of recognized core competencies for various types of programs 
and services.”169 While programs are available across the country, their application and quality is 
inconsistent. Funding is so limited that the Department of Justice found it allowed “communities 
to hire minimal staff (in some cases, only a single part-time person) to operate programs along 
with volunteers or other staff paid through other sources.”170  
 A lack of funding is a barrier to the availability of alternative and culturally-appropriate 
sanctions and this is due in part to a lack of political will. A $15 million annual expenditure by the 
Government of Canada is insignificant in budgetary terms. The unevenness in program quality and 
issues with staff training alone demonstrate that current levels of funding are insufficient.  Given 
that these programs are community based and intended to provide culturally-relevant programming 
for Indigenous peoples, there may be reticence on the part of governments to attach too many 
specific requirements to funding. Notwithstanding a desire to adopt a hands-off approach to the 
management of Indigenous community justice programs, if government wants them to function 
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efficiently and to see more frequent prosecutorial referrals, there will need to be increased funding 
accompanied by some directives regarding the kinds of programs that they will need to provide.  
It is important to note that these organizations do not simply provide alternative sanctions 
for offenders, they also respond to the needs of victims and other members of the community.171 
The impact of this expanded mandate on these organization is further exacerbated by the limited 
nature of funding arrangements which often last only for a prescribed period of time, impacting 
the capacity of organizations to plan effectively.172  Arguably, until these programs benefit from 
stable funding and political support, their potential to impact the crisis facing Indigenous peoples 
in the criminal justice system will remain an open question. Given their limited nature and spotty 
financing, it is impossible to tell if they have or could have a real impact in addressing the intended 
purpose of the Gladue provisions.173  
 
7. Corrections 
 Like the community justice programs that are designed to provide community-based 
services to offenders, a lack of programs and services also plagues the correctional system. In one 
study of sentencing decisions, a considerable number of judges spoke of their hope that the 
offender would be able to avail themselves of Indigenous-specific programming during their 
imprisonment.174 This is a refrain heard frequently among sentencing judges who determine that 
there is no recourse except imprisonment. Justice Knazan argued that the availability of such 
programs is a consideration in crafting an appropriate sentence for Indigenous offenders.175 
Despite the need for culturally-relevant correctional programming, they do not tend to be available 
in provincial prisons due to the limitation on programs and resources in these institutions and the 
short length of sentences.176  
The short length of terms notwithstanding, 96% of all custodial sentences are served in 
provincial and territorial institutions.177 This suggests that there should be an increased focus on 
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the provision of Indigenous-specific services by the provinces and territories. Some jurisdictions, 
such as the Northwest Territories, have dealt with this issue by entering into exchange of service 
agreements with the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) that allow offenders sentenced to a 
term greater than two years to serve their time in a territorial institution at the recommendation of 
the sentencing court.178 Though federal penitentiaries are better equipped to provide programs for 
inmates than territorial institutions, some judges believe that allowing an Indigenous offender to 
serve their time in a culturally relevant and familiar environment in their own region will do more 
to aid their rehabilitation than CSC programming.179 
 Federal penitentiaries tend to provide more involved rehabilitative programs for offenders 
than their provincial counterparts and the same is true of culturally-specific programs for 
Indigenous people. The CSC has suggested that “[s]ome institutions in the Prairies Provinces can 
be considered ‘Indigenous Prisons’,” such as the Stony Mountain Institution and the Saskatchewan 
Penitentiary, where 58% and 59% of inmates are Indigenous.180 In recognition of the particular 
issues facing Indigenous people in federal custody, the CSC operates the Elder Service Program 
which “supports the delivery of ceremonial services, participation in the delivery of Aboriginal 
correctional programs and establishing and maintaining partnerships to help offenders reintegrate 
into the community.”181 However, the CSC admits that these programs are under-staffed and 
under-resourced and that this has taken a toll on the provision of services within the system.182  
 Alongside its attempts to provide services within federal institutions, the CSC has also 
established healing lodges, either on their own or operated by Indigenous communities pursuant 
to an agreement with the CSC under section 81 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.183 
Healing lodges exist to “assist the successful reintegration of Indigenous offenders by using 
traditional healing approaches and holistic and culturally appropriate programming.”184 At present, 
the CSC operates four lodges with a total of 60 beds for women and 210 for men while Indigenous 
communities operate a further five lodges under the auspices of section 81 of the CCRA with 16 
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beds for women and 131 for men.185 These healing lodges are located only in Quebec and western 
Canada, leaving large portions of the country to do without. This is particularly troublesome given 
that no lodges exist in any of the three territories, where the Indigenous proportion of the 
population is highest.  
 The CSC has found a number of significant shortcomings in its analysis of the program. 
Availability across the country was not the only geographic issue, the CSC conceded that most 
Indigenous offenders will eventually be released into urban centres rather than Indigenous 
communities where most of these facilities are located. They determined that to increase their 
effectiveness and relevance, the CSC would need to concentrate on developing ties to urban 
Indigenous organizations for offenders on conditional release.186  Because 70% of Indigenous 
inmates will be released to urban communities, the CSC hopes to expand the operation of healing 
lodges from First Nations’ territory to lodges organized by urban Indigenous organizations.187 
Besides the limitations of geography, the capacity of these facilities is also a concern. In 2012, 
healing lodges could accommodate no more than 2% of Indigenous inmates in the federal 
penitentiary system and less than 20% of those held in minimum-security facilities.188  
 There are also issues with community-run lodges operated in partnership with the CSC. 
The Office of the Correctional Investigator noted that many Indigenous communities, like non-
Indigenous communities, had no desire to play host to offenders.189 As with much of the system 
erected to support the implementation of the Gladue provisions, Indigenous communities and 
Indigenous-run justice organizations are frequently not compensated for their services but asked 
to volunteer their time and resources. In the context of healing lodges in particular, members of 
the communities in which they are located were being asked to monitor the compliance of 
offenders without compensation.190 Like those organizations funded by the AJS, section 81 healing 
lodges were found to be under-resourced and their staff underpaid.191 These programs are not 
without value but they are small in scale and, as can be seen with many community justice 
programs in Canada, under resourced and dependant on voluntary contributions of community 
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labour and effort. As with other aspects of the support structure for the Gladue provisions, 
governments are attempting to achieve these goals with a minimum of expense.  
 
8. Prosecutorial Discretion and Diversion 
 All actors in the criminal justice system play critical roles in ensuring that the Gladue 
provisions are implemented successfully. The Supreme Court has called directly upon counsel and 
judges to inform themselves of an offender’s Indigenous status and to take steps to acquire the 
relevant information. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a key aspect of the system and it 
is at this stage that decisions are made that will substantially impact what follows. Depending on 
the circumstances of the case, prosecutors can divert matters, lay charges carrying mandatory 
minimums, choose to proceed by indictment or summary conviction, or temper their sentencing 
submissions. Prosecutorial decisions and directives represent an important facet of the application 
of the Gladue factors in practice. In order for courts to craft sentences that see an impact by the 
Gladue provisions, Crown counsel will have to take the Gladue considerations into effect when 
they make submissions before the court. 
Given that the Gladue principles are remedial in nature, Marie Manikis192 has argued that 
to achieve this end, they should be “recognized as a stand-alone principle that also applies to all 
decision-making processes by criminal justice agencies that have the power to restrict an 
Aboriginal person’s liberty.”193 The decision to prosecute at all or how to proceed has outsized 
effects going forward. Consequently, Manikis argues, the background and systemic factors and 
their relationship to the offender should be considered by prosecutors before charges are laid 
against Indigenous accused.194 
 In the context of deportation proceedings undertaken against an Indigenous respondent, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in United States v Leonard offered the proposition that the Gladue 
factors should be considered by “all decision-makers who have the power to influence the 
treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system… whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty 
is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.”195 The court determined that “[t]he sound exercise 
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of prosecutorial discretion is fundamental to the fair administration of criminal justice. The 
decisions of prosecutors have enormous implications for accused persons and for the justice 
system” and “[g]iven the importance of prosecutorial discretion to the administration of Canadian 
justice and to the extradition process, I cannot accept the proposition that Gladue principles have 
no bearing on their exercise.”196  
The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in Leonard but rendered a judgment on the 
issue in 2014. In Anderson, the Court narrowly applied the judgment from the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, noting that it was only meant to apply in respect of deportation proceedings.197 Justice 
Moldaver wrote for a unanimous Court that: 
 
both Gladue and Ipeelee speak to the sentencing obligations of judges to craft a 
proportionate sentence for Aboriginal offenders. They make no mention of 
prosecutorial discretion and do not support Mr. Anderson’s argument that 
prosecutors must consider Aboriginal status when making a decision that limits the 
sentencing options available to a judge. Mr. Anderson’s argument in effect equates 
the duty of the judge and the prosecutor, but there is no basis in law to support 
equating their distinct roles in the sentencing process.198 
 
The Court held that prosecutorial discretion is immune to review on the basis of an accused’s 
Indigenous status. However, given the interest of all levels of government in pursuing a reduction 
in the over-incarceration of Indigenous people this does not preclude voluntary policies on the part 
of attorneys general and directors of public prosecutions.  
 The Department of Justice’s assessment of Gladue practices nationwide found that only 
two of eleven districts had formal prosecutorial directives concerning Indigenous accused.199 
Neither the Public Prosecution Service of Canada nor any of the four western provinces have 
specific Indigenous charging policies in their Crown prosecution manuals and each make only 
passing mention of Indigenous persons in practice directives concerning alternatives measures and 
diversion.200 The most comprehensive policy comes from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
                                               
196 Ibid 86-87. 
197 R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41 at para 27.  
198 Ibid  at para 25 [Emphasis in original]. 
199 April and Orsi, “Gladue Practices,” supra note 165 at 14. 
200 Public Prosecution Service of Canada, “Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook,” (https://www.ppsc-
sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf) at 3 section 3.8; British Columbia Prosecution Service, 
“Crown Policy Manual – Alternative Measures for Adult Offenders,” (https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-
crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/prosecution-service/crown-counsel-policy-manual/alt-1.pdf); Alberta Justice and 
 
 
36 
 
General. Ontario’s practice directive on Indigenous people speaks to the importance of 
relationships between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, diversion, bail, sentencing, Gladue 
Reports, and Indigenous communities with particular reference to supports available to the 
offender and to victims.201 While this practice directive is comprehensive, the policy makes no 
particular reference to the exercise of restraint in prosecution but rather urges knowledge of and 
sensitivity to Indigenous considerations.  As will be addressed in chapter 3, this research suggests 
that Crown attorneys in some jurisdictions have a tendency to make submissions for longer 
sentences in certain sub-types of manslaughter than others and this can affect the length of sentence 
for Indigenous offenders. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 The academic analysis of the Gladue provisions suggests that practical guidelines for their 
application to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crime have not crystalized in the trial 
courts. This state of affairs is partially explained by a lack of guidance provided by the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeal. However, it is equally apparent that both levels of government have 
failed to raise an infrastructure that would provide support for Indigenous offenders both within 
and outside the correctional system. As with most areas of government, a lack of funding has 
prevented the effective creation of programs to support Indigenous offenders and provide judges 
with Gladue Reports in the majority of cases. The following chapter addresses the manner in which 
sentencing is conducted in Canada and the approaches that the courts of appeal have taken to 
sentencing manslaughter in the jurisdictions being examined in this study.  
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Chapter Three: Manslaughter Sentencing in Canada 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter begins by outlining the general purposes and principles used in sentencing in 
Canada with an emphasis on those principles that are addressed most frequently in the sentencing 
of manslaughter. It then proceeds to examine the general regime for manslaughter sentencing that 
operates in Canada, with an emphasis on the role played by sentencing ranges in the practice. It 
then addresses the different subcategories of manslaughter identified in the body of cases used in 
this study and their general distribution in the data set. Finally, this chapter concludes by analyzing 
divergent manslaughter sentencing regimes established by courts of appeal in the different 
provinces and territories and how they treat these subcategories of manslaughter.   
 
2. The Structure of Sentencing 
A. Section 718 – Fundamental Purpose of Sentencing 
 Sentencing in Canada is governed primarily by the fundamental purpose of sentencing in 
section 718 of the Criminal Code, the fundamental principle of sentencing in section 718.1, and 
the other sentencing principles contained in section 718.2. The first stage is determining the 
objectives of sentencing in the case. Here, section 718 explains:  
 
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and contribute, 
along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance 
of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more 
of the following objectives: 
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community 
that is cause by unlawful conduct; 
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; 
(c) to separate the offender from society, where necessary; 
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; 
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and  
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgement of 
the harm done to victims or to the community. 
 
One or more of these considerations must inform a judge’s reasoning in fixing a just sanction for 
an offence. In sentencing manslaughter, denunciation and deterrence were the objectives most 
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frequently cited as being the paramount considerations. After that, rehabilitation was mentioned 
most often but judges frequently specified that it was a subordinate or secondary objective. 
Separation, reparation and promotion of a sense of responsibility were offered as justifications far 
less frequently and most often in cases involving individuals with substantial criminal records or 
those offenders with a demonstrated history of being unresponsive to rehabilitative efforts.  
 
Denunciation 
 Denunciation is not directed to the personal characteristics of the offender but instead to 
society’s condemnation of the act itself.1 The Supreme Court has explained that denunciation 
serves as a societal condemnation of the actions of a perpetrator who has contravened its code of 
values. Denunciation, they suggest:  
 
mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of that 
particular offender’s conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element 
represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be 
punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within 
our substantive criminal law… The relevance of both retribution and denunciation 
as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply a 
vast system of negative penalties designed to prevent objectively harmful conduct 
by increasing the cost the offender must bear in committing an enumerated offence. 
Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses 
denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In 
short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, 
judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the 
basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal 
Code.2 
 
While denunciation is also a crucial part of the sentencing process, it takes on a particular 
importance when sentencing people who lead otherwise law-abiding lives.3 Societal 
condemnation, it is believed, has little impact on people who regularly engage in criminal 
behaviour but will have a substantial impact on ordinary citizens who do not. This is relevant for 
                                               
1 Clayton Ruby, Sentencing, Ninth Edition. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2017) at 6. 
2 R v M(CA), [1996] 1 SCR 500 at para 81. [Emphasis in original] 
3 R v Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para 73. 
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manslaughter sentencing since many people who commit the offence have not previously been 
convicted of a crime.  
 
Deterrence 
 At its core, deterrence as a sentencing principle is premised on the idea that the example of 
punishment is itself sufficient to discourage crime.4 There are two distinct forms of deterrence: 
general deterrence, directed toward society at large and to others who may be inclined to commit 
a similar offence; and individual or specific deterrence, directed at the offender who is being 
sentenced.5 While the Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned sentencing judges against relying 
too much on the largely unproven efficacy of deterrence they nonetheless agree that there remain 
times when it is necessary.6  Whatever its efficacy in practice, general deterrence continues to be 
a mainstay of sentencing for manslaughter and was cited in virtually every decision in this study. 
Specific deterrence on the other hand is meant to deal with the particular offender before the court. 
The idea is not to discourage the offender from committing all crimes in future but this particular 
crime based on the severity of the consequences.7 Like general deterrence, specific deterrence was 
frequently noted as one of the paramount sentencing objectives in the manslaughter decisions 
examined here.  
 
Rehabilitation 
 Canadian sentencing law places a substantial emphasis on rehabilitation even in serious 
cases of violent crime. In common with the criticisms of deterrence, there is little evidence to 
suggest that rehabilitation comes about as a result of imprisonment.8 The tenor of many sentencing 
decisions suggests that the need for rehabilitation, far from being focused on giving the offender 
access to programs while imprisoned, implies that the sentence should not be one that is so onerous 
that it forecloses any future for the prisoner when released. In this respect, rehabilitation as it is 
sometimes used suggests an element of restraint, however, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 
where denunciation and deterrence predominate “there may be few options other than 
                                               
4 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 7. 
5 Ibid at 8-9. 
6 R v Proulx, [2000] 1 SCR 61 at para 107. 
7 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 14. 
8 Ibid at 19. 
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imprisonment for meeting those objectives.”9 This provides a partial explanation for why 
rehabilitation was frequently cited in the manslaughter decisions considered here as a secondary 
or subordinate consideration. The decisions strongly suggest a presumption of prison time resulting 
from a manslaughter conviction. 
 
B. Section 718.1 - Fundamental Principle of Sentencing  
 The fundamental principle of sentencing in Canada is proportionality, and it is here that 
the “objectives of sentencing are given sharper focus.”10 Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code states 
that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender.” This consideration is crucial to the determination of a fit 
sentence. At its simplest:  
 
The more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s 
degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be. In other words, the 
severity of the sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime’s 
consequences, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender.11 
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal expanded on the elements of proportionality in Hamilton, explaining 
that: 
 
The “gravity of the offence” refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic 
sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific 
features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the 
harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence… 
 
The “degree of responsibility of the offender” refers to the offender’s culpability as 
reflected in the essential elements of the offence – especially the fault component 
– and any specific aspects of the offender’s conduct or background that tend to 
increase or decrease the offender’s personal responsibility for the crime.12 
 
                                               
9 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 6. 
10 R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6 at para 40. 
11 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 12. 
12 R v Hamilton, [2004] OJ No 3252 (CA) at paras 90-91. 
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This question lies at the core of determining a just and appropriate sanction for a crime and will 
be defined primarily with reference to the gravity of the offence.13 In manslaughter, the gravity 
involves the death of human being. While an arson directed at a residential area may occasion a 
greater risk of harm to the community than the stabbing of an acquaintance in a drunken 
altercation, the core of the gravity consideration for manslaughter remains a person’s death.  
With the centrality of proportionality to the sentencing process, parity becomes a secondary 
consideration and the operation of proportionality may result in disparate sentences.14 However, 
highly similar cases involving highly similar offenders should still see sentencing outcomes that 
are roughly similar. The importance of proportionality to the sentencing process is such that the 
Alberta Court of Appeal has called it “the only governing sentencing principle under the Code,”15 
and that “no matter what objective or combination of objectives a sanction is intended to achieve, 
to be a just sanction, the sentence imposed must comply with the proportionality principle.”16 
 
C. Section 718.2 – Other Sentencing Principles 
 The determination of sentence is rounded out by considering the secondary principles of 
sentencing outlined in section 718.2, comprising aggravating and mitigating factors, parity, 
totality, restraint, and restorative justice. These considerations, which the sentencing judge must 
take into account, are all “either components of the proportionality principle or properly influence 
its interpretation and application.”17  
 
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 As noted, Clayton Ruby has written that, “few crimes are truly original, their characteristic 
features repeat themselves with appalling regularity” and these features will consequently serve to 
either increase or decrease the sentence.18 The Criminal Code lists a number of statutory 
aggravating factors such as hate crimes, breach of trust, domestic relationship, criminal 
organizations and terrorism but the list of potential aggravating factors is considerably wider. 
Many of the more common aggravating factors are not statutory but judicially recognized. Among 
                                               
13 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 33. 
14 Lacasse, supra note 3 at paras 54-55. 
15 R v Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363 at para 47. 
16 Ibid at para 65. 
17 Ibid at para 59. 
18 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 239. 
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the most common of these are prior convictions, the use of a weapon, cruelty or brutality, offences 
committed while subject to conditions, multiple victims or incidents, group or gang activity, 
planning and organization, and the vulnerability of the victim.19 All of these were found in the 
cases examined for this study and many appeared frequently. 
Given the multiplicity of scenarios in which a manslaughter can unfold, the sentencing 
decisions under consideration in this study offered a variety of offence-specific aggravating factors 
that were frequently cited. Some of these were variations on those listed above but others were 
peculiar to manslaughters and other acts of serious violence such as failing to render aid to the 
victim, fleeing the scene, and taking steps to cover up involvement in the crime. It should be noted 
that there were factors that, while they may appear aggravating, cannot be employed as such at 
sentencing for example a failure to plead guilty, a lack of remorse, or a failure to cooperate with 
authorities.20  
 The Criminal Code does not outline any specific mitigating factors but many have been 
judicially recognized. The most frequently cited mitigating factors include the offender’s status as 
a first offender, the lack of a criminal record, prior good character, guilty plea, remorse, evidence 
of impairment – either mental impairment or occasionally and inconsistently intoxication, 
employment record, collateral consequences such as immigration considerations or family 
situation, rehabilitative efforts, and an offender’s disadvantaged background.21 In the cases 
examined for this study, some other frequently cited mitigating factors were provocation, 
deficiencies in the Crown’s case (where there was a guilty plea), family support, and youth. It 
should be noted that Gladue factors are not considered true mitigating factors like those outlined 
above. Rather, they are “mitigating in nature” and require the sentencing judge to look to the 
collective experiences of Indigenous peoples rather than merely to the individual and they do not 
require a causal link with the commission of the offence.22 Frequently, and particularly with co-
accused, aggravating and mitigating factors will be the most apparent cause for the disparity 
between sentences for otherwise similar offences. 
 
                                               
19 Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 151-158.  
20 Ibid at 160-1. 
21 Ibid at 131-147. 
22 R v Eustache, 2014 BCCA 337 at para 13.  
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3. Courts of Appeal 
A. Starting Points and Ranges 
Categorization, ranges and starting points have developed in an attempt to rationalize 
sentencing and achieve some degree of uniformity.23 Given the wide discretion conferred upon 
trial courts, the potential variations in sentences, and the widespread absence of minimum 
punishments for most crimes in Canada, these mechanisms are meant to ensure some measure of 
parity. The Supreme Court views these tools as useful in meeting the requirements of sentencing 
set out in sections 718-718.2 of the Code, noting that they have developed: 
 
To ensure that similar sentences are imposed on similar offenders for similar 
offences committed in similar circumstances – the principle of parity of sentences 
– and that sentences are proportionate by guiding the exercise of… discretion, and 
to prevent any substantial and marked disparities in sentences imposed on offenders 
for similar crimes committed in similar circumstances.24 
 
Despite the attempts to rationalize the sentencing process undertaken by the courts of appeal, these 
mechanisms are meant to effect a uniformity in approach, rather than result.25  
These tools exist to ensure “a uniform application of sentencing principles” while avoiding 
the kind of rigidity that would make individualized justice impossible.26  Placing an excessive 
emphasis on uniformity and parity risks creating a system in which the individual characteristics 
of the offender are ignored and those of the offence hold sway. Such a system would risk 
eliminating the discretionary role of sentencing judges. Criminal sentencing in United States 
Federal Courts has been criticized on the grounds that the sentencing guidelines in that system are 
so rigid that they ignore both the individual characteristics of the offender and the underlying 
principles of sentencing.27  Parliament and the courts in Canada have rejected such an approach in 
favour of one focused on the individualized nature of sentencing that continues to vest discretion 
in the trial judge.  
 
                                               
23 Arcand, supra note 15 at para 92. 
24 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 2. 
25 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 863. 
26 Ibid at 863. 
27 Charles J. Ogletree Jr, “The Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” (1988) 101 
Harv L Rev 1938 at 1952-54. 
 
 
44 
 
Categorization  
Given sufficient time, a “systematic assimilation of appellate decisions will provide 
guidance for the exercise of sentencing discretion.”28 This assimilation will provide the body of 
case law that Gillian Balfour has referred to as the “dominant sentencing discourses” which will 
be drawn on by sentencing judges in crafting their decisions.29 Among these forms of appellate 
guidance is categorization, defined by the Alberta Court of Appeal as “identifying a category or 
categories within an offence based on varying degrees of seriousness.”30 Categorization serves as 
an integral component of both starting point sentencing and ranges by narrowing the otherwise 
broad categories of offences in the Criminal Code.31 Categories may serve as a first step in 
establishing which starting point or range is appropriate or they may exist in isolation where neither 
of those things have been established with respect to the offence.32 While categorization may not 
necessarily contain set ranges or starting points, it will almost certainly form a first step in 
determining the final sentence.33 Categorization of manslaughters is nearly inseparable from 
ranges in the sentencing context. 
 
Starting Points 
Starting point sentencing is a practice that has been adopted sparingly in Canada. Alberta 
is alone among the jurisdictions in this study to have explicitly adopted a starting approach to 
sentencing although they have not done so for manslaughter. Only one of the decisions studied for 
this paper mentions a starting point for manslaughter, which it identifies as one of seven years in 
Saskatchewan.34 The Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that starting points represent “a logical step 
in the judiciary’s efforts to reduce idiosyncratic decision-making” and play an important role in 
reducing drastic divergences in sentence for serious crimes.35 They also suggest that starting points 
“constitute an integral component of the proportionality principle” embodied in the 1996 
sentencing reforms.36  
                                               
28 Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 65. 
29 Gillian Balfour, “Do Law Reforms Matter? Exploring the victimization-criminalization continuum in the 
sentencing of Aboriginal women in Canada,” 19 International Review of Victimology 1, 85 (2012) at 88. 
30 Arcand, supra note 15 at para 92. 
31 Ibid at para 93. 
32 Ibid at para 98. 
33 R v Holloway, 2014 ABCA 87 at para 109. 
34 R v RRF, 2008 SKCA 52 at para 9.  
35 Arcand, supra note 15 at para 102.  
36 Ibid at para 103.  
 
 
45 
 
Starting points operate within a three-step framework. The court begins by clearly defining 
the category into which the particulars of the offence fall. The court will then determine the 
appropriate starting point by comparing past cases and weighing policy considerations. Finally, 
the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that apply to the offender as 
articulated in section 718.2(a) in order to determine a just and appropriate sentence.37 The Supreme 
Court has recognized starting points as a legitimate tool in reducing disparity in sentencing, 
particularly where the potential sentences available for the offence are sufficiently broad.38 
However, the Court cautions that the process runs the risk of creating de facto minimum sentences 
for certain categories of offences where Parliament has not expressly chosen to do so.39  
The primary concern with all mechanisms aimed at reducing disparity is that they will act 
to restrain the discretion of trial judges and by extension Parliament’s prerogative in bestowing 
it.40 With this in mind, the Supreme Court was cautious in authorizing starting points. While it 
permitted the practice and agreed that the departure from an appropriate starting point may be 
suggestive of unfitness, such a departure alone would not be sufficient for a court of appeal to 
overturn a sentence.41 Despite its fondness for starting points, the Alberta Court of Appeal in 
Tallman determined that, given the vast potential difference in culpability with respect to 
manslaughter, the offence did not seem to be an appropriate one for the use of a starting point 
regime.42  
 
Ranges 
The most frequent mechanism for addressing disparity in sentence comes in the form of 
ranges.  The sentencing range has “gained wide acceptance because it is clearly a discernible 
reflection on the methods of the common law applied to sentencing decisions.”43 As applied at 
sentencing, a range will usually address itself to the seriousness of the offence and to the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender without considering the aggravating and mitigating factors that 
can serve to increase or decrease the sentence for the particular offender.44 Ranges are ordinarily 
                                               
37 Ibid at paras 104-105. 
38 Proulx, supra note 6 at paras 86-87. 
39Ibid at para 88. 
40 Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 71. 
41 R v McDonnell, [1997] 1 SCR 948 at para 43. 
42 R v Tallman, 1989 ABCA 47 at para 14.  
43 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 866. 
44 Ibid at 866. 
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used in two distinct senses, either to mean one established by an appellate court to provide 
guidance for future decisions or by a trial court after surveying the landscape of similar decisions.45 
 Though it does not change the role of the trial judge, where a court of appeal establishes a 
range for a particular offence, it provides a tool to guide the trial courts in measuring the fitness of 
sentence under s. 687(1) of the Criminal Code.46 While they serve to provide guidance to the trial 
courts in their attempts to ensure parity, ranges do not relieve the sentencing judge of their 
obligation to proceed on a case-by-case basis.47 Rather, where a case arises with a fact pattern that 
is sufficiently dissimilar from others in the generally accepted range, this will serve to expand the 
range of available sentences rather than create a “straightjacket to the exercise of discretion.”48 
 Ranges are largely a reflection of the “objective seriousness” of the offence being 
sentenced.49 Endorsing the decision in Keepness, the Supreme Court explained that: 
 
although they are used mainly to ensure the parity of sentences, they [ranges] reflect 
all the principles and objectives of sentencing… [and]… are nothing more than 
summaries of minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve 
in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and 
objectives.50 
 
Whatever else they may do, ranges cannot take precedence over the principle of deference. In fact, 
disparity may arise “where warranted by the circumstances” in order to serve the principle of 
proportionality.51 
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the “judicial creation of a category of 
offence within a statutory offence for the purpose of sentencing” to which starting points or ranges 
could attach, arguing that there was no legal basis for doing so and that it was a violation of the 
principle against judicially-created offences in Frey v Fedoruk.52 However, the Court subsequently 
endorsed the dissent in McDonnell and “resurrected” the idea of appending starting points and 
ranges to subcategories of offences.53  The Supreme Court included the caveat that “appellate 
                                               
45 R v Keepness, 2010 SKCA 69 at paras 22-23. 
46 Ibid at para 24. 
47 R v Jack, 2008 BCCA 437 at para 59. 
48 Keepness, supra note 45 at para 24. 
49 Hamilton, supra note 12 at para 111. 
50 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 57. 
51 R v LM, 2008 SCC 31, at paras 35-36. 
52 McDonnell, supra note 41 at para 33. 
53 Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 73. 
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courts must clearly specify what category of offences are meant to be covered,” so it will not be 
sufficient for the court to refer to “this kind” of a given offence.54 The Alberta Court of Appeal 
has argued that the “value of a range is directly linked to the degree to which the required 
sentencing rigour has been applied to defining the range and to the reasoning in the cases making 
up the range” and therefore “where unifying principles might be discerned from what otherwise 
appear to be a number of disparate results.”55 Ranges are designed to provide some basic scope to 
the wide variety of potential sentences available for most offences in Canada which can 
theoretically be extremely broad and the “margin for unwarranted disparity… great.”56  
 The Supreme Court endorsed the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s position in Muise,57 
finding that the “the most that can be expected of a sentencing judge is to arrive at a sentence that 
is within an acceptable range” given the variety of possible sentencing outcomes.58 In determining 
the range, the trial judge does not need to engage in an exhaustive analysis of all the principles and 
purposes of sentencing. They are only required to analyze the principles in sections 718-718.2 of 
the Criminal Code “to the extent necessary to narrow the range of sentence for the offender.”59 In 
this respect, establishing an appropriate range of sentence is only the first step in determining a 
just and appropriate sanction for a given offender and a given offence. The choice of range is left 
to the trial judge and subject to the same discretion before the court of appeal as other aspects of 
the sentencing process.60 Should a case depart from the facts of those generally established by 
other cases that have informed the range, the trial judge is entitled to depart from that range as long 
as the sentence is one that accords with the principles and objectives of sentencing.61 
 Critically, ranges are guidelines and not rules, and “deviation from a sentencing range is 
not synonymous with an error of law or an error in principle.”62 In a similar vein, it can never be 
an error for a trial judge to fail to place a particular case into a particular category.63 The existence 
of sentencing ranges reflect the individual cases that have preceded them, but will not govern the 
                                               
54 R v Stone, [1999] 2 SCR 290 at para 245. 
55 Arcand, supra note 15 at para 121. 
56 Ibid at para 68. 
57 [1994] NSJ No 487 (CA). 
58 R v Shropshire, [1995] 4 SCR 227 at para 48. 
59 Proulx, supra note 6 at para 59. 
60 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 51. 
61 Nasogaluak, supra note 10 at para 44. 
62 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 60. 
63 McDonnell, supra note 41 at para 32. 
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cases that follow and may be altered intentionally given an appropriate degree of consideration.64 
Even where most cases will fall within the generally accepted range for an offence, cases falling 
outside that range will not be treated as acceptable only in “exceptional circumstances” provided 
that there has been found to be a correct application of principles.65  
 
B. Regional Differences 
 Canadian sentencing law recognizes that regional differences and local conditions will 
produce disparate sentences for similar offenders and similar offences. There are a number of 
possible sources for such a disparity. Given the inherently individualized process of sentencing, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that sentences, “should be expected to vary to some degree 
across various communities and regions in this country, as the ‘just and appropriate’ mix of 
acceptable sentencing goals will depend on the need and current conditions of and in the 
particularly community where the crime occurred.”66  
 The principal justification for such disparate sentences is the prevalence of crime in a given 
area. The sentencing judge should take “into account the needs and current conditions of and in 
the community.”67 This state of affairs has been commented on frequently by the courts of appeal 
and endorsed regularly by the Supreme Court.68 Local frequency itself is not an aggravating factor 
but there may be circumstances in which it may be included in the consideration of denunciation 
but it cannot be allowed to contribute to a sentence that is demonstrably unfit.69   
 Given the emphasis on individualization in sentencing, the trial judge is considered to be 
best positioned to reach a conclusion as to the appropriate sentence. Trial judges know the local 
conditions and the frequency with which particular crimes come before their courts and are 
qualified to take judicial notice of such frequency.70 The trial judge is not obliged to inquire into 
the conditions in other jurisdictions, their knowledge of  local conditions is sufficient to justify 
disparity in sentence and the courts of appeal should defer to their expertise.71 
 
                                               
64 R v Wright, 2006 ONCA at para 23. 
65 Keepness, supra note 45 at para 29.  
66 M(CA), supra note 2 at para 92. 
67 Ibid at para 91. 
68 Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 93. 
69 Ibid at para 90.  
70 Ibid at paras 93-96. 
71 Ibid at para 102.  
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C. Manslaughter Sentencing 
 Manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under the Criminal Code 
and, except where a firearm is used, there is no minimum punishment prescribed.72 As a 
consequence, the potential sentence available on a conviction for manslaughter is among the 
widest for any crime.  Courts of appeal have remarked that the proper range for sentencing 
manslaughter runs from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment.73 Given the vast difference in 
possible sentences, any manslaughter sentencing must be a fact-specific inquiry and establishing 
any kind of precise range for sentencing is difficult.74 Ultimately, “[a]ny clear and definitive 
principles governing the sentencing of an accused on a manslaughter conviction… have not been 
realized.”75  
The offence itself is infinitely mutable. Manslaughters may result from criminal 
negligence, from an unintentional death resulting from another offence, or an intentional killing 
mitigated by provocation or violence.76 Generally, the “well-established spectrum of culpability” 
ranges between that of “near-accident” and “near murder.”77 Most sentences for manslaughter will 
ordinarily be in the penitentiary range,78 and these lengthy sentences will be born of the need to 
address the gravity of the offence.79 In all manslaughter cases the fact remains that the offender 
has caused the death of another person. While there may be some variation in the gravity of the 
offence, the result remains the same and so the gravity will always be substantial and denunciation 
and general deterrence will usually predominate in the sentencing of manslaughter.80 
Despite the prevalence of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing manslaughter, the 
highly flexible framework for sentencing the offence is meant to account for the variability of 
moral blameworthiness.81 Given the variety of circumstances that define different acts of 
manslaughter running from accidental deaths to acts of violence falling short of the intent required 
for murder, the scheme works to permit a sentence “tailored to suit the degree of moral fault of the 
                                               
72 S. 236, Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
73 R v Dasilva, [1998] BCJ No 1744 (CA) at 2. 
74 R v Hermiz, [2007] OJ No 1589 (SCJ) at para 11. 
75 R v Csincsa, (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 241 (CA) at 2. 
76 Ruby, Sentencing, supra note 1 at 915. 
77 R v EH, [2005] BCJ No 4 (CA) at para 20.  
78 R v Turcotte, [2000] OJ No 1316 (CA) at para 19. 
79 Hermiz, supra note 74 at para 13. 
80 EH, supra note 77 at para 43. 
81 R v Martineau, [1990] 2 SCR 633 at 647. 
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offender.”82 This variety of moral culpability is not limited to the distinction between the “near 
accident” and “near murder” divide but exists equally among a variety of impulsive killings.83 As 
a consequence of the variance in moral culpability, there are a variety of categories into which 
manslaughter may be placed.  
 
4. Types of Manslaughter 
 Allan Manson identifies four basic categories of manslaughter: murder reduced by 
provocation, manslaughter by reason of intoxication or mental disorder, unlawful act 
manslaughter, and manslaughter by criminal negligence.84 This study is not concerned with 
criminal negligence but concentrates instead on the other three categories. While these are useful 
categories, they do not neatly correspond to the landscape of sentencing observed in the cases 
surveyed here. Many of the cases informing this paper were the result of jury convictions and, as 
a result, the precise basis for the conviction for manslaughter is not always evident. For the 
purposes of this study, manslaughters are divided into five categories defined by the circumstances 
of the offence.  
The first category are those cases where intoxication by drugs or alcohol are the defining 
characteristic of the offence. These sentencing decisions do not always suggest that intoxication 
was sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter but they all share the common thread that the 
offender was in a state of self-induced intoxication which largely precipitated the acts of violence. 
The second and related category are those cases classified here as “near murder.” These cases are 
not, following Manson’s definition, always defined by provocation, though that may have played 
a role. They are crimes which are very similar to the drug and alcohol cases with respect to the 
types of violence involved but lack the element of intoxication that defines the former.  
The third category is similar to Manson’s unlawful act category. This paper deals with 
cases where the manslaughter occurred as part of a home invasion or robbery. These are separated 
from the fourth category of deaths by arson. This distinction is made because arson cases, like the 
home invasion and robbery category, have a distinctive sentencing regime and applicable cases as 
well as a tendency to draw lengthier sentences. The final category used for this paper may be 
                                               
82 R v Creighton, [1993] 3 SCR 3 at 48-49.  
83 Stone, supra note 54 at para 233.  
84 Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 309.  
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classified as “one-punch” cases and those involving unusual circumstances. These are cases in 
which violence was employed by the offender but death resulted from a fluke occurrence. They 
most commonly involved the offender striking the victim once, causing them to lose consciousness 
and hit their head on the ground, dying as a result. These were treated by sentencing judges as 
distinct from the near murder and drug and alcohol cases given the high degree of chance involved 
in the resulting death.  
 
A. Near Murder 
 The Manitoba Court of Appeal has commented that many of the cases that eventually result 
in manslaughter sentences are such that they would, had the required intent been present, have 
resulted in a conviction for murder.85 While some of these cases fall into the drugs and alcohol 
category, the majority fall into the category defined here as “near murder” killings. Many of these 
cases are defined by brutality or prolonged application of violence and the resulting sentences are 
ordinarily in the range of 4-12 years.86 Clayton Ruby suggests that like most categories of 
manslaughter, these cases often feature heavy drinking.87 Despite the presence of intoxication in 
many of these cases, this paper distinguishes between these cases and those where the sentencing 
judge places a special emphasis on the role of drugs and alcohol in the commission of the offence. 
This category represented 99 offenders in total, of whom 27 were Indigenous. 
 
B. Drugs and Alcohol 
 Notwithstanding their similarities, cases where drugs and alcohol predominate will 
generally be sentenced in a fashion similar to the near murder cases but evidence suggests that 
these cases will ordinarily find themselves at the lower end of the general 4-12 year range that 
defines both categories.88 Notwithstanding the extreme levels of intoxication involved in these 
offences, the accused will not be permitted to benefit from this at sentencing since they have 
already benefitted by having the charge of murder reduced to manslaughter.89 This is distinct from 
the issue of provocation, where the Supreme Court has ruled that it is a legitimate consideration 
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both in reducing murder to manslaughter and in determining the offender’s moral culpability at 
sentencing.90 Cases of this kind represent the second-largest category after near murder and they 
comprise the majority of cases involving Indigenous offenders, accounting for 52 offenders in 
total, of whom 43 were Indigenous.  
 
C. Home Invasion/Robbery 
 Manslaughters occurring during an indictable offence are sentenced more severely than the 
more spontaneous variety.91 Besides those involving arson, the only other cases defined by 
indictable offences here involved manslaughters committed in the course of robberies and home 
invasions. The element of premeditation present in these cases, along with the greater tendency of 
offenders to have prior records for similar offences tend to result in higher sentences for offenders. 
In addition, the courts will often seek to deter acts committed for financial gain with stiffer 
punishments. This category accounted for 14 offenders in total of whom three were Indigenous. 
 
D. Arson 
 The second category of indictable offence manslaughters arising in these cases involved 
arsons. In many cases it is unclear whether the fire was set with the intention of killing or doing 
bodily harm to the victim or if that was merely its result. Notwithstanding the intent of the offender, 
these cases are ordinarily sentenced more severely than other types of manslaughter. In some of 
these cases this will be the result of multiple victims being killed in the resulting fire, but even 
where there is only one victim the potential for public endangerment will result in higher sentences 
on average. In all there were six offenders convicted for arson-related manslaughters, of whom 
half were Indigenous. 
 
E. Unusual Circumstances and One Punch Cases 
 The final distinct category of manslaughters sentenced in this material are the so-called 
“one-punch” cases and those involving unusual circumstances. These are cases that are primarily 
defined by brief episodes of violence and will tend to attract sentences in the range of one to four 
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years.92 Judges often remark that these cases are particularly hard to sentence given the substantial 
gravity of the offence and the outsized role played by chance in the resulting death. Decisions 
falling into this category represented a very small proportion of cases overall but they were almost 
all among those with the shortest sentences. There were a total of four one-punch offenders, half 
of whom were Indigenous and three unusual circumstances cases, one of which involved an 
Indigenous offender.  
 
F. Domestic Manslaughter 
 A substantial proportion of these cases, whatever category they fell into, involved the 
killing of a spouse or other intimate partner. While the killing of an intimate partner is a statutorily-
mandated aggravating factor under the Criminal Code, these cases do not appear to be substantially 
different from many other cases of manslaughter and will attract a wide range of sentences.93  
Notwithstanding the potential range of sentences, in the cases under examination domestic 
manslaughters appeared to be sentenced more harshly than non-domestic ones.  
 
G. Mental Illness 
 Another common feature of manslaughter cases are offenders who are suffering from 
varying degrees of mental illness that fall short of a finding of not criminally responsible on 
account of mental disorder. Nonetheless, the offender’s mental illness will affect their moral 
blameworthiness and by consequence the sentence, but it will not be sufficient to negative criminal 
liability altogether.94 In these cases, the sentence may also be strongly affected by the potential 
treatment options made available or restricted by the choice of a federal or provincial institution. 
 
5. Manslaughter and Sentencing Ranges 
 The Supreme Court has not endorsed any range of sentence with respect to manslaughter, 
they have only said that the possible range of sentences lies between one day and life 
imprisonment.95 The British Columbia Court of Appeal have repeatedly endorsed a similar line of 
                                               
92 Ibid at 934.  
93 Cscinca, supra note 75 at 15. 
94 Creighton, supra note 82 at 70. 
95 Martineau, supra note 81 at 647. 
 
 
54 
 
thinking, defining the only legally binding range for the offence as being one between a suspended 
sentence and life imprisonment as outlined in the Criminal Code.96 As noted, courts of appeal can 
establish ranges for particular types of offences to serve as guidelines to the trial courts but these 
cannot be binding.  
Given the wide scope of circumstances and offenders that can come under the umbrella of 
manslaughter, it was considered particularly ill-suited to the use of a starting point regime by the 
Alberta Court of Appeal.97 While the Supreme Court did not decide that ranges were inappropriate 
for the sentencing of manslaughter, they cautioned that the type of manslaughter to which a range 
was applied would need to be defined with some precision to be of use to sentencing judges and 
therefore permissible.  In Stone, the Court noted that a “need for clear direction applies to ranges 
set by appellate courts” and that a court of appeal’s reference simply to “this kind of manslaughter” 
provided no useful clarity.98  
The dubious utility of ranges for the exercise of manslaughter sentencing has not prevented 
their proliferation in the courts of appeal, particularly among the most common forms of 
manslaughter such as the near murder and drug and alcohol cases. Despite the individualized 
nature of sentencing and the wide range of sentences available for manslaughter, patterns 
nonetheless repeat and many cases emerge that bear striking similarities to those that have come 
before. Most courts of appeal in the jurisdictions under consideration here have some form of 
established range for at least some forms of manslaughter. Among the different types of 
manslaughter categories defined above, there are distinct bodies of cases that tend to regularly 
guide the sentencing practice of courts.  
 
6. Provinces and Territories 
A. Ontario 
 The Ontario Court of Appeal has gone back and forth on the issue of the appropriate range 
for manslaughter sentencing and whether it is worthwhile to affix labels to subcategories.  In 2003, 
the court in Clarke found that a range of 8-12 years was appropriate for what they identified as a 
case of “aggravated manslaughter.” In that decision, a highly intoxicated rooming house resident 
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brutally attacked another elderly resident with a knife, attempting to divert suspicion before 
ultimately confessing.99  
 Three years later in Devaney, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the idea of “aggravated 
manslaughter” as a useful definition. A panel composed of Rosenberg, Goudge, and Feldman JJA 
wrote:  
 
it is not useful to attach a label to a subcategory of the offence, then try to 
pigeonhole the facts of any case into the label. Adding a descriptive label to a set 
of facts within the defined offence adds a level of complexity to the sentencing 
exercise that is both unnecessary and potentially diverting for the court and could 
lead to errors. Nor do I read this court’s decision in Clarke as adopting that 
approach.100 
 
The court rejected the naming of subcategories of manslaughter and insisted that each offender 
must be subject to a case-by-case analysis.101 Four days later, another panel of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal composed of Cronk, Lang and MacFarland JJA ruled in Cleyndert that the sentence 
handed down by the trial judge was not outside the appropriate range for an “aggravated 
manslaughter” in Ontario.102  
Despite the obvious clarity of the panel in Devaney, the trial courts in Ontario continued 
either to adopt103 or dismiss as inappropriate104 the designation of “aggravated manslaughter.” 
Whatever the prevailing appellate perspective is on the propriety of defining subcategories of 
manslaughter, the concept of an aggravated manslaughter accompanied by an appropriate range of 
8-12 years continues to predominate in sentencing in Ontario. Manslaughter sentences fitting the 
near murder and drug and alcohol categories are overwhelmingly understood as having a range 
somewhere around 8-12 years. This range is also evident in the sentencing submissions of Crown 
and defence counsel. In reference to this range for aggravated manslaughter the Ontario Court of 
Appeal held that, where appropriate, it is always within the power of the sentencing judge to depart 
from a range of sentence where circumstances exist that “distinguish the situation significantly 
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from other cases where sentences were imposed in the range”.105 Whether or not the categorization 
of aggravated manslaughter exists in Ontario as a legal concept at the Court of Appeal, it exists in 
practice in the trial courts.  
 
B. British Columbia 
 The British Columbia Court of Appeal continues to emphasize that manslaughter cases 
exist on a spectrum of near accident to near murder and that this is a factual determination for the 
sentencing judge.106 For many years, British Columbia has relied on the decision in Gillies in 
discussions of the potential range for manslaughter.107 Here, the court of appeal outlined their basic 
understanding of sentencing manslaughter by noting that: 
 
While the Criminal Code prescribes a range of from suspended sentence to life, 
four to six years has been the usual range for most manslaughter cases for as long 
as I can remember. 
 
There are, of course, other cases where sentences of eight to ten years or more have 
been given. In most of these cases, however, there were other factors that made the 
offence much more serious. Cases were cited where there was torture, long records 
of violence offences, violence against a spouse, woman or child, and killing in the 
course of a robbery.108 
 
This structure bears a striking similarity to that which has been in operation in Ontario with respect 
to “aggravated manslaughter,” where cases resembling those outlined by the court in Gillies are 
sentenced in excess of ten years. 
 The Gillies ranges were later expanded by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Green, 
and both cases were cited with roughly the same frequency. There, the Court of Appeal stated its 
view that “most cases fall within the period of four to 15 years. A sentence below or above that 
range is imposed only in a case involving special circumstances.”109 While these two cases were 
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the most frequently cited, in Andrew110 in 2008, the Court of Appeal  revived the pre-Gillies 
standard from Mintert.111 Here, the Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s view that: 
 
A review of the British Columbia Court of Appeal cases since 1990 dealing with 
the sentencing in manslaughter cases provides sentences from a suspended sentence 
to life imprisonment. The lower range involves a near accidental death and very 
special circumstances where the moral culpability of the offender is at the lowest.  
 
In my opinion the next range involves sentences where the culpability of the 
offender is such that the principle of general deterrence warrants a sentence of one 
to seven years. 
 
The next range involves sentences resulting in incarceration for six to twelve years 
where the need is to remove the offender from the community to meet [sic] risk that 
the offender presents after careful consideration of all the circumstances and the 
need for general deterrence; and the maximum sentence I’ve already discussed.112 
 
To this, the court in Andrew added only that in their view the bottom end of the range, absent 
unusual circumstances was four years’ imprisonment.  
The consensus in British Columbia is that the appropriate range for a manslaughter 
sentence is between 4-15 years with sentences above or below for cases involving special or 
unusual circumstances.113 Circumstances justifying non-custodial sentences are most likely to 
appear in cases “marked by carelessness or near accident as opposed to violence.”114 However, 
absent such exceptional, special or unusual circumstances, general deterrence and denunciation in 
the sentencing of manslaughter will require a custodial sentence.115 In keeping with the Supreme 
Court’s guidance on the question of sentencing ranges, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
recognizes that a departure from the recognized range does not constitute an error.116  
British Columbia is alone is establishing a range of sentence for manslaughter that 
specifically addresses cases involving Indigenous offenders. Citing the need for sentencing 
Indigenous offenders to focus primarily on rehabilitation rather than denunciation and deterrence, 
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggested that “a range of sentence for a young Aboriginal 
offender with no prior record who committed manslaughter… appears to be generally between 
three and eight years imprisonment with sentences of one and ten years at the outer ends.”117 Other 
jurisdictions discuss the particular circumstances of Indigenous offenders and the need to address 
rehabilitation, but British Columbia is alone in suggesting a potential range of sentence that is 
unique to this group.  
 
C. Alberta 
 Since 1995 manslaughter sentencing in Alberta has been governed by Laberge.118 This case 
breaks down manslaughters into three categories based on moral culpability. The court states that: 
 
Unlawful acts may be divided into three broad groups: those which are likely to put 
the victim at risk of, or cause bodily injury; those which are likely to put the victim 
at risk of, or cause, serious bodily injury and those that are likely to put the victim 
at risk of, or cause, life-threatening injury. Only when the offender’s proven 
mental state at the time of the commission of the offence is evaluated in the context 
of the crime itself, in other words in terms of its relative degree of seriousness, is it 
possible to classify for sentencing purposes the degree of fault inherent in the crime 
committed.119  
 
In order to complete the picture with respect to the culpability of the individual, the sentencing 
judge must then consider “those personal characteristics of the offender which would mitigate or 
aggravate culpability.”120  
The Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that this sort of categorization is critical in 
articulating intelligible principles for sentencing manslaughter and without engaging in such an 
exercise, the public would not be able to discern any logic in determining sentence.121 They also 
maintain that the Laberge categories are designed to satisfy the requirements of parity and 
proportionality and so allow a predictable pattern of sentencing.122 However, the court insists that:  
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The approach in Laberge does not fix any numbers for any of the categories. Nor, 
for that matter does it insist that a case in a particular category will necessarily be 
responded to by a sentence which might not also fit a different category. There are, 
after all, other factors to consider. Laberge proposes a careful consistency in 
approach, not arithmetic.123 
 
This is in keeping with the court’s directive in Laberge that the categories did not represent 
“gradually escalating degrees of moral culpability as one moves from one to the other.”124 
 Despite the Court of Appeal’s position to the contrary, dissenting justices have pointed out 
that the claims of Laberge to a disinterested and rational categorization of manslaughter does not 
reflect the practical reality. Berger JA offered a pointed criticism of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s 
protestations in his dissent in Holloway.125 Justice Berger argued that whatever the Court of Appeal 
may believe, trial courts will view the Laberge categories as consisting of an escalating scale and 
will sentence accordingly and without regard to the individual characteristics of the offender.126 
He suggests the Laberge categorization has the effect of creating three categories of manslaughter 
and offers the view that the trial courts have already taken up the process of populating those 
ranges with numbers and creating de facto subcategories of judicially-created manslaughter.127 
 In doing so, Berger JA argues that the Laberge scheme relegates the personal 
characteristics of the offender to merely another category of aggravating or mitigating factors and 
in doing so usurps Parliament’s prerogative by unduly constraining discretion.128 He argues this 
has led to a situation where:  
 
Notwithstanding the vehement protests of appellate decisions in this jurisdiction… 
that Laberge does not establish a grid, it does just that when, with the enthusiastic 
approval of this Court, the categories are populated with numbers. The practical 
effect is to constrain the exercise of discretion of sentencing judges in the trial 
courts and to facilitate appellate intervention on the basis that ‘in fixing the 
category, the judge got it wrong’. Laberge quacks and walks like a grid.129 
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Justice Berger is passionate in his criticism but he is correct in his view that the trial courts are 
busy populating the Laberge categories with sentence ranges.  The majority in Holloway itself 
noted that the case at bar, which fit the third Laberge category of culpability, was similar to other 
cases involving factors such as protracted brutality, weapons and vulnerable victims and that the 
Alberta Court of Appeal had generally found that such cases warranted sentences greater than ten 
years or alternatively in the range of eight to twelve years. They insisted they were not 
“recognizing or adjudicating a starting point for such situations” but merely noting “that in a de 
facto way something of a range of that sort appears to be reflected in the present selection of 
decisions of this Court and some from other jurisdictions.”130  
The population of categories with ranges can be seen in Valente, an Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench case cited by half the Alberta cases examined for this study. Here, the sentencing 
judge determined that the offender’s actions fit the middle Laberge category involving the risk of 
serious bodily injury. For this category, the court found that it: 
 
covers a broad range of circumstances and therefore a wide variety of sentences. 
The low end of the range is generally about 3.5 or 4 years’ imprisonment, although 
there are cases… where sentences of 2 or 3 years were imposed. The higher end of 
the range is generally about 6 or 7 years, although again there are unusual cases 
where higher sentence have been imposed. The higher end of the range has mostly 
been applied where there were weapons involved or prolonged and extreme 
violence.131 
 
Here there is evidence that the second Laberge category, involving sentences of approximately 
3.5-7 years, appears to fill a similar role to cases just below Ontario’s “aggravated manslaughter” 
categorization or the lower half of the standard British Columbia range of 4-15 years’ 
imprisonment. As noted, Holloway, which was cited in approximately half of Alberta cases under 
consideration, suggests a potential range for the third Laberge category of ten or more years, or 
eight to twelve years. This is roughly in line with the “aggravated manslaughter” designation in 
Ontario and the upper half of the British Columbia range. Notwithstanding the objections of the 
majority in Holloway, the concerns of the dissent seem to have been borne out in the application 
of the Laberge scheme at the trial level.  
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D. Saskatchewan 
In 1990 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal surveyed the historical landscape for 
manslaughter sentencing in the province over the previous quarter century. They found that 
between 1965 and 1980, sentences in the three to five year range were common for manslaughters, 
and sentences in the seven to eight year range increasingly common throughout the 1980s.132 The 
court credited these increases in sentence with a response to the mounting prevalence of the crime 
in the jurisdiction and the need to emphasize general deterrence in an effort to protect the public.133 
The increase in sentence range has continued in Saskatchewan in the three decades since Zimmer 
and, like Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, Saskatchewan assigns ranges to types of 
manslaughter. 
Interestingly, Saskatchewan has also adopted a starting point with respect to manslaughter. 
In RRF, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, stressing the need for deterrence in sentencing the 
crime, found that seven years’ imprisonment was an appropriate starting point.134 This seven-year 
starting point for manslaughter is determined generally and without reference to the specifics of 
either the offender of the offence. It is only subsequently that the circumstances of the offender 
and aggravating and mitigating circumstances are examined.135  
Following an analysis of case law in the province in 2010, the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal adopted a specific range of four to twelve years for “manslaughter involving brutality and 
alcohol or drugs.”136 This range had been adopted earlier by the Court of Queen’s Bench for 
Saskatchewan with the caveat that sentences falling outside the four to twelve year range “ought 
to occur only in the most unusual, exceptional or extenuating circumstances.”137 The court in 
Keepness, endorsed the Hathway model but cautioned that: 
 
This language may lead a judge to conclude incorrectly that the lower and upper 
limits of the range are more fixed than they are, or that they are to be departed from 
in only the rarest of cases. No matter how one tries to delimit the type of case for 
which the range for manslaughter is being set, the description will remain nebulous 
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and the circumstances variable. Correct application of the principles of sentencing 
should mean there are fewer sentences falling outside the range for manslaughter 
than within in, but in the exercise of their discretion, judges may depart, without 
introducing disparity, where the circumstances of the case are beyond those 
customarily found at the lower or upper end of the range.138 
 
The category of manslaughter defined by the court of appeal in Keepness – those involving 
brutality and alcohol or drugs – accounted for the overwhelming majority of cases of manslaughter 
that came before the courts in this study. Given the application of the decision at the trial level, 
Keepness appears to address itself to cases involving drugs and alcohol as well as cases where 
brutality is present but intoxication is not. In Saskatchewan, therefore, cases falling under the near 
murder and drugs and alcohol categories are generally subject to sentences between four and 
twelve years under the Keepness regime.  
 
E. Manitoba 
Unlike the other provinces examined, the Court of Appeal for Manitoba has declined to 
assign numerical ranges to the sentencing of manslaughter. In their place, they have suggested 
general principles to guide sentencing courts. The court has declined to recognize a difference 
between voluntary and involuntary manslaughters noting that “the element of provocation (which 
may reduce a murderous killing to a manslaughter) and drunkenness (which may reduce a culpable 
homicide to manslaughter because the requisite intent of murder is not proved) often merge… in 
particular factual circumstances.”139 The court indicates that while involuntary manslaughters 
involving alcohol will attract sentences at the lower end compared to voluntary manslaughters, 
that heavy sentences are nonetheless reserved for drunken killings involving heavily intoxicated 
offenders and brutality.140 
Though lacking specifics, the Manitoba Court of Appeal outlined a series of general 
considerations to guide the trial courts in sentencing manslaughter. They noted, as in 
Saskatchewan, that there had been a general increase in the length of sentences in Manitoba as a 
reflection of the need to protect society and that the two paramount considerations in determining 
an appropriate sentence will be the culpability of the offender and the extent of the violence or 
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brutality involved in the offence.141 With respect to the appropriate range for manslaughter, the 
court noted that the range offered by the Criminal Code moving from a suspended sentence to life 
imprisonment was not a particularly useful guide. While technically true, in reality:  
 
this is not the range of reasonable sentences available to a trial judge in any 
particular case. The available range will be much narrower and its limits fixed by 
reference to the circumstances of the offence and the offender and, most 
particularly, the degree of the offender’s blameworthiness. The higher the degree 
of blameworthiness, the higher will be the range.142 
 
Unlike the Alberta Court of Appeal, which has a tendency to keep a hand on the tiller of the trial 
courts, the Manitoba Court of Appeal prefers to defer to the expertise of the trial courts in 
determining appropriate sentences. 
 
F. The Territories 
 A survey of territorial court of appeal jurisprudence on manslaughter sentencing is bare. 
There are few cases dealing with manslaughter and none address ranges or sentence quantum. 
Consequently, the determination of sentences for manslaughter in Yukon, the Northwest 
Territories and Nunavut appears to be left more or less to the trial courts. Much of the membership 
of the Courts of Appeal of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut are drawn from the Alberta 
Court of Appeal and those of the Yukon Court of Appeal from the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. It is fair to say that the influence of these jurisdictions on the jurisprudence of the territories 
is strong. 
 One recurring theme in the manslaughter jurisprudence of the territorial trial courts is the 
importance of local conditions to sentencing. These courts tend to focus on the distinctive nature 
of life and society in the north, in particular the reality that most of the offenders coming before 
these courts for sentencing on convictions for serious and violent crimes are Indigenous. Nunavut 
manslaughter sentencing decisions in particular concentrate on the unique local conditions in the 
territory, placing particular emphasis on the social issues affecting the Inuit population. The 
Nunavut Court of Justice therefore frequently emphasizes the need for deterrent sentences given 
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the high levels of domestic homicide and violent crime and their strong connection to 
uncontrollable alcohol consumption.143 
 
7. Conclusion 
Having outlined the general scheme for sentencing manslaughter in Canada and the 
regimes of the jurisdictions under examination, this chapter sought to provide an overview of the 
prevailing court of appeal jurisprudence with respect to the sentencing of manslaughter across 
different provinces and territories. The next chapter will assess how these regimes operate in 
practice. It will also present the major statistical findings of this paper comparing the sentence 
outcomes for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders for manslaughter generally and within the 
subcategories of manslaughter outlined in this chapter.  
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Chapter Four: Comparative Sentencing Outcomes for Indigenous 
and Non-Indigenous Offenders 
 
1. Introduction  
 This chapter examines the differences in sentence outcomes between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders across all categories of manslaughter and among the jurisdictions examined 
for this study. It begins with an outline of the study as it was conceived and carried out. It then 
proceeds to analyze the general data on manslaughter drawn from the study before assessing that 
information across different categories of manslaughter and different jurisdictions. This section 
concludes with a comparison of the near murder and drug and alcohol categories. These two 
categories account for the overwhelming proportion of offenders in this study and they 
demonstrate some interesting differences between the treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
offenders based on the category of manslaughter in which they were sentenced.  
 
2. Plan of Study 
 This study is designed to examine the process of sentencing for manslaughter to determine 
if there is a different methodology employed in sentencing Indigenous offenders and, if so, what 
results it produces. The object is to take the measure of the landscape over the recent past. One 
problem with the earlier studies discussed above was the use of a pre-Ipeelee comparator group 
which is, in effect, a different jurisprudential regime for sentencing Indigenous offenders. This 
project aims to avoid that by drawing on cases exclusively from the post-Ipeelee period. This study 
is focused on a single violent offence sentenced at one level of court with the aim of addressing 
the application of the Gladue provisions to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crimes. 
 The decisions for this project were drawn from Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. It does not deal with 
cases drawn from Quebec or the Atlantic provinces. The omissions of these provinces is meant to 
allow the study to concentrate on areas with large Indigenous populations. With the exception of 
Ontario, all the provinces and territories under consideration have Indigenous populations that are 
greater than the 4.85% national figure. The proportion of the population that is Indigenous in these 
jurisdictions varies from a low of just under 3% in Ontario to a high of over 85% in Nunavut and 
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a provincial high of nearly 18% in Manitoba.1 These five provinces and three territories account 
for over 80% of Canada’s Indigenous population.2 
 These jurisdictions, with the exception of Ontario, also have elevated levels of violent 
crime compared to the national average. Between 2013 and 2017, each of these provinces and 
territories - except Ontario - had police-reported rates of violent crime above the national average, 
often by considerable margins.3 Not only do these jurisdictions consistently have high levels of 
violent crime but in the same period they accounted for over 85% of all homicides reported in 
Canada and almost 95% of all homicides in which the accused was identified as Indigenous.4 Given 
that these jurisdictions account for an overwhelming number of homicides committed in Canada 
and particularly those alleged to have been committed by Indigenous offenders, they represent 
fertile ground for conducting this study. While Ontario’s levels of violent crime and homicide are 
consistently below the national average, the province nonetheless accounts for nearly 40% of the 
country’s population and a large proportion of its Indigenous people, its inclusion is therefore 
important to provide a thorough survey of the national landscape.  While Nunavut and the 
Northwest Territories only represented 0.31% of the total population from these jurisdictions, 
those territories produced  8% of all the manslaughter offenders.5 Notwithstanding this substantial 
share of the total number of manslaughter offenders, both territories still maintained the lowest 
average sentences for drug and alcohol manslaughters.6  
 To maximize the number of cases available, this study collected all manslaughter 
sentencing decisions reported in CanLII, Westlaw and Quicklaw for the period 2013 to 2018 
inclusive. The intention was to gather as complete a sample set as possible but one confined by 
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34, No 1 at 29; Jillian Boyce, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2014,” Juristat, Vol 35, No 1 at 30; Mary 
Allen, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2015,” Juristat, Vol 36, No 1 at 36; Kathryn Keighley, “Police-
reported crime statistics in Canada, 2016,” Juristat, Vol 37, No 1 at 37; Mary Allen, “Police-reported crime statistics 
in Canada, 2017,” Juristat, Vol 38, No 1 at 35. 
4 Zoran Miladinovic and Leah Mulligan, “Homicide in Canada, 2014,” Juristat, Vol 35. No 1 at 42; Leah Mulligan, 
Marsha Axford, and André Solecki, Homicide in Canada, 2015,” Juristat, Vol 36 No 1 at 18; Jean-Denis David, 
“Homicide in Canada, 2016,” Juristat, Vol 37, No 1 at 23; Sara Beattie, Jean-Denis David, and Joel Roy, “Homicide 
in Canada, 2017,” Juristat, Vol 38, No 1 at 31. 
5 https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/12-581-x/2018000/pop-eng.htm 
6 See Table 4.14 at page 87. 
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time and offence to allow a detailed assessment of how the Gladue provisions function within the 
sentencing process and what outcomes result. The cases produced in the initial search represent all 
the sentencing decisions reported in those databases in that time period and sentenced before the 
superior courts. The initial search resulted in 217 sentencing decisions from within the jurisdictions 
and time period.  
 This study deals only with unlawful act manslaughter and not manslaughter by criminal 
negligence. This is because it is meant to examine the application of the Gladue provisions to 
crimes of violence. While some crimes of violence may fall under the heading of criminal 
negligence, most were cases of unlawful act manslaughter. Cases involving the sentencing of 
accessories for manslaughter have been omitted in order to concentrate on those who have 
participated directly in the violent act leading to the death of the victim. Cases involving young 
offenders have been omitted, as have those cases involving the deaths of children to concentrate 
on violence committed between adults. Those cases involving dangerous offender and long-term 
supervision order applications have also been omitted since these decisions tend to concentrate 
primarily on the designation itself. Finally, some decisions were so threadbare that they did not 
include enough information beyond the sentence quantum to be useful and were omitted. As a 
result of removing these cases, the material under consideration consists of 167 cases representing 
sentencing decisions for 179 discrete offenders. 
 The core of this study is a survey of the decisions carried out to determine the outcome and 
the judge’s reasoning in reaching their conclusions. This survey recorded the date, the presiding 
judge, the jurisdiction and district, the Indigenous status of the offender, the age of the offender 
and victim, the gender of the offender and victim, the relationship between the two, a description 
of the offence, the sentence quantum (gross and net), time spent on remand, the original charge 
(i.e. whether manslaughter was a lesser included offence), reference to Indigenous-specific 
sanctions or correctional programs, aggravating and mitigating factors, Indigenous-specific 
mitigating factors, the two stages of the Gladue analysis, the offender’s criminal record, the 
offender’s history of violence, the sentencing principles cited, and justifications for sentence. This 
data was analyzed in light of provincial sentencing jurisprudence for manslaughter to allow 
comparisons between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders and between and within 
jurisdictions. Drawing out this information permits an analysis of the judicial decision-making 
process for a particular offence across jurisdictions and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
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comparator groups in order to answer the core question of whether there is a different methodology 
at work and if so, what differences in outcome it produces. 
 The first part of this analysis presents an overview of the landscape of manslaughter 
sentencing in the cases surveyed. This section examines the characteristics of offences such as the 
subcategory of manslaughter, the manner of death, the age of the offender, their relationship to the 
victim, the type of trial chosen by the offender, joint submissions, the positions of the parties at 
contested sentencings, and the age and gender distribution of offenders. The second half of this 
section examines the sentencing outcomes by subcategory of manslaughter and jurisdiction to 
highlight differences and similarities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders across 
types of manslaughter and jurisdictions. 
 
3. National Manslaughter Data 
A. National, Annual and Provincial Data Totals 
 Of the 179 offenders examined in this study, 80 were Indigenous and 99 were non-
Indigenous. The vast majority of decisions came from Ontario and British Columbia with 59 and 
67 offenders respectively of whom 12 and 40 were Indigenous. The prairie provinces produced 
another 38 offenders divided between Alberta with 14, Saskatchewan with 10 and Manitoba with 
12 each. These provinces produced five, nine and 11 Indigenous offenders respectively. The 
Yukon produced one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous offender. The Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut produced six and nine decisions respectively, with all offenders identified as Indigenous.  
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut all had proportions of 
Indigenous offenders in excess of 90%. Alberta and British Columbia had proportions of 
approximately 35% and 40% respectively, and Ontario some 20%. Half the cases in the Yukon 
dealt with Indigenous offenders but since there were only two cases in the data, this was 
insufficient to come to any conclusions about the general distribution between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous offenders for that territory.  
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Table 4.1 – Sentencing Decisions by Jurisdiction, Year and Indigenous Status 
 ON BC AB SK MB YK NT NU Total Ann. % 
2013 Ind. 1 5 1 2 4 - - 1 14 53.84 
2013 Tot. 10 7 2 2 4 - - 1 26 - 
2014 Ind. - 7 1 - 3 - 2 1 14 56.00 
2014 Tot. 5 13 1 - 3 - 2 1 25 - 
2015 Ind. 1 3 1 1 - - 1 3 10 40.00 
2015 Tot. 8 9 2 1 1 - 1 3 25 - 
2016 Ind. 5 3 1 2 2 1 - 4 18 58.06 
2016 Tot. 14 7 1 2 2 1 - 4 31 - 
2017 Ind. 3 4 - 2 1 - 2 - 12 34.28 
2017 Tot. 8 15 5 3 1 1 2 - 35 - 
2018 Ind. 2 5 1 2 1 - 1 - 12 32.43 
2018 Tot. 14 16 3 2 1 - 1 - 37 - 
Tot. Ind. 12 27 5 9 11 1 6 9 80 44.69 
Tot. Non 47 40 9 1 1 1 - - 99 55.31 
Overall 59 67 14 10 12 2 6 9 179 - 
Prov. % 20.33 40.29 35.71 90.00 91.66 50.00 100.0 100.0 44.69 - 
 
B. Manner of Death 
 The most common methods of committing manslaughter in these cases were stabbing 
(48.60%), beating (24.02%) and shooting (15.64%) followed by arson (3.35%), strangulation 
(4.04%) and the “one-punch” and unusual circumstances cases (3.34%). The method of homicide 
remained largely consistent between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with stabbings the 
leading cause of death in both groups of cases. However, there were two significant differences 
between the two groups. Just over 20% of all cases involving a non-Indigenous offender resulted 
from a shooting; among Indigenous offenders, this was less than 10%. Conversely, nearly one third 
of Indigenous offenders killed the deceased by beating them to death. The comparable figure for 
non-Indigenous offenders was slightly less than 20%.  
 
Table 4.2 – Cause of Death 
 Stabbing Shooting Beating Strangle Vehicle One 
Punch 
Arson Unusual Unknown Total 
Indigenous 40 7 25 1 1 2 3 0 1 80 
Percentage 50.00 8.75 31.25 1.25 1.25 2.50 3.75 - 1.25 - 
Non-Ind. 47 21 18 4 2 2 3 2 0 99 
Percentage 47.47 21.21 18.18 4.04 2.02 2.02 3.03 2.02 - - 
Total 87 28 43 5 3 4 6 2 1 179 
 
C. Relationship to Victim 
 The most common relationships between victims and offenders in these cases were 
strangers (32.59%), acquaintances (32.59%), family relationships (11.59%), spousal relationships 
(9.38%), and intimate relationships (8.28%), with the relationship in the remaining cases not 
 
 
70 
 
discernible from the decision (5.52%).7 Like the figures for cause of death, the relationship 
between the victim and the offender were largely similar between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
offenders. The figures for familial, spousal and intimate relationships, for example, were nearly 
identical. The most substantial difference between the two groups comes with respect to strangers 
and acquaintances. Non-Indigenous offenders (40.59%) were nearly twice as likely to kill a 
stranger than were Indigenous offenders (22.5%). Conversely, cases involving Indigenous 
offenders were slightly more likely to involve the death of an acquaintance than those with non-
Indigenous offenders. This may be a result of larger numbers of Indigenous offenders living in 
smaller communities such as First Nations’ reserves where they were less likely to encounter 
strangers.  
 
Table 4.3 – Relationship to Victim 
 Stranger Acquaintance Spouse Intimate Relative Unknown 
Indigenous  Number 18 29 9 8 8 6 
Indigenous Percentage 22.50 36.35 9.25 10.00 10.00 07.50 
Non-Ind. Number 41 30 8 7 13 4 
Non-Ind. Percentage 40.59 29.70 9.22 6.93 12.87 03.96 
Total Number 59 59 17 15 21 10 
Total Percentage 32.59 32.59 9.38 8.28 11.59 05.52 
 
 
D. Original Charge and Trial Type 
 It has been noted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal that it is quite rare that a conviction for 
manslaughter will arise from a charge of manslaughter and this is likely the result of 
“overcharging” on the part of the Crown.8 While no opinion is offered on the latter conclusion, the 
former is borne out by the evidence from this study. For 37 of the 179 offenders examined here, 
the sentencing decision did not indicate the original charge. However, that information was 
available in the remaining cases and confirms the observations of the Manitoba court. Among 
cases where information was available, nearly nine in ten cases resulted from an indictment 
alleging murder. The overwhelming number of these charges were for second degree murder 
(69%), with first degree murder (15.49%), unspecified murder (4.22%), and manslaughter 
(11.26%) charges accounting for the remainder. In the sample set of cases reviewed, non-
Indigenous offenders were more than twice as likely to be charged with first degree murder 
compared with Indigenous offenders. Similarly, Indigenous offenders were charged with murder 
                                               
7 “Intimate relationship” includes current and former intimate partners; “spousal relationship” includes current, 
former and separated spouses; “acquaintance” includes criminal relationship. 
8 R v Csincsa (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 241 (CA) at 17. 
 
 
71 
 
in nearly two-thirds of cases (63.75%) compared with non-Indigenous offenders in more than 
three-quarters of cases (75.57%).   
  
Table 4.4 – Original Charge  
 First Degree Second Degree Murder – 
Unspecified 
Manslaughter Unknown 
Ontario 13 35 3 3 5 
British Columbia 7 37 2 10 11 
Alberta 2 5 - - 7 
Saskatchewan - 5 - 1 4 
Manitoba - 6 - 1 5 
Yukon - 2 - - - 
NWT - 2 - - 4 
Nunavut - 6 1 1 1 
Total 22 98 6 16 37 
Percentage 12.29 54.74 03.35 8.93 20.67 
Percentage Where 
Charge is Known 
15.49 69.00 04.22 11.26 n/a 
 
 More than half of all convictions for manslaughter arose from guilty pleas (55.86%), 
followed by trials by judge and jury (27.37%) and trials by judge alone (15.08%). Indigenous 
offenders demonstrated a slight preference for pleading guilty (60%) over non-Indigenous 
offenders (52.52%). However, non-Indigenous offenders were twice as likely to opt for a trial by 
judge and jury (35.35%) than Indigenous ones (17.5%). Jury trials were most common in Ontario 
where over 60% of offenders opted for them. This was in contrast to British Columbia where only 
one in ten offenders chose trial by judge and jury. Judge alone trials, while the rarest overall, were 
favoured in relative terms by offenders in British Columbia who opted for them in nearly one 
quarter of cases regardless of whether the offenders was Indigenous or non-Indigenous.  
The near murder and drug and alcohol categories formed 84% of the body of cases used in 
this study but they accounted for 91% of all guilty pleas. Therefore discussions of guilty pleas and 
joint submissions will mostly be conducted with respect to these two subcategories. Ontario and 
British Columbia, the two largest provinces in this study, accounted for 65 of the 100 offenders 
who pleaded guilty. This figure was relatively close to their combined total of seven in ten cases 
overall. However, there was a clear disparity between the two provinces. British Columbia 
accounted for a disproportionate number of guilty pleas at 43 out of 100, or approximately 64% of 
all cases resolved in this fashion. Ontario represented the opposite end of the spectrum with only 
22 guilty pleas accounting for some 37% of trials.    
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Table 4.5 - Trial Type 
 Guilty Plea Jury Judge Alone Unknown 
Total 100 49 27 3 
Percentage  of Total 55.86 27.37 15.08 01.67 
Indigenous 48 14 15 3 
Percentage  of 
Indigenous 
60.00 17.50 18.75 03.75 
Non-Indigenous 52 35 12 - 
Percentage of  Non-
Indigenous 
52.52 35.35 12.12 - 
 
E. Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions 
 It is a well-established principle of sentencing that where an offender has pleaded guilty 
they can expect to receive a more lenient sentence compared with one who has not. However, this 
was not strictly true in these manslaughter cases and a close examination of the figures suggests 
an interesting contradiction. A simple comparison of offenders who did and did not plead guilty 
in the drug and alcohol category found that guilty pleas resulted in sentences that were less than 
one month shorter. A comparable examination of the figures for near murder manslaughters 
showed that guilty pleas resulted in sentences that were longer on average by one month.  
 Dividing the guilty pleas between contested sentencings and those arrived at by way of a 
joint submission suggests an explanation. The average near murder sentence coming about through 
a guilty plea and determined by a trial judge was slightly less than seven years and nine months or 
nearly nine months shorter than cases where the offender did not plead guilty. By comparison, 
cases involving a joint submission had an average sentence just short of nine years, a figure that 
was ten months longer than those who opted for a trial. A similar pattern was discernible in drug 
and alcohol cases, where joint submissions resulted in sentences that were 20 months longer than 
offenders who did not plead guilty and over 30 months longer among those who pleaded guilty 
but contested the sentence. This pattern was common to Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.  
Sentencing decisions unfortunately do not contain particulars of the negotiations leading to joint 
submissions, so there is no way of knowing how these figures were arrived at or why they were 
longer than those who opted to forego the supposed benefit of a guilty plea. While joint 
submissions tended to carry heavy sentences in this research, the benefit of pleading guilty was 
clearly demonstrated where the sentence was determined by a judge.  
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Table 4.6 – Sentence Outcomes with Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions – In Months 
 Near Murder – 
Indigenous 
Near Murder – Non-
Indigenous 
Drugs/Alcohol –
Indigenous 
Drugs/Alcohol – Non-
Indigenous 
No Guilty Plea 115.63  90.85 78.25 88.5 
Guilty Plea 113.20  91.05  85.79 85 
GP with Joint Submission 116.57  97.61  99 104 
GP no Joint Submission 110  87.85 71.4 66.5 
 
 Of the 100 cases resolved through guilty pleas in this study, 36 involved joint submissions 
and one joint submission arose from a jury trial. The near murder and drug and alcohol categories 
accounted for 34 of the total in roughly similar proportions (39% and 33%). As a percentage of 
their respective groups, one third of Indigenous offenders had their sentence determined by a joint 
submission while the figure for non-Indigenous offenders was slightly more than 40%. As with 
guilty pleas overall, joint submissions were most frequently found in British Columbia. Here, half 
of all guilty pleas resulted in joint submissions, compared to over a third of guilty pleas in Ontario. 
British Columbia alone accounted for approximately six in ten joint submissions compared with 
only one in five for Ontario. 
 
F. Positions of the Crown and Defence 
 Among the majority of cases not resolved by way of a joint submission it is useful to 
examine the sentences proposed by Crown and defence counsel and their relationship to sentence 
quantum. In approximately half of all contested sentencings, whether involving Indigenous or non-
Indigenous offenders, the sentence lay somewhere between the ranges proposed by the parties. 
Around one fifth of all sentences ended up within the ranges proposed by the Crown and an equal 
number within that proposed by defence counsel.  
Around one quarter of sentences between the ranges proposed by the parties were closer to 
that proposed by the Crown and around a fifth closer to that proposed by the defence.  Indigenous 
offenders were as  likely to have received sentences closer to the range proposed by either party, 
with approximately one fifth falling into each category. However, non-Indigenous offenders were 
more likely to find their sentences closer to that proposed by the Crown (25%) than by the defence 
(15%). In approximately one third of cases, the judge found a sentence that was within or closer 
to the range proposed by the Crown. This was also true for the proposed ranges of defence counsel, 
where the judge passed a sentence that was within or closer to the range proposed by defence 
counsel in approximately one third of cases. By contrast, judges found a sentence within or closer 
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to the defence range in around a third of cases involving non-Indigenous offenders but closer to or 
within the Crown range in approximately 45% of cases.   
In those provinces with generally accepted ranges for manslaughter most of the proposed 
sentences lay within those ranges. For British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan this was not a 
significant issue since those ranges are broad, running from four to 12 years in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan and four to 15 years in British Columbia. Ontario was a different matter and one 
that presents a distinct issue for the proposed sentences of the Crown. In British Columbia, 65% 
of near murder sentence proposals from the Crown were above eight years and only 43% of those 
proposed for drug and alcohol manslaughters were above the eight year mark. There was an evident 
separation between the two groups of cases where Crown submissions were concerned. In Ontario, 
by contrast, 77% of all near murder sentence proposals by the Crown were eight years or more as 
were 71% for the drug and alcohol category. This was connected to the fact that Ontario only has 
an established category and range for “aggravated manslaughter” which corresponds to the near 
murder classification used in this study. As a result, the Crown in Ontario appeared to treat those 
manslaughters falling into the drug and alcohol category as corresponding to an aggravated 
manslaughter. Borrowing Gillian Balfour’s phrase, the dominant sentencing discourse in Ontario 
understands virtually all manslaughters not in the near accident category as belonging to the 
aggravated category and they were treated as such by the Crown in their sentencing submissions.  
 
G. Criminal Records 
 Indigenous offenders were more likely to have a criminal record (63.5%) than non-
Indigenous ones (51.51%). However, this was not consistent across the country. Indigenous 
offenders in Ontario, the prairie provinces and the territories were more likely to have a criminal 
record than non-Indigenous accused. The opposite held true in British Columbia, which accounted 
for one third of all Indigenous offenders. Among offenders with criminal records, there was no 
appreciable difference in the likelihood that Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders had criminal 
records for violence. Within both groups, the criminal records for seven in ten of those offenders 
contained convictions for violence. Unlike the lower number of Indigenous offenders in British 
Columbia with criminal records on the whole, over 90% of those with prior convictions in that 
province involved violence. This figure was the highest of any jurisdiction except for Nunavut 
where all offenders with criminal records also had convictions for violence and were Indigenous.  
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Table 4.7 - Criminal Records 
 Indigenous Indigenous % Non-Ind. Non-Ind.% Total 
Ontario 9 75.00 19 40.42 28 
British Columbia 12 44.44 23 57.50 35 
Alberta 4 80.00 6 66.66 10 
Saskatchewan 5 55.55 1 100 6 
Manitoba 10 90.09 1 100 11 
Yukon - - 1 100 1 
NWT 5 83.33 - - 5 
Nunavut 5 55.55 - - 5 
Total 50 63.50 51 51.51 101 
 
 
Table 4.8 - Criminal Records with Violence 
 Indigenous Indigenous % Non-Ind. Non-Ind.% Total 
Ontario 4 44.44 14 73.68 18 
British Columbia 11 91.66 16 69.56 27 
Alberta 1 25.00 4 66.66 5 
Saskatchewan 3 60.00 - - 3 
Manitoba 7 70.00 - - 7 
Yukon - - 1 100 1 
NWT 4 80.00 - - 4 
Nunavut 5 100.00 - - 5 
Total 35 70.00 35 68.62 70 
 
H. Age Distribution 
This study divided manslaughter offenders into four age groups: 18-24 year-olds, 25-34 
year-olds, 35-49 year-olds and those over 50 years of age.9 The sentencing decisions suggest that 
judges generally considered a youthful offender as one who was under 25 years of age and so 
represented a strong potential for rehabilitation. Judges have remarked that offenders between the 
ages of 25 and 34 had the potential for rehabilitation but they did not appear to benefit from the 
mitigating effects of youth. Those between 35 and 49 were not considered strong prospects for 
rehabilitation. Those older than 50 were similarly not viewed as good candidates for rehabilitation 
but their more advanced age was taken into consideration with regard to how many years they may 
have left to live and the threat they might pose to society as they age. The distributions between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders did not vary substantially from age group to age group, 
as might be expected given the comparatively youthful Indigenous population.  
Approximately one third of offenders were under the age of 25, roughly 40% were between 
25 and 34-years-old, just over 17% between 35 and 40, and less than a tenth were over 50 years 
old. These figures show little variation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Along 
with the presence of a criminal record, age was one of the leading indicators for sentencing judges 
of an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation and could play a substantial role in determining 
                                               
9 Age of offender was available for 156 of 179 offenders.  
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sentence. For near murder and drug and alcohol manslaughters, there were clear spikes in sentence 
length among offenders in the 25-34 category, which dropped off in the two categories of older 
offenders. The other types of manslaughter did not provide sufficient numbers of offenders to 
make any meaningful observations about the distribution among age groups.  
 
Table 4.9 – Age Distribution – As Percentage of Total 
 18-24 25-34 35-49 50+ 
Indigenous 32.81% 42.18% 14.06% 10.93% 
Non-Indigenous 34.78% 36.95% 19.56% 08.69% 
All 33.97% 39.10% 17.30% 09.61% 
 
I. Gender and Domestic Violence 
 As with most acts of violent crime, men represented the overwhelming majority (87.15%) 
of offenders in these cases. However, Indigenous women were over-represented in the figures for 
female offenders in manslaughter convictions. As a proportion of their respective demographic 
groups, Indigenous women represented twice the number of manslaughter offenders as non-
Indigenous women. One in five Indigenous offenders were women compared with only one in ten 
non-Indigenous offenders. While Indigenous people are vastly overrepresented within the criminal 
justice system, Indigenous women are over-represented to an even greater degree than men.10 In 
these decisions, female offenders received lower sentences overall than male offenders, with an 
average sentence of just over seven years and seven months’ imprisonment, compared with an 
average for male offenders of less than eight years and one month. This was partially a result of 
the fact that female offenders were not found in the home invasion and robbery categories which 
tended to have higher sentences.  
Among domestic manslaughters overall, three quarters were committed by men and 
Indigenous men accounted for roughly half of all domestic manslaughter convictions.  Female 
offenders were also more than twice as likely to be convicted of a domestic manslaughter than 
male offenders. Over one third of all female Indigenous offenders were sentenced for the 
manslaughter of a domestic partner compared to approximately one fifth of non-Indigenous female 
offenders.  Most domestic cases were either in the near murder or drug and alcohol categories. The 
remaining two were arsons and those sentences lay at the high and low end of sentences overall. 
For the remaining domestic manslaughter cases, men received an average sentence of nine years 
                                               
10 Elspeth Kaiser-Derrick, Implicating the System: Judicial Discourses in the Sentencing of Indigenous Women, 
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2019) at 4-5. 
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and five month’s imprisonment. This was substantially higher than the six-year average sentence 
received by women for the same. This was largely attributable to the fact that many female 
offenders were in a relationship in which they had been victims of domestic violence. While they 
were not necessarily acting in self-defence at the time they killed the deceased, the nature of the 
relationship was a factor at sentencing.  
 
Table 4.10 - Gender Distribution 
 Male Female Female % of Total 
Indigenous - Number  66 14 21.21 
Indigenous – Percentage 82.50 17.50 - 
Non-Indigenous - Number 90 9 10.00 
Non-Indigenous - Percentage 90.09 09.09 - 
Total – Number 156 23 - 
Total - Percentage 87.15 12.85 - 
 
 
Table 4.11 - Gender Distribution – Domestic Violence 
 Male  Female 
Indigenous – Number 11 5 
Indigenous – Percentage 52.38 71.42 
Non-Indigenous - Number 10 2 
Non-Indigenous – Percentage 47.62 28.57 
Total – Number 21 7 
Total - Percentage 13.46 30.43 
 
J. Mental Illness 
 Mental illness as a consideration in sentencing for manslaughter arose infrequently in these 
cases. It was only cited in a total of 11 decisions. Seven of those decisions arose in Ontario and 
two in British Columbia. All cases involving mental illness were classified in the near murder 
category. They received an average sentence of nearly eight years and four months, or 
approximately four months shorter than the national average for that category among offenders 
not determined to be suffering from a mental illness.  This was predictable given that mental illness 
is typically understood as diminishing the offender’s moral blameworthiness and renders 
deterrence and punishment less important as factors at sentencing.11  
In only one case citing the offender’s mental illness were they Indigenous. This outcome 
mirrors a pattern seen in the forensic mental health system. While these cases do not deal with 
findings of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (“NCR”), studies have found 
that such findings are rarely made for Indigenous people. One study determined that Indigenous 
                                               
11 R v Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 at para 38. 
 
 
78 
 
offenders accounted for only 2.9 percent of NCR findings nationwide, a number below their 
proportion in the population but well below their relative numbers in the criminal justice system.12  
 
4. Manslaughter by Categories 
 Of the 179 offenders studied here, 175 received a defined period of imprisonment. One 
Indigenous offender in British Columbia and a second non-Indigenous offender in Ontario 
received suspended sentences and probation.13 In addition, one Indigenous offender in Manitoba 
and a second non-Indigenous offender in Alberta received sentences of imprisonment for life. Both 
of the life imprisonment cases involved multiple victims. The Alberta case involved an elderly 
couple murdered in the course of a robbery and the Manitoba case involved five victims burned to 
death in a fire deliberately set at a rooming house.14 These four cases have therefore been omitted 
from the analysis of sentence quantum in this section but they form part of the analysis elsewhere 
in the paper.  
 It is important to consider the regional distribution of offenders. In Ontario there were a 
total of 12 Indigenous and 47 non-Indigenous offenders sentenced and in British Columbia, 27 
Indigenous and 40 non-Indigenous offenders. These two provinces provide distinct groups large 
enough to allow a robust comparison. Alberta produced two smaller groups from which some 
conclusions could be drawn with nine Indigenous offenders and five non-Indigenous ones. 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, with ten and 12 offenders respectively, each had only one non-
Indigenous offender and therefore no effective intra-provincial comparisons can be made. The 
same was true for the Yukon which had one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous offender and so 
it was not possible to draw conclusions about sentencing generally or an Indigenous/non-
Indigenous comparison in particular for that territory. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut had 
six and nine offenders respectively but all were Indigenous and so no conclusions can be drawn 
about the relationship of these sentences to those of non-Indigenous offenders in those jurisdictions 
- to the extent that they might exist. 
 Taken alone, the national averages present a fairly simple picture. The overall average 
sentence for a manslaughter among the 175 offenders receiving determinate sentences was just 
                                               
12 Patrick Baillie, “A Valuable (and Ongoing) Study: The National Trajectory Project Addresses Many Myths About 
the Verdict of Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder” in 60 Can J Psych 3 (2015) at 94. 
13 R v Alphonse, 2018 BCSC 2045; R v Anguelov, 2014 CarswellOnt 18747. 
14 R v Vader, 2017 ABQB 48; R v Flett, 2013 MBQB 124. 
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over eight years’ imprisonment. Among the 78 Indigenous offenders, the average sentence was 
slightly less than seven years, nine months’ imprisonment and for the 97 non-Indigenous offenders, 
it was just under eight years and three months’ imprisonment. Taken as a whole, Indigenous 
offenders were more likely to receive a shorter sentence. However, once the numbers were broken 
down into different categories of manslaughter, a more nuanced picture emerged.  
 
Table 4.12 - Provinces/Territories Gross Sentence Lengths 
 All Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
Ontario 103.55 months 108.33 months 120.30 months 
British Columbia 88.26 months 85.32 months 91.47 months 
Alberta 102.38 months 73.20 months 120.62 months 
Saskatchewan 98.90 months 100.55 months 84 months 
Manitoba 95.73 months 98.4 months 84 months 
Yukon 96 months 108 months 84 months 
Northwest Territories 62 months 62 months - 
Nunavut 116 months 116 months - 
Total 96.04 months 92.63 months 98.78 months 
 
 On the whole, Indigenous people received longer sentences in most categories of 
manslaughter and in most jurisdictions than non-Indigenous offenders. The one factor that appears 
to account for this difference were the sentences for drug and alcohol cases. Here, the average 
sentence was lower than other types of manslaughter and a majority of Indigenous offenders were 
sentenced for this type of manslaughter. 
 
A. Near Murder 
 Near murder cases for the purposes of this paper included both those in which provocation 
was found to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter as well as cases where, though such 
provocation was absent, a jury nonetheless convicted for manslaughter, or a plea to manslaughter 
was accepted by the court. Notwithstanding that distinction, these cases tended to closely resemble 
those in the drugs and alcohol category but for the absence of intoxication as a defining feature. 
This category accounted for 99 offenders representing 55.30% of the total of whom 98 received 
determinate sentences. Indigenous offenders were underrepresented in these cases, accounting for 
only 27 of 99 offenders. This was in contrast to the drug and alcohol cases where Indigenous 
offenders represented the overwhelming majority.   
Near murder accounted for 72.72% of all sentences for non-Indigenous offenders but only 
31.25% of sentences for Indigenous offenders. This category of manslaughter was sentenced more 
severely than the overall average, with sentences of approximately eight years and eight months’ 
imprisonment on average. Non-Indigenous offenders in this category were sentenced to slightly 
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less than eight years, three months’ imprisonment. By contrast, Indigenous offenders received an 
average sentence of over nine years, 11 months or nearly one year, nine months longer than non-
Indigenous offenders. 
 
Table 4.13 – Provincial and Territorial Average Sentences for Near Murder Manslaughter 
 All Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
Ontario 100.57 months 108 months 99.7 months 
British Columbia 95.91 months 114 months 92.17 months 
Alberta 108.66 months 66 months 130 months 
Saskatchewan 100.5 months 106 months 84 months 
Manitoba 111.6 months 122 months 96 months 
Yukon 96 months 108 months 84 months 
Northwest Territories - - - 
Nunavut 175.2 months 175.2 months - 
Total 103.92  months 117.87 months 98.67 months 
 
i. Nunavut 
This difference can be partially attributed to the long average sentences handed down in 
Nunavut. While Nunavut accounted for only nine Indigenous offenders, it produced five of the 25 
Indigenous offenders convicted for a near murder manslaughter. These five individuals received 
average sentence of 14 years and seven months’ imprisonment, considerably higher than the 
overall average. However, even if Nunavut were removed from the calculations, the average 
sentence for an Indigenous offender overall would be over eight years, nine months imprisonment, 
approximately nine months longer than those for non-Indigenous offenders. Two near murder 
cases in Nunavut have among the longest sentences in the survey and skew the territorial average. 
One case involved an offender who killed three men with a semi-automatic rifle when they 
attacked his home armed with a sword and a golf club. This was taken to be a case of excessive 
force used in self-defence and resulted in a sentence of 20 years.15 The other was a domestic killing 
that had gone through a lengthy process of trial and retrial before finally resulting in a guilty plea 
and a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment which amounted to time served.16 Notwithstanding these 
two cases, the average of the other three Nunavut near murder cases remained 11 years and eight 
months, still the longest in the country. This appears to be the result of the Nunavut Court of 
Justice’s attempts to strongly denounce the use of firearms to commit homicide in the territory. 
 
                                               
15 R v Bishop, 2015 NUCJ 10. 
16 R v VanEindhoven, 2016 NUCJ 19. 
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ii. Ontario 
 Ontario accounted for the largest number of near murder manslaughters at 38, or nearly 
four in ten of those decisions in the data set. It also accounted for four of the 25 Indigenous near 
murder cases. The average sentence for this category in Ontario was around eight years and four 
months for non-Indigenous offenders and nine years for Indigenous ones. This accorded roughly 
with the national average for the category and is situated toward the bottom of the range of eight 
to 12 from Ontario’s “aggravated manslaughter” category. There were only four cases to inform 
the findings for Indigenous offenders and so it was difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about 
the relative length of sentences. 
 
iii. British Columbia 
 British Columbia produced 35 near murder manslaughters and six of those involving 
Indigenous offenders, or around 35% of all sentences for near murder and approximately one 
quarter of Indigenous sentences for the same. The average sentence for non-Indigenous offenders 
in that province was slightly more than seven years and eight months’ imprisonment. The average 
for Indigenous offenders was nearly one year and ten months longer at an average of nine years 
and six months. Sentence lengths for non-Indigenous offenders were below the middle of British 
Columbia’s established range of four to 15 years where sentences for Indigenous offenders were 
in the middle of the range. The British Columbia courts’ tendency to sentence drug and alcohol 
cases more leniently for Indigenous offenders compared to non-Indigenous ones did not appear to 
extend to near murder cases. 
 
iv. Alberta 
 Alberta accounted for nine near murder cases and three involving Indigenous offenders. 
The average sentence for the six non-Indigenous offenders was ten years and ten months’ 
imprisonment. The average sentence for Indigenous offenders was shorter by five years and four 
months for an average sentence among the three Indigenous offenders of five years, six months. 
The near murder category accorded most closely with the third Laberge category of manslaughter 
classification in Alberta which captures actions placing the victim at risk of life-threatening injury. 
This category was generally associated with ranges of eight to twelve years. 
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 It appears from the data that non-Indigenous offenders were sentenced roughly in 
accordance with the range set out by the Alberta Court of Appeal but that Indigenous offenders 
were benefitting from lower sentences. The actions of five of the six non-Indigenous offenders 
were mentioned as belonging in the third category of Laberge. No mention was made of Laberge 
for the sixth but much of the sentencing material concentrated on her mental health issues and their 
impact on her moral blameworthiness.17 A Laberge classification was not provided for two of the 
three Indigenous offenders but the third was described as being situated somewhere between the 
second and third categories, though the circumstances of the offence appear to fall clearly within 
the near murder category. Based on this limited data set from Alberta, as illustrated in Table 4.13, 
it would appear the Court of Queen’s Bench was reticent to apply the third Laberge category to 
Indigenous offenders who committed a near murder manslaughter but were comfortable in doing 
so with non-Indigenous offenders. Despite a body of only nine cases, there was an evident 
difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders, with the lowest sentences handed 
down to Indigenous offenders in this category. The absence of explicit reference to the appropriate 
Laberge category in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders in near murder manslaughters could 
suggest a reticence to classify them under the third category which allowed for lower sentences 
for those offenders without running afoul of the Alberta Court of Appeal. 
 
v. Saskatchewan 
 A total of four near murder cases were drawn from Saskatchewan with three Indigenous 
and one non-Indigenous offender. The average sentence for all four was eight years, four and a 
half months’ imprisonment. The single non-Indigenous offender received a sentence of seven 
years, while the Indigenous offenders received average sentences of eight years and ten months’ 
imprisonment, or 22 months longer. Both of these average sentences were around the middle of 
the accepted Saskatchewan range of four to 12 years for manslaughters involving brutality and 
drugs and alcohol. Once again, the small sample set, particularly the presence of only a single non-
Indigenous offender, makes it impossible to draw a conclusion on the question of sentence 
differential in the province for the Indigenous/non-Indigenous divide.  
 
                                               
17 R v Lamb, 2017 ABQB 239. 
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vi. Manitoba 
 Manitoba produced five near murder cases in total, divided between three Indigenous and 
two non-Indigenous offenders. The average provincial sentence for this category of manslaughter 
was approximately nine years and four months’ imprisonment. The two non-Indigenous offenders 
in the group received an average sentence of eight years between them. By contrast, the three 
Indigenous offenders received an average sentence two years and two months longer at ten years 
and two months. Of note for the Manitoba near murder category is that all three Indigenous 
offenders were co-accused in the beating death of a federal inmate arising from an internal conflict 
within a prison gang rather than from unconnected incidents of manslaughter.18 Therefore there 
was no variation in the fact patterns giving rise to this particular group of cases and so it was 
difficult to arrive at any generalizations.  
 
vii. Yukon and the Northwest Territories 
 While both cases arising in the Yukon were near murders, they represented too small a 
sample set to analyze in a useful manner. It consisted of one Indigenous offender receiving a 
sentence of nine years imprisonment and one non-Indigenous offender receiving a sentence of 
seven years. There was no Yukon Court of Appeal range against which to examine them. No 
sentencing decisions from the Northwest Territories Supreme Court dealt with manslaughters in 
the near murder category. Nor was there any jurisprudence dealing with this category of 
manslaughter from the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal. 
 
viii. Trial Types, Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions 
Nearly 60% of all near murder cases were resolved through a guilty plea regardless of 
whether the offenders were Indigenous or non-Indigenous. There was, however, a stark division 
between Ontario and British Columbia. In British Columbia over 80% of near murder sentences 
came about as the result of a guilty plea compared with only one third of Ontario cases. In Ontario, 
by contrast, 68% of non-Indigenous offenders opted for a trial by jury but only one Indigenous 
offender of the four did the same. In British Columbia, less than 10% of offenders chose a jury 
trial and none of those were Indigenous. Judge alone trials were the least common option for 
                                               
18 R v Ryle, 2013 MBQB 33. 
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offenders overall but Indigenous offenders opted for them in over a fifth of cases, where non-
Indigenous offenders did the same in only 5% of cases. As with manslaughter on the whole, 
Indigenous offenders in this category expressed a clear preference for trial by judge alone or 
pleading guilty over taking their chances with a jury.   
Near murders accounted for 23 of the 37 joint submissions found in this research and arose 
in 40% of all guilty pleas for this category. About half of all Indigenous offenders who pleaded 
guilty did so in connection with a joint submission, this was true of only 35% of non-Indigenous 
offenders.   As noted above, the averages for near murder cases involving a joint submission 
suggest that no benefit arose for an offender entering into a joint submission with the Crown 
relative to a mere guilty plea. While it may be that the cases resolved by joint submissions tend to 
involve more serious factual circumstances and were likely to result in longer sentences if decided 
by a judge, this does not appear to be the case. Whatever the logic may be, it is impossible to know 
what the outcome might have been. 
The tendency of joint submissions to result in sentences that were longer than bare guilty 
pleas suggests that Crown counsel were not playing a part in attempting to reduce the over-
incarceration of Indigenous people for serious and violent crimes through the plea bargaining 
process. As noted in chapter one, only Ontario among the jurisdictions studied for this research, 
has a Crown policy directive dealing with Indigenous accused but it does not contain many 
specifics. While Gladue speaks to the role of judges in remedying the overrepresentation of 
Indigenous people in the criminal justice system, judges frequently work with the tools provided 
to them by counsel. Joint submissions that were in excess of bare guilty pleas run counter to the 
project of reducing Indigenous overrepresentation. Though defence counsel plays a role in the plea 
negotiation process, the Crown retains the balance of power and appear uninterested in making 
concessions to Indigenous offenders. This was visible both in the elevated prison terms resulting 
from joint submissions – some six and a half months longer than bare guilty pleas – and the nearly 
21-month gap between joint submissions for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. 
 
ix. Criminal Records and Violence 
In this category, of the 98 cases where information was available, 52 offenders had criminal 
records and 35 of those records involved violence. This held true across Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders with more than half of all offenders having prior criminal records. As a 
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proportion of all near murder offenders, one third had criminal records for violence whether or not 
they were Indigenous. There was effectively no difference in the proportion of Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous offenders who had criminal records and criminal records involving violence. 
However, there was a clear difference in average sentence outcome for those who had criminal 
records and records with violence.19  
 Indigenous offenders without a criminal record received an average sentence of eight years 
and two months, compared to an average sentence of over seven years, seven months for non-
Indigenous offenders without a criminal record. Where a criminal record was present, those figures 
increased to almost nine years, four months for Indigenous offenders and nearly eight years and 
ten months for non-Indigenous ones. Finally, where the criminal record contained convictions for 
violence, the average sentence for Indigenous offenders was ten years and 11 months, compared 
to less than eight years and ten months for non-Indigenous offenders. There was an escalation in 
sentence quantum due to the presence of criminal records and a further increase attributable to 
records with violence. There was also a clear indication that Indigenous offenders with criminal 
records and records for violence consistently received lengthier sentences than their non-
Indigenous counterparts. This indicates that criminal records for Indigenous offenders may be 
understood as making the offender less receptive to rehabilitation and therefore presenting a 
greater risk to reoffend. 
 
x. Age of Offenders 
As with the figures for criminal records, there was a pattern among the age groups 
represented in the cases. Offenders between the ages of 25 and 34 received the longest sentences, 
followed by those over the age of 50 , and by those between 35 and 50. Offenders who were under 
the age of 25 received the lowest sentences on average. This pattern was consistent between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous accused. For Indigenous offenders under the age of 25, the average 
sentence for near murder was seven years and eight months’ imprisonment, compared to over six 
years and nine months for their non-Indigenous analogues. For those between the ages of 25 and 
34, Indigenous offenders received average sentences of more than ten years and two months 
compared to more than eight years and five months for non-Indigenous offenders. 
                                               
19 Given the handful of extreme sentences handed down in Nunavut for near murders involving Indigenous 
offenders, that territory has been removed as a statistical outlier. 
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These figures dropped off again for offenders between 35 and 49-years-old, where 
Indigenous offenders received an average sentence of more than nine years and nine months, and 
their non-Indigenous counterparts received average sentences greater than seven years, eight 
months. Average sentences for non-Indigenous offenders over the age of 50 were greater than nine 
years and ten months. There was only a single near murder case involving an Indigenous offender 
over the age of 50 and so no meaningful comparison can be made for that age group.  
The severity of sentence was tied to age distribution in the near murder category and it 
remained consistent between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. It is clear in each age 
range, where sufficient information was available to reach a conclusion, that Indigenous offenders 
received sentences longer than their non-Indigenous equivalents. Among younger offenders, 
Indigenous ones could expect to receive a sentence over one year longer and for older Indigenous 
offenders, the difference was closer to two years.  
 
xi. Summary of Near Murder 
 The near murder category of manslaughter is defined by the striking similarities between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous comparator groups while nonetheless producing a dissimilarity in 
sentence outcome to the detriment of the former. The one significant distinction involves the 
tendency of Indigenous offenders to avoid trial by pleading guilty but this does not produce any 
reduction in sentence compared to non-Indigenous offenders. Criminal records and records for 
violence were nearly identical as were the age distributions of both groups. The longer sentences 
for Indigenous offenders for near murder were mostly consistent across the country with noticeably 
lower sentences only in Alberta and the Saskatchewan, both of which had few Indigenous 
offenders to contribute to the overall figures. There did not appear to be any substantial difference 
between these two groups that would justify the difference in sentence outcome observed. 
 
B. Drugs and Alcohol 
 Drug and alcohol cases are those where the intoxication of the offender was taken by the 
sentencing judge to be the defining characteristic of the case. It would often be that the offender 
could not form the requisite intent for murder due to their level of intoxication or that death was 
not intended but the offender was nonetheless intoxicated to the point where such cases could be 
differentiated from the near murder category where the offender was sober or relatively so. This 
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category contained the majority of cases involving Indigenous offenders, accounting for 43 of the 
80. Of a total of 52 drug and alcohol cases, only nine involved the sentencing of non-Indigenous 
offenders. These cases had an average sentence of approximately six years, ten and a half months’ 
imprisonment. Indigenous offenders, at six years, nine and a half months, received average 
sentences that were slightly more than five months shorter than the seven year, two and-a-half 
month average handed down to non-Indigenous offenders.  
 
Table 4.14 - Provincial and Territorial Average Sentences for Drug and Alcohol Manslaughter 
Jurisdiction All Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
Ontario 100 months 106.28 months 91.2 months 
British Columbia 76.97 months 79.03 months 86 months 
Alberta 77.66 months 84 months 65 months 
Saskatchewan 101.83 months 101.83 months - 
Manitoba 81.8 months 81.8 months - 
Yukon - - - 
Northwest Territories 62 months 62 months - 
Nunavut 52 months 52 months - 
Total 82.43 months 81.56 months 86.55 months 
 
 The fact that the majority of Indigenous offenders were sentenced in relation to drug and 
alcohol cases and that these cases carried lower sentences accounted for the lower sentences of 
Indigenous offenders overall in the body of cases examined for this research. The lower sentences 
of Indigenous people were not a result of more lenient sentencing across the board occasioned by 
the application of Gladue, but instead of Indigenous offenders being sentenced for a category of 
manslaughter that carried lower average penalties. Unfortunately, comparative information for this 
category was only available for British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta as no non-Indigenous 
offenders were convicted for drug and alcohol cases in other jurisdictions. However, the evidence 
suggests that the lower average sentences for drug and alcohol cases involving Indigenous 
offenders themselves were sufficient to bring down the overall average for all manslaughters 
involving Indigenous offenders.  If drug and alcohol cases are removed from consideration for all 
offenders, the average sentence for an Indigenous offender for all other categories of manslaughter 
changes from six months shorter than the average for a non-Indigenous offenders to six months 
longer. The result was an increase in overall Indigenous sentences by nearly 14 months and an 
increase in non-Indigenous sentences of just over one month. It initially appeared as though the 
lower Indigenous figure nationally may have been the product of lower sentences overall in British 
Columbia and the large proportion of Indigenous offenders in that province. However, if British 
Columbia is removed from the national figures, this serves to increase averages for Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous offenders alike in roughly the same proportion. It therefore appears that the 
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difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous sentences was attributable to differences in the 
sentencing of offenders in the drug and alcohol category rather than to a more lenient sentencing 
regime in British Columbia overall. 
 
Table 4.15 – Overall Averages without Drug and Alcohol Cases – In Months 
 All Indigenous  Non-Indigenous Difference for Ind. 
With Drug and Alcohol 96.04 92.63 98.78 -6.15 
Without Drug and Alcohol 101.78 106.22 100.03 +5.92 
Change +5.74 +13.59 +1.25  
 
 
Table 4.16 – Overall Averages without British Columbia – In Months 
 All Indigenous  Non-Indigenous Difference for Ind. 
With British Columbia 96.04 92.63 98.78 -6.15 
Without British Columbia 100.75 97.28 103.91 -6.63 
Change +4.71 +4.65 +5.13  
 
It is important to discuss the limitations of the data available for assessing the drug and alcohol 
category. Drug and alcohol killings involving non-Indigenous offenders were limited to Alberta, 
British Columbia and Ontario. This is because these killings were distributed in a way that made 
intra-provincial or territorial comparisons impossible in all but these three jurisdictions. This is 
illustrated in Table 4.14, which demonstrates the relative sentences in provinces where that 
information was available and also shows those jurisdictions where it was not. The national 
numbers saw higher overall sentences for non-Indigenous offenders compared to Indigenous ones 
when it came to drug and alcohol killings. This was also true of the cases arising in British 
Columbia. However, Alberta and Ontario both produced higher average sentences for drug and 
alcohol killings among Indigenous offenders compared with non-Indigenous offenders than did 
British Columbia. If we remove Ontario from the figures on the assumption that it is an outlier, 
the average sentences for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders nationwide in the drug and 
alcohol category decrease in roughly the same proportion; the drawback, however, is that the 
analysis then becomes dependent almost exclusively on British Columbia. The tendency of Ontario 
courts to sentence drug and alcohol manslaughters harshly is explored below in the discussion of 
the role played by that province’s “aggravated manslaughter” categorization. However, this does 
not provide an explanation for why Indigenous offenders received longer sentences for drug and 
alcohol killings in that province than non-Indigenous offenders did. 
Because of the limitations in the data, the sentences given to non-Indigenous offenders as a 
whole had to be compared with data that relied heavily on jurisdictions where there were no non-
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Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders sentenced at all. This required a comparison that used the 
national averages for the two groups and consequently was not able to adequately explain the 
longer sentences received by Indigenous offenders in Alberta and Ontario when compared with 
British Columbia. This is not ideal but the limitations in the data do not allow for more robust 
comparisons. Differences in average sentences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders 
in the drug and alcohol category is smaller than that for near murder and the conclusions drawn 
about the relative length of drug and alcohol sentences for non-Indigenous offenders are based 
primarily on the fact that such offenders tended to receive shorter sentences in Ontario and longer 
sentences in British Columbia. To draw general conclusions about the relative figures required 
bringing in averages from jurisdictions that contained no non-Indigenous offenders. The relative 
differences in sentences involving drug and alcohol killings between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders should therefore be assessed cautiously given that over a third of all drug 
and alcohol manslaughters occurred in jurisdictions where no non-Indigenous offenders fell into 
that category. 
 
i. Ontario 
 Ontario produced a total of twelve drug and alcohol cases involving seven Indigenous and 
five non-Indigenous offenders. These accounted for slightly more than one quarter of these cases. 
Indigenous offenders received average sentences of greater than eight years and ten months’ 
imprisonment. In contrast, sentences for non-Indigenous offenders were over one year, eight 
months shorter at slightly more than seven years, seven months. Overall, Ontario had the second-
highest average sentences in the country for drug and alcohol manslaughters, falling only four 
months short of the province’s average sentence for a near murder manslaughter. It also had the 
highest average sentence for Indigenous offenders in this category of manslaughter. 
 This phenomenon may be a result of the Ontario courts’ approach to establishing ranges 
for manslaughter. British Columbia and Saskatchewan have large, general ranges for 
manslaughters running from a low of four years to a high of 12 and 15 years respectively. 
Similarly, Alberta has established ranges for the two highest categories of manslaughter that 
together accord roughly with the wider ranges in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. By contrast, 
the Ontario courts have only developed one range for what is referred to as “aggravated 
manslaughter”. While a good deal of these cases had characteristics that fit the model of aggravated 
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manslaughter there was still a recognizable pattern in Ontario and across the country that the drug 
and alcohol cases received lower sentences. In Ontario, the absence of a wider range for general 
manslaughter or a specific range for manslaughters of a lower category created a situation in which 
eight to 12 years was viewed as the standard range for most violent manslaughters not falling into 
the unusual circumstances or one-punch categories on the one hand or home invasion and robbery 
category on the other. This produced higher average sentences than other jurisdictions, as a 
sentence below the eight-year bottom of the range appeared comparatively lenient. In the absence 
of a lower end of the range in which such crimes could be placed, manslaughter sentences for this 
category were pulled higher.   
 
ii. British Columbia 
 The largest proportion of drug and alcohol cases - around one third - originated in British 
Columbia. This province produced 17 cases in total, 14 involving Indigenous offenders and only 
three non-Indigenous ones. While not the lowest sentences  in the country, these sentences were 
among the lowest and given that they represented a substantial number of Indigenous offenders, 
they served to lower the average sentence for these offenders across the country. The average 
sentence for an Indigenous offender in British Columbia was just over six years and three months’ 
imprisonment. Non-Indigenous offenders received average sentences that were nearly 11 months 
longer at seven years and two months.  
 What is notable for the British Columbia figures was that Indigenous offenders convicted 
for drug and alcohol manslaughters received sentences which were nearly three years and three 
months shorter than Indigenous offenders convicted in near murder cases. The comparable 
difference for non-Indigenous offenders were sentences that were lower by slightly more than six 
months. The Indigenous average for drug and alcohol murders was situated in the lower half of 
the established British Columbia range for manslaughter of four to 15 years, where non-Indigenous 
offenders were found in the middle of the range and closer to the average for near murder cases.  
 There was a clear difference between near murder and drug and alcohol charges among 
Indigenous offenders in British Columbia. Drug and alcohol manslaughters were viewed as a 
separate and less morally blameworthy category of homicide and offenders were sentenced 
accordingly. While Alberta also saw lower sentences for non-Indigenous offenders sentenced for 
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drug and alcohol cases, this was a result of a single non-Indigenous offender and so does not permit 
a worthwhile comparison.  
 
iii. Alberta 
 The Alberta data produced one non-Indigenous and two Indigenous offenders in this 
category. Unfortunately, this sample was not large enough to reach any conclusions about the 
differences between the two sets of offenders. The two Indigenous offenders received an average 
sentence of seven years where the lone non-Indigenous offender received one of five years. These 
figures were below the national average for drug and alcohol cases. This is notable since Alberta 
generally produced among the highest sentences overall for manslaughter. The two Indigenous 
offenders received an average sentence that was actually 18 months longer than the Indigenous 
average for the near murder category, while the non-Indigenous offender received a sentence that 
was five years and five months shorter than the non-Indigenous average for the same. 
 One of the Indigenous offenders was found to be in the second Laberge category, while 
the other was found to be in the third and their sentences reflect this with a difference of two years. 
The single non-Indigenous offender was found to be in the upper part of the second category of 
Laberge and he received a sentence that was six months shorter than the Indigenous offender found 
within the second category. Nonetheless, all three sentences were within the generally accepted 
higher end of the range for the second Laberge category. Such a small difference in sentence could 
be attributable to any number of factors. As noted above, the small number of cases makes it 
difficult to draw useful conclusions for this category in this province.  
 
iv. Saskatchewan 
 Six drug and alcohol cases emerged from Saskatchewan, representing the majority of cases 
from the province. All of these decisions dealt with Indigenous offenders and accounted for two 
thirds of the Indigenous total for that province. The average sentence handed down in the province 
for these cases was just over five years and two months’ imprisonment. This figure was lower than 
that for near murder cases in the province by over three years and two months. The average 
sentences for drug and alcohol cases involving Indigenous offenders were located toward the lower 
end of the province’s established four to twelve-year range for manslaughters involving brutality 
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and drugs and alcohol. There were no non-Indigenous cases in this category and it was therefore 
not possible to determine whether this was also true of those offenders. 
 
v. Manitoba 
 Like Saskatchewan, the drug and alcohol decisions in Manitoba all involved Indigenous 
offenders. The five offenders in this category represented nearly half of those in the province 
overall as well as half of Indigenous offenders. The average sentence for such cases was slightly 
less than six years and ten months’ imprisonment. This figure was approximately three years and 
four months shorter than the average sentence for Indigenous offenders involved in a near murder 
case. It should be recalled that Indigenous offenders received sentences in excess of two years 
longer for near murder cases in Saskatchewan than did non-Indigenous ones. Even accounting for 
that, Indigenous offenders in drug and alcohol cases in the province still received sentences that 
were more than 14 months shorter than the non-Indigenous figures for a near murder manslaughter. 
This difference was present despite the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s insistence that there will be 
heavier sentences for drunken killings. Unfortunately, the lack of a non-Indigenous comparator 
group makes it impossible to determine if this was a trend common to all drug and alcohol cases 
in the province, or merely those involving Indigenous offenders.  
 
vi. The Territories 
 There were no cases fitting this category of manslaughter in the Yukon. By contrast, all six 
cases in the Northwest Territories were classified as drug and alcohol manslaughters and all 
involved Indigenous offenders. The average sentence in the territory for these killings was five 
years and two months’ imprisonment.  While there were no near murder or non-Indigenous cases 
against which to compare these decisions, they were on average slightly less than 17 months 
shorter than the national average for an Indigenous offenders convicted of a drug and alcohol 
manslaughter and more than two years shorter than those for non-Indigenous offenders.  
 Three of Nunavut’s nine decisions were classified as drug and alcohol killings and like all 
decisions arising in the territory, they dealt with Indigenous offenders. Nunavut had the highest 
sentences for manslaughters overall and the highest by far for near murders at over 14 years and 
seven months. Nunavut had the lowest average sentences in the country for drug and alcohol 
killings at four years and four months’ imprisonment. This is unusual given the territory’s often 
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strong emphasis on local conditions and the particularly harsh manner in which the near murder 
category of manslaughters was sentenced there. 
 
vii. Trial Types, Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions 
It is important to note that drug and alcohol cases amounted to a total of 52 offenders, 
therefore this discussion of trial types was based on a smaller sample set than the foregoing 
discussion of near murder cases. For this type of manslaughter, the largest group consisted of 
Indigenous offenders from British Columbia. Overall, Indigenous offenders demonstrated a slight 
preference (62.6%) for pleading guilty in drug and alcohol cases, compared with non-Indigenous 
offenders. Like the figures for near murders, there was a marked difference between Ontario and 
British Columbia. In Ontario, only 40% of non-Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty with the 
remainder opting for trial by jury, while 85% of Indigenous offenders opted to plead guilty and 
the remainder – consisting of only one offender – chose trial by jury. These figures were roughly 
consistent with the Ontario figures for near murders. 
In British Columbia, two of the three non-Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty while the 
third opted for trial by judge alone. By contrast, less than half of Indigenous offenders pleaded 
guilty with a fifth choosing trial by judge and jury and a quarter trial by judge alone. There was no 
information to determine the trial type for the remaining offender. The Indigenous offender figures 
for British Columbia dealing with drug and alcohol cases offered a very different picture than those 
for near murder. The judge alone figures were fairly consistent at a fifth for near murder and a 
quarter for drug and alcohol cases. However, where 80% of Indigenous offenders chose a guilty 
plea for near murder, only 46% did so in drug and alcohol cases. Similarly, while no Indigenous 
offenders in the near murder category chose trial by judge and jury, a fifth of those involved in 
drug and alcohol cases did.  Though nearly half of Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty in the drug 
and alcohol category, this was far lower than the 80% figure for near murder cases. The Indigenous 
offenders from British Columbia in drug and alcohol cases demonstrated a discernible preference 
for taking their chances at trial rather than pleading guilty.  
Eleven of the 37 joint submissions were the product of guilty pleas in drug and alcohol 
cases. Sixty percent of non-Indigenous offenders who pleaded guilty did so in connection with a 
joint submission, but the comparable figure for Indigenous offenders was under 30%.  As noted, 
there was no demonstrated benefit arising from a joint submission when compared with a bare 
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guilty plea. Non-Indigenous offenders who did not plead guilty received sentences of an average 
of seven years and four months, compared with Indigenous offenders who received an average of 
six years and six months. For bare guilty pleas, the figures were effectively identical at around 
seven years and one month. Where there was a bare guilty plea, Indigenous offenders received 
sentences of roughly five years and 11 months compared with five years and six months for non-
Indigenous offenders. While the sentences were higher overall for joint submissions at eight years 
and three months for Indigenous and eight years and eight months for non-Indigenous offenders, 
the figures for Indigenous offenders were lower than non-Indigenous ones. This was in contrast to 
those for near murders, where Indigenous sentences were higher across the board. Therefore there 
was a benefit for Indigenous offenders in a joint submission but only relative to non-Indigenous 
ones, rather than Indigenous offenders who had their sentence determined by a judge. 
 
viii. Criminal Records and Violence 
In drug and alcohol manslaughters, among the 52 cases, 37 offenders had criminal records 
and 27 of those included convictions for violent offences. Unlike the near murder category where 
there was no discernible difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with respect 
to criminal records and records with violence, there was a striking difference among the drug and 
alcohol cases. Nearly 80% of Indigenous offenders had a criminal record compared with only one 
third of non-Indigenous ones. Within those figures, nearly three quarters of Indigenous records 
involved violence, a figure which was two thirds for non-Indigenous offenders. As a proportion of 
all offenders, nearly 60% of Indigenous offenders had criminal records for violence compared to 
just over 20% of non-Indigenous ones.  
Indigenous offenders without criminal records received an average sentence of five years 
and eight months’ imprisonment, where non-Indigenous offenders without criminal records were 
given sentences averaging seven years and three months. Where the offender had a criminal record, 
those figures increased to slightly more than seven years for Indigenous offenders and nearly seven 
years and two months for non-Indigenous offenders. Finally, for offenders with criminal records 
including convictions for violence, the average sentence for an Indigenous offender was just over 
seven years and one month. The comparable figure for non-Indigenous offenders was more than 
five years and eight months, however this sample consisted of only two offenders and so it does 
not allow for a useful comparison to the 25 Indigenous offenders with records for violence.   
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While there was an obvious escalation for all offenders with criminal records, and then for 
Indigenous offenders with records involving violence, the information was insufficient to make a 
similar conclusion for non-Indigenous offenders. Despite the clear increase of over 16 months 
between Indigenous offenders without criminal records and those with prior convictions, there was 
no discernible increase between those with criminal records and those with records involving 
violence. This was in contrast to Indigenous offenders convicted for near murder manslaughters, 
where there was an increase of around 20 months for those with records for violence compared to 
those with criminal records without convictions for violence.  
This suggests that in the drug and alcohol categories, while criminal records were a 
consideration at sentencing, the presence of violence in those records was not treated as a further 
aggravating factor on the whole. It should be noted that 30% of Indigenous offenders in this 
category were from British Columbia and that 70% of them had records for violence. Given British 
Columbia’s generally low sentences in this category and relatively large share of the total number 
of offenders, these cases play an outsized role in determining the figures overall.  
 
ix. Age of Offenders 
As with all figures in this section, there were fewer non-Indigenous drug and alcohol 
offenders to deal with so limited conclusions can be drawn about their presence in the different 
age categories. For Indigenous offenders the patterns between age groups were similar to those for 
the near murder category. Indigenous offenders under 25 years of age received an average sentence 
of slightly less than five years and eight months’ imprisonment. This figure increased to nearly 
seven years and nine months for those between the ages of 25 and 34 and decreased for Indigenous 
offenders between 35 and 50 to five years and three months. One point of interest here was the 
presence of five individuals older than 50 among Indigenous offenders, who received an average 
sentence of nearly seven years and six months’ imprisonment. There was only a single non-
Indigenous offender over the age 50 among drug and alcohol offenders.  
For non-Indigenous offenders the pattern among the handful of drug and alcohol offenders 
in the data followed a pattern similar to Indigenous offenders. The three offenders aged 18-24 
years old received an average sentence of almost six years and four months. This increased to ten 
years for the single non-Indigenous offender aged between 25-34 and decreased again to six years 
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for the one offender aged between 35-50. The single non-Indigenous offender over the age of 50 
received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment.  
The pattern of increasing sentences for offenders in the 25-34 category that was apparent 
among Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders and both categories of near murder offenders 
persisted for non-Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders. The shorter sentences for Indigenous 
offenders in the drug and alcohol category were apparent across the age distribution with the 
exception of offenders over 50, where the single non-Indigenous offender received a lower 
sentence.  
Interestingly, while there were five Indigenous offenders over the age of 50 in the drug and 
alcohol category against a single non-Indigenous one, the figures were reversed for the near murder 
category where there were six non-Indigenous offenders compared with a single Indigenous 
offender over the age of 50.  In the respective categories in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
offenders represented the overwhelming number of offenders, non-Indigenous offenders over 50 
represented only 9% of offenders compared to older Indigenous offenders representing 13.5% of 
the total.  
 
x. Summary of Drug and Alcohol  
Drug and alcohol manslaughters saw more differences between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders. Most notable was the overall reversal in sentence severity in this category, 
with Indigenous offenders receiving lower sentences without a significant difference in guilty 
pleas, despite the substantially higher likelihood that Indigenous offenders would have both 
criminal records and records with convictions for violence. There was some evidence in these 
cases that the Crown was willing to offer more lenient plea agreements in their joint submissions 
to Indigenous offenders than to non-Indigenous ones. This was the reverse of the plea bargaining 
situation for near murder cases which resulted in longer sentences for non-Indigenous offenders. 
Like the near murder category, there does not appear to be any readily discernible explanation for 
the difference in sentence outcome from this data alone. 
 
C. Robbery and Home Invasion 
 Home invasion and robbery cases represented a fairly small fraction of the total sentencing 
decisions for manslaughter in the country but tended to be sentenced most severely. These cases 
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generally dealt with the offender killing the victim in the course of a robbery or a home invasion 
and the severity of sentence results from premeditation and the indifference to human life 
demonstrated in the course of a crime committed for financial gain. There were a total of 14 cases 
involving either home invasions or robberies and only three involved Indigenous offenders. Eight 
of these decisions were from Ontario, three from British Columbia, two from Alberta and one from 
Manitoba. Thirteen of these cases resulted in a determinate sentence and one offender from Alberta 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for killing an elderly couple during a robbery on a remote 
stretch of highway.20 
 Indigenous offenders were largely underrepresented in this category. While such decisions 
accounted for a tenth of all non-Indigenous offenders, they accounted for less 4% of Indigenous 
ones. Among manslaughters of this kind, the average sentence was over ten years and nine months 
imprisonment or two years, ten months longer than the average sentence for a manslaughter 
generally. For non-Indigenous offenders, the average sentence was in excess of 11 years, seven 
months which was over three years and seven months longer than the Indigenous average of eight 
years’ imprisonment. However, the Indigenous figure was drawn from a sample of only three cases 
and so can provide little in the way of general information about Indigenous robbery and home 
invasion cases. 
 
Table 4.17 – Provincial and Territorial Average for Robbery and Home Invasion Manslaughters 
 All Indigenous Non-Indigenous 
Total Months 1,680 288 1,392 
Number of offenders 13 3 10 
Average in months 129.23 96 139.2 
 
D. Arson 
 There were six offenders sentenced for manslaughters committed by arson, and they were 
split evenly between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. In discussing arson cases it is not 
particularly useful to analyze them in terms of averages as the difference between the cases was 
too great.  One Indigenous offender was given a life sentence for setting a fire in which five 
residents of a rooming house were killed.21 In another case, a non-Indigenous man in British 
Columbia set his home on fire with his wife and five children inside and killed his spouse for 
                                               
20 R v Vader, 2017 ABQB 48. 
21 Flett, supra note 14. 
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which he was given a sentence of 18 years following a guilty plea.22 Another case involved an 
Indigenous woman in Nunavut who was sentenced to one year imprisonment when, following an 
argument with her husband, she set the small shed in which he was drinking on fire and killed 
him.23 While this case and the rooming house fire that resulted in five deaths were the outliers, it 
can be said that manslaughters resulting from arson were punished most severely. If the life 
sentence and the reformatory sentence are removed from consideration, there remains an average 
sentence of 13 years and seven and a half months’ imprisonment. The high average for arson 
sentences was derived from the extraordinary risk to the public created by the intentional setting 
of fires and the obvious indifference to human life involved.  
 Of the six cases involving arson, four were domestic homicides. All arson cases involving 
non-Indigenous offenders were domestic homicides wherein the offender’s spouse was either the 
victim or the intended victim. In only one case involving an Indigenous offender was this true. The 
domestic violence aspect of arsons were considered to be a significant aggravating factor that 
produced substantial sentences for two of the non-Indigenous offenders.24 However, for the single 
Indigenous offender where the arson was domestic in nature, the sentence was among the lowest 
received by any offender in this study for any manslaughter conviction.25  
 
E. Unusual Circumstances and One-Punch 
 The lower end of the sentence averages were occupied almost exclusively by those 
classified as one-punch and unusual circumstances cases. In both these categories, the resulting 
death depended heavily on the element of chance. One-punch cases consist of a single punch to 
the victim where they subsequently lost consciousness and struck their head causing death. 
Unusual circumstances manslaughter cases were varied but the resulting death also depended 
substantially on chance. There were four one-punch cases, all arising in British Columbia and 
divided evenly between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. One Indigenous and one non-
Indigenous offender were sentenced to six months and one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous 
offender were each sentenced to three years.  
                                               
22 R v BKJL, 2018 BCSC 379. 
23 R v Ussak, 2013 NUCJ 9. 
24 BKJL, supra note 22; R v Dosanjh, 2018 BCSC 2302. 
25 Ussak, supra note 23. 
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 There were a total of three cases classified as unusual circumstances, all occurring in 
British Columbia, of which two involved non-Indigenous offenders. In both cases with non-
Indigenous offenders, they both received sentences of six months. The only Indigenous offender 
in the category received a sentence of five years. The death in that case resulted from the offender 
attempting to attack the victim with pepper spray and a length of chain while he was sitting in a 
car, causing the deceased to flee into the street where he was struck by a passing vehicle and 
killed.26 Despite the substantial sentence, it was classified as an unusual circumstances case 
because of the degree of chance that led to the death. As with the arson cases, the wide differences 
in the circumstances of the offence and the small number of cases make generalizations about these 
cases difficult. 
 
5. Comparison Between Drug and Alcohol and Near Murder Categories 
Comparing Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders convicted of manslaughter 
demonstrates that the two groups of offenders were substantially similar to one another. The 
principal differences arose in the types of manslaughter for which they were convicted and the 
dissimilarity in sentence quantum. Indigenous offenders tended to be involved in more personal 
crimes. They were more likely to kill acquaintances and family members than non-Indigenous 
offenders and they were less likely to be involved in offences committed for profit. The most 
substantial difference has to do with the classifications of their crimes. Indigenous offenders were 
largely convicted in the drug and alcohol category and this was the sole category in which they 
received lower sentences overall.  
 Drug and alcohol and near murder killings between them represented 84% of all offenders 
examined in this study. The two categories essentially represented a division between the bulk of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Seventy two of ninety nine near murder offenders were 
non-Indigenous and represented roughly 72% of both the near murder category and the total 
number of non-Indigenous offenders. By contrast, forty three of fifty two three drug and alcohol 
offenders were Indigenous, which represented just under 54% of all Indigenous offenders and just 
short of 83% of all drug and alcohol offenders. Drug and alcohol killings therefore represented 
less than one in ten of all non-Indigenous offenders compared to over half of Indigenous ones.  
                                               
26 R v Cote, 2013 BCSC 2424. 
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 In the near murder category the difference in average sentence outcome between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders was evident. There, Indigenous offenders received 
sentences that were an average of twenty months longer than those handed down to non-
Indigenous offenders. Among drug and alcohol killings there was a less substantial difference in 
sentence outcome between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with Indigenous offenders 
receiving average sentences five months shorter than non-Indigenous ones.  
 Of particular interest in the division between these two groups was the presence of criminal 
records in the two categories. Among the body of offenders for near murder, there was virtually 
no difference between the rates of criminal records and criminal records with violence between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. However, Indigenous offenders still received 
demonstrably longer sentences than non-Indigenous offenders. By contrast, nearly 80% of 
Indigenous offenders in the drug and alcohol category had criminal records compared to a third of 
non-Indigenous offenders and those Indigenous offenders with criminal records were more likely 
to have convictions for violence on their records. Despite these differences between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous offenders in the two categories, near murder sentences still saw consistently 
longer sentences applied to Indigenous offenders despite identical rates of criminal records and 
records with violence. In the drug and alcohol category, notwithstanding the substantially higher 
numbers of Indigenous offenders with criminal records and records for violence, sentences for 
Indigenous offenders remained lower for than those for non-Indigenous ones.  
 The difference in criminal records and records with violence was the only significant one 
between the bodies of offenders in the near murder and drug and alcohol killings. Otherwise, they 
were substantially similar. Given the relative difference in the rates of criminal records in the drug 
and alcohol category it would be expected that sentences for Indigenous offenders would be longer 
instead of shorter. In the near murder category, the similar rates of criminal records and records 
with violence would be expected to produce similar sentence outcomes, with all else being equal. 
This suggests that the criminal record issue, despite its importance in sentencing overall, did not 
play a significant role in determining relative sentence outcome, meaning that some other factor 
was at play in creating that difference.  
 The vast bodies of Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders were substantially similar in 
most aspects, the only significant differences lay in the types of manslaughters for which they were 
convicted and the differences in sentence quantum between those categories. This suggests that 
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something else explains the relative differences in sentence length between the two categories of 
manslaughter offenders. Indigenous offenders, despite pleading guilty at roughly the same rates as 
non-Indigenous offenders and having similar rates of criminal records and records with violence 
received longer sentences for near murder and with similar rates of guilty pleas and a greater 
likelihood of criminal records and records with violence, Indigenous offenders received shorter 
sentences for drug and alcohol killings. This suggests that a contributing factor in both of these 
was the impact or lack of impact of the Gladue provisions on sentence.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The social conditions of many Indigenous communities and neighbourhoods in Canada are 
well known, as are the community’s struggles with substance abuse. It should therefore not be 
surprising that many of the manslaughters committed by Indigenous people fell into the drugs and 
alcohol category. Despite the more frequent guilty pleas in near murder cases and nearly identical 
figures for criminal records and for violence, Indigenous people received longer sentences than 
non-Indigenous offenders for this type of manslaughter. Conversely, lower rates of guilty pleas 
but considerably higher rates of criminal records and records with violence in the drug and alcohol 
category led to lower sentences for Indigenous offenders compared with non-Indigenous 
offenders.  
This apparent contradiction was likely related to the operation of the Gladue principles but 
in a particular fashion. Drug and alcohol killings may be viewed by judges, although never 
explicitly in these terms, as a typically Indigenous style of manslaughter. Because of the role 
played by intoxication, such crimes can be connected more easily with the prevalent stereotypes 
about the social conditions of Indigenous people and the effects of residential school and 
intergenerational trauma. Therefore, when Indigenous offenders committed types of manslaughter 
that did not fit the drug and alcohol pattern they were viewed as departing from crimes that could 
be readily connected to these experiences and so lost the benefit of a reduced sentence that might 
result from that connection. Instead, they were being viewed as more dangerous to the public and 
in need of longer sentences to deter them from committing further crimes. These questions are 
explored in more depth in the following chapter through the analysis of the application of the 
Gladue principles to the judicial decision-making process and their impact on sentence outcomes. 
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Chapter Five: The Application of Gladue at Sentencing 
 
1. Introduction 
 This chapter examines the application of the Gladue provisions in the sentencing process 
itself. Its purpose it to ascertain whether there was a different methodology employed in sentencing 
Indigenous offenders and how that manifested in judicial decisions. The previous chapter 
suggested that in comparing Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders there were distinctions in 
sentence outcomes between these two groups. Indigenous offenders received lower sentences for 
drug and alcohol killings compared to non-Indigenous offenders but they received equal or higher 
sentences in other categories such as near murder.  This section serves to assess whether causes 
for these disparities can be attributed to the operation of the Gladue provisions.   
 This chapter begins with an analysis of the rates of Gladue Reports in the cases examined 
and the material which they contained. It then moves to a consideration of the two stages of Gladue 
by trial courts. The balance of this chapter involves an examination of the different types of 
methodologies that have been employed to sentence Indigenous offenders for manslaughter before 
comparing the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome between and within Indigenous-
specific sentencing methodologies and traditional methodologies. 
 
2. Gladue Reports 
Before analyzing the application of the provisions themselves, it is necessary to return to 
the question of Gladue Reports and place the information submitted to the sentencing courts into 
context. As noted in chapter one,1 the availability of Gladue Reports is not consistent across 
Canada and some provinces and territories have no mechanisms for producing them. However, 
with the seriousness of a conviction for manslaughter, it would be reasonable to expect Gladue 
Reports to appear frequently in these cases. Even where resources for their production are scarce 
– which is the case everywhere – given the potential severity of sentence, manslaughter convictions 
are a good place to direct the limited resources available to the Gladue Report infrastructure.  
                                               
1 See pages 24-25. 
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Unlike pre-sentence reports, there is no established form for Gladue Reports and no 
particular mechanism for ordering them.2 While they are not standardized in any fashion, these 
reports will usually convey information on the background and systemic factors related to the 
offender being sentenced and the community from which they come. Here, this often included 
discussions of the individual’s personal experiences with physical, emotional, and sexual abuse;3 
substance use;4 history in the child welfare system;5 and, any relevant experiences they may have 
had with residential schools.6  
These reports also dealt with the offender’s family history where appropriate. This often 
involved a discussion of the residential school experiences of parents and grandparents,7 or their 
adoption into non-Indigenous families and the resulting intergenerational trauma that may have 
affected the offender.8 This may be in the form of personally experiencing violent and neglectful 
childhoods9 or witnessing widespread substance abuse and physical violence in the home.10 A 
Gladue Report is designed to bring this information to the attention of the court in order to 
appreciate the impact of the background and systemic factors on the offender and craft a sentence 
taking them into account.11 It should be noted that Gladue Reports are not expert reports and 
instead serve to convey the information without any judgment as to its veracity.12  
As outlined in chapter one,13 formal processes do not exist for producing Gladue Reports 
in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The Yukon created a pilot 
program to produce Gladue Reports in 2018 but only after the single case from that jurisdiction 
                                               
2 Jonathan Rudin, Indigenous People and the Criminal Justice System: A Practitioner’s Handbook. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2019) at 109.  
3 R v Jourdain, 2016 ONSC 7890; R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615; R v Fiddler, 2018 SKQB 197; R v Flett, 2013 
MBQB 124; R v Taniskishayinew, 2018 BCSC 296. 
4 R v Jourdain, 2016 ONSC 7890; R v Cote, 2013 BCSC 2424; R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615; R v Taniskishayinew, 
2018 BCSC 296. 
5 R v Beaulieu, 2014 BCSC 2068; R v Touchie, 2015 BCSC 1833; R v Isadore, 2016 ABQB 83. 
6 R v Stonechild, 2017 SKQB 138. 
7 R v Touchie, 2015 BCSC 1833; R v Abraham, 2014 MBQB 242; R v Dick, 2014 MBQB 187; R v Isadore, 2016 
ABQB 83; R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615; R v Scotchman, 2016 BCSC 652; R v David, 2017 BCSC 877; R v 
Johnson, 2017 BCSC 1240; R v Taniskishayinew, 2018 BCSC 296; R v Swampy, 2015 ABQB 319. 
8 R v Nicholls, 2015 ONSC 8136. 
9 R v Jourdain, 2016 ONSC 7890; R v Thomas, 2016 ONSC 7944; R v Brerrton, 2013 BCSC 1029; R v Beaulieu, 
2014 BCSC 2068. 
10 R v Touchie, 2015 BCSC 1833; R v Gray, [2015] OJ No 1915; R v Jourdain, 2016 ONSC 7890; R v Johnny, 2015 
BCSC 615; R v Swampy, 2015 ABQB 319.  
11 Rudin, Indigenous People, supra note 2 at 111-112. 
12 Ibid at 114. 
13 See page 24. 
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considered in this study was decided.14 Among the jurisdictions examined, Ontario, British 
Columbia and Alberta each have a formal system for producing Gladue Reports.15 Resources in 
the criminal justice system are scarce everywhere and this is evident in the paucity of coverage for 
Gladue Reports. As Jonathan Rudin has stated, “[t]o describe that availability of Gladue Reports 
across the country as a patchwork quilt would do a disservice to quilt makers” as even “patchwork 
quilts do not have huge holes in them.”16  
 
Table 5.1 – Gladue Reports by Province/Territory 
 Gladue Report PSR – Gladue 
Component 
Gladue Report 
Waived 
None/Unknown Percentage of 
Jurisdiction 
Ontario 8 - - 4 66.66 
British Columbia 12 4 5 6 44.44 
Alberta 2 - - 3 40.00 
Saskatchewan 2 1 - 6 22.22 
Manitoba 6 - - 5 54.54 
Yukon - - - 1 - 
NWT - - - 6 - 
Nunavut - - - 9 - 
All 30 5 5 40 - 
Percentage of Total 37.50 6.25 6.25 50.00 - 
 
The differences in Gladue Report production across the country are apparent in the cases 
considered in this research. Of the 80 Indigenous offenders examined here, only 30 had Gladue 
Reports prepared for their sentencing hearings. While the absence of some Gladue Reports can be 
attributed to the presence of a joint submission and a more limited sentencing hearing,17 there were 
also cases involving joint submissions that included Gladue Reports,18 so this was not 
determinative. There were no Gladue Reports cited in the decisions from the territories at all. Two-
thirds of Ontario cases involved a Gladue Report compared to less than half of British Columbia 
cases, while in Alberta only two of the five Indigenous offenders had a Gladue Report prepared. 
Despite the absence of a formal system for their production in Manitoba, over half of all cases 
from that province involved a Gladue Report as did two of the nine cases from Saskatchewan. 
Reports were produced in less than one third of near murder cases but close to 40% of drug and 
alcohol cases, however, all three home invasion or robbery cases involved a Gladue Report. 
 
 
 
                                               
14 Rudin, Indigenous People, supra note 2 at 110. 
15 Ibid at 109-110 
16 Ibid at 110. 
17 R v Grenier, 2013 BCSC 1894; R v Saar, 2014 BCSC 847; R v Strongquill, 2016 SKQB 397. 
18 R v Skead, 2017 ONSC 179;  R v David, 2017 BCSC 877; R v Brerrton, 2013 BCSC 1029; R v Abraham, 2014 
MBQB 242. 
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Table 5.2 – Gladue Reports by Category of Manslaughter 
 Gladue Report PSR – Gladue 
Component 
Gladue Report 
Waived 
None/Unknown Percentage by 
Offence 
Near Murder 8 3 1 15 29.62 
Drug/Alcohol 17 2 2 23 38.63 
Home Invasion/Robbery 3 - - - 100.0 
Arson 1 - 1 1 33.33 
One Punch - - 1 1 - 
Unusual Circumstances 1 - - - 100.0 
Total 30 5 5 40 - 
 
There were occasions where a pre-sentence report was written that contained a “Gladue 
component.” These were essentially pre-sentence reports where the probation officer who drafted 
them attempted to address the background and systemic factors affecting the offender and offering 
their conclusions about possible impacts. Caution has been expressed by scholars toward this 
practice because of the tendency of pre-sentence reports to focus on risk assessment and from fears 
that discussion of the systemic and background factors may cause the offender to be deemed a 
higher risk than they might be were these details omitted.19 Notwithstanding the potential negative 
effects of these reports, they served to convey some of the same relevant information to the court. 
Pre-sentence reports with a Gladue component were submitted to the court in four cases in British 
Columbia and one in Saskatchewan.20  
In most other cases where the provision of pre-sentence information was specified it came 
in the form of a traditional pre-sentence report or occasionally from psychiatric reports and 
sometimes from a combination of the two. It is evident from reading the decisions that even in the 
absence of Gladue Reports or Gladue components within pre-sentence reports, most traditional 
pre-sentence reports contained some information germane to the offender’s Indigenous 
background that could be useful in determining sentence. Where this was not the case, there were 
rare instances in which submissions of defence counsel were presented in lieu. One of these 
submissions occurred in British Columbia21 and two in the Northwest Territories.22 A final case 
from Nunavut involved a “Gladue Report” that was written by defence counsel.23 
It is impossible to determine from the information contained in the decisions why Gladue 
Reports were submitted in some cases and not in others. However, there were several cases where 
                                               
19 Kelly Hannah-Moffat and Paula Maurutto, “Recontextualizing Presentence Reports: Risk and Race,” (2010) 12:3 
Punishment & Society 262, at 275. 
20 R v Laglace, 2013 BCSC 2143; R v Williams, 2013 BCSC 1082; R v Neel, 2014 BCSC 1989; R v Robinson, 2017 
BCSC 681; R v Stewart, 2015 SKQB 182. 
21 R v Morris, 2018 BCSC 803. 
22 R v Sayine, 2014 NWTSC 85; R v DSA, 2017 NWTSC 22. 
23 R v Makpah, 2015 NUCJ 34. 
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the preparation of a Gladue Report was waived by the offender. In one instance, this was because 
the offender was not sufficiently affected by the Gladue factors, however, defence counsel 
nonetheless made submissions on the matter.24 In another, the offender’s connection to their First 
Nations’ heritage was deemed insufficient by defence counsel to merit the preparation of a report.25 
In one case, no report was prepared on the basis that a joint submission had been agreed and the 
preparation of a Gladue Report was therefore not necessary as sentence had been determined.26 In 
a final instance, defence counsel waived the report on the basis that the offence was simply too 
serious to warrant consideration of the Gladue factors, though the provisions were still considered 
by the court.27  
While the Gladue Report is the preferred vehicle for bringing evidence of systemic and 
background factors before the court, this information found its way before the courts one way or 
another in virtually all cases.  In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, where Gladue Reports 
were not produced at all, this often took the form of judicial notice by the court. Given that these 
jurisdictions have substantial Indigenous populations, the judges may well have sufficient 
knowledge of local conditions to take notice of the effects that the background and systemic factors 
have had on the wider community, though they may lack an in-depth understanding of the role 
they have played in the life of any particular offender. 
 
3. Gladue Provisions 
A. Stage One 
Following the direction of the Supreme Court, the application of the Gladue provisions is 
a two-stage process. The first stage consists of analyzing the “unique systemic and background 
factors which may have played a role in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the 
court.”28 This is where the information relevant to the offender is considered by the court. It is here 
that the Gladue Report comes into play by providing a detailed description, though this information 
most frequently came by another route in these cases. This is a fairly low bar to clear. While it is 
preferable for this information to come about in a formal manner or through witness testimony, 
                                               
24 R v Morris, 2018 BCSC 803. 
25 R v Hanley, 2014 BCSC 1373. 
26 R v Grenier, 2013 BCSC 1894.  
27 R v Houle, 2013 ABQB 70. 
28 R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para 66.  
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the presiding judge may also take judicial notice of the effects of the systemic and background 
factors on the offender and their community where evidence has not been adduced.29 This is a 
common practice in cases drawn from Nunavut where judges tended to recognize the damaging 
effects on the wider community regardless of whether the offender had been personally impacted.30 
In this respect, Gladue was sometimes seen as being relevant to the wider community and not just 
the individual.  
The first stage was addressed in 72 of the cases involving Indigenous offenders in this 
study. In five of the eight cases where the first stage was not considered, the decision involved a 
joint submission.31 These decisions were generally cursory and consisted mostly of the judge 
assessing whether the joint submission was acceptable to the court rather than examining the life 
of the offender or the principles of sentencing in detail. This was not, however, the case with most 
joint submissions, where the judge nonetheless undertook the first stage of the Gladue analysis 
before endorsing the joint submission. The lack of a first stage consideration was not fatal to a 
subsequent consideration of the second stage of Gladue.32 In virtually all cases involving 
Indigenous offenders, even those with tenuous connections to their heritage and those who had 
waived the considerations altogether, the court nonetheless engaged in some limited examination 
of the first stage of the Gladue provisions. As likely as not this had to do with judges assuring 
themselves that they had at least given the offender’s Indigenous status some attention should an 
issue arise on appeal. There is no airtight formula for identifying an application of the first stage 
of Gladue, a state of affairs that is equally apparent with the second stage.  
 
B. Stage Two 
The second stage of Gladue requires a consideration of “[t]he types of sentencing 
procedures which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her 
particular aboriginal heritage or connection.”33 This stage speaks to two distinct aspects of 
sentencing Indigenous people. Following strictly from the Criminal Code, the first aspect requires 
a remedial approach emphasizing restraint in sentencing and a suggestion that alternatives to 
                                               
29 Ibid at para 83. 
30 R v Usssak, 2013 NUCJ 09; R v Kappi, 2016 NUCJ 28. 
31 R v Quigley, 2016 BCSC 2184; R v Murphy, 2016 YKSC 48; R v Bishop, 2014 NUCJ 1; R v VanEindhoven, 2016 
NUCJ 19; R v Coté, 2016 SKQB 49. 
32 R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615. 
33 Gladue, supra note 28 at para 66. 
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imprisonment or restorative justice be considered.34  The second aspect requires sentencing an 
Indigenous offender according to a different methodology following the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Wells.35  
As the Supreme Court has stated, Gladue does not mandate a different result.36 The 
assumption entering into this research was that, with those few exceptions where restorative justice 
measures or a non-custodial sentence were found to be appropriate, manslaughter convictions 
would result in a period of imprisonment. This presumed that where the remedial aspect of Gladue 
was being addressed by the sentencing court there would be some evidence of a reduction in 
sentence quantum.  However, a different methodology employed to arrive at the final sentence is 
distinct from whether or not the final sentence is different from what it may have been for an 
offender to whom the Gladue provisions do not apply. A judge could sentence an Indigenous 
offender in a manner entirely undifferentiated from how they would a non-Indigenous offender 
and still fulfill the remedial aspect of Gladue by passing a lower sentence. Equally, the judge could 
undertake a non-traditional approach to sentencing an Indigenous offender and nonetheless arrive 
at the conclusion that the sentence warranted was no different from a proportionate sentence for a 
similarly situated non-Indigenous offender.  
Therefore, the measure of the second stage is not simply whether it results in restorative 
justice or alternatives to incarceration or even a reduction in sentence quantum. Rather, analyzing 
a court’s approach to Gladue at sentencing requires looking first to whether there are distinct 
procedures utilized in sentencing the Indigenous offenders and second to whether a difference in 
the sentence outcome can be ascertained. Examples of the latter are not confined to restorative 
justice, other alternatives to imprisonment, or to comparatively lower sentences.  This chapter 
examines the process of sentencing first through assessing any differences in methodology 
employed and then through ascertaining the impact which the application of the provisions were 
found to have on sentence. A different methodology employed in sentencing an Indigenous 
offender is distinct from an outcome in which Gladue can be seen to affect sentence and could be 
exhibited in different ways. There were two distinctive forms of different methodologies employed 
                                               
34 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 718.2(e). 
35 R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para 44.  
36 Ibid at para 44. 
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for sentencing Indigenous offenders identified in this study: one involving a first principles’ 
methodology and the other an Indigenous comparator case methodology.  
 
4. Differences in Methodology 
A. Traditional Methodology 
The traditional methodology of sentencing involves a judge assessing the principles and 
purposes of sentencing, along with any relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, and then 
coming to a decision as to the appropriate penalty with reference to any relevant case law in much 
the same fashion as any offender would be sentenced. An illustrative example of this was a case 
where the Gladue provisions were explicitly applied as a sentence reduction. In R v Mitchell, 
Mearow, and Jocko, two Indigenous offenders (Eric Shane Joseph Mearow and Dylan Albert 
Jocko) and one non-Indigenous offender (Ronald Albert Mitchell) participated in a group attack 
on a fourth man in a “flop house” in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario where drugs were sold and consumed 
and in which Eric Mearow resided.37 All three were charged with first degree murder in the 
stabbing death of Wesley Hallam and the subsequent dismemberment and disposal of his body. 
All three pleaded guilty and agreed to a joint submission for a period of imprisonment of ten years 
for manslaughter and three years to be served concurrently for indecent interference with human 
remains. All three men spent prolonged periods on remand and all received reformatory sentences 
as a result.  
 The sentencing proceeded in an identical fashion for all three offenders and they were 
treated in a manner consistent with a traditional sentencing. The principles and purposes of 
sentencing were analyzed, as were the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the cases used in 
sentencing followed similar fact patterns and involved non-Indigenous offenders. Neither 
Indigenous offender had a Gladue Report prepared and while their Indigenous status and 
background were discussed, they clearly had no effect on the gross sentence as Mr. Mitchell – the 
non-Indigenous offender - received an identical one, although he had spent slightly longer in 
custody and would receive a lower net sentence as a result. In his final pronouncement of sentence, 
Justice McMillan gave Mearow and Jocko a further reduction in sentence of five months based on 
their status as Indigenous offenders and in recognition of time spent in solitary confinement while 
                                               
37 2016 ONSC 5339. 
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awaiting trial. The judge made no distinctions about how that reduction was apportioned between 
Gladue and solitary confinement. 
 Though this case was resolved by way of a guilty plea and joint submission, the presiding 
judge nonetheless undertook a full review of the sentence to determine its fitness and did not make 
any particular allowance for the Indigenous status of two of the offenders during that process. 
Gladue clearly impacted sentence outcome in this case but as a reduction after the appropriate 
sentence had been determined by the court as being one of ten years’ imprisonment. Even with the 
resulting reduction of five months, both Indigenous offenders were still sentenced to more time in 
prison than their non-Indigenous co-accused because of his longer remand time. Though this is 
one of the few cases produced in this research in which the judge explicitly outlined how Gladue 
was impacting sentence, and one of even fewer in which that explicit application took the form of 
a sentence reduction, it was nonetheless conducted as a textbook sentencing following the 
traditional methodology.  
 
B. Indigenous Comparator Cases 
The first difference in methodology manifested as a consideration of the offender and 
offence with reference largely to decisions involving other Indigenous offenders and the manner 
in which they had been sentenced, rather than cases dealing with non-Indigenous offenders. For 
the purposes of this discussion, these decisions are referred to as Indigenous comparator cases. 
These decisions qualify as a different methodology, despite their procedural similarities to the 
traditional approach to sentencing. This methodology effectively required sentencing the offender 
as an Indigenous person but employing the traditional framework. This sometimes involved more 
emphasis being placed on what impact the offender’s actions had on their community or the judge 
downplaying the importance of an offender’s criminal record or their past difficulties abiding by 
conditions, but the sentencing procedure still closely resembled those employed for non-
Indigenous offenders. This Indigenous comparator case methodology nonetheless emphasized the 
Indigenous status of the offender within a traditional framework. 
An illustrative example of this sentencing methodology was the British Columbia decision 
of R v Johnny.38 Dakota Dillon Johnny, aged 19, beat Cindy Scow, aged 28, to death with a wooden 
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dowel on the Tsulquate Reserve of the Gwa’Sala ‘Naxwaxda’xw Nation and left her to die in an 
abandoned house before returning to the party where he had been drinking heavily. At no point 
was the offender able to offer an explanation for his actions in the death of the victim, but he 
pleaded guilty nonetheless. 
Justice Maisonville of the British Columbia Supreme Court, sitting in Campbell River,  
ultimately sentenced Johnny to eight years’ imprisonment, the lowest sentence suggested by the 
Crown’s range and the highest suggested by the defence. The sentencing proceeded in a more or 
less traditional manner. While it involved discussions of Johnny’s life story and his personal 
problems occasioned by the background and systemic factors outlined in the Gladue Report, the 
sentence was largely determined with reference to factually-similar cases involving Indigenous 
offenders introduced by counsel. The only cases not involving Indigenous offenders with similar 
facts were those British Columbia Court of Appeal cases establishing the general range for 
manslaughter in the province. Justice Maisonville approached the sentencing of Johnny in a 
fashion that recognized the cases suited to his circumstances were defined by the Indigenous 
heritage of the offenders as much as by the similarities of the offences themselves.  
After accounting for time spent on remand, Johnny was sentenced to a further seven years’ 
imprisonment. While sentencing Mr. Johnny, Justice Maisonville noted that the community 
options suggested would not be relevant at this stage but that his rehabilitation could be assisted 
by the Integrated Code Program Model in the Pacific Region of Correctional Services Canada. He 
suggested:  
 
This model is an innovative and holistic approach to correctional programs with a 
view to enhancing public safety. It endeavours to address the needs and risk of a 
specific offender population in the most effective manner possible. If sentenced to 
a federal sentence… an aboriginal person would be managed within the context of 
an aboriginal continuum care model, and could then access various aboriginal 
programs and services, including elders, traditional circles, smudging kits, 
aboriginal liaison officers, aboriginal-specific units, sweat lodge ceremonies, 
powwows, and other ceremonies.39 
 
In the case of Dakota Johnny, circumstances ultimately did not coalesce to allow his sentence to 
be reduced to a reformatory term but the judge suggested that his time in a federal penitentiary 
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should be focused as much as possible on his First Nations’ heritage. Notwithstanding the 
outcome, the sentencing procedure was undertaken with the understanding that Mr. Johnny was 
an Indigenous offender and that the cases against which to compare an appropriate sentence were 
others involving Indigenous offenders.  
 
C. First Principles’ Cases 
The second fashion in which a different methodology was apparent was where offenders 
were not subject to an Indigenous-focused version of the traditional sentencing model but were 
instead sentenced in a manner that was more holistic. These are referred to here as the first 
principles’ cases. In these decisions, though they might have been listed and considered, the 
traditional considerations such as the principles and purposes of sentencing and the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors did not play a central role. Instead, judges were mostly 
concerned with the offender as an Indigenous person and they were sentenced in a fashion where 
this took centre stage. Other considerations were either not mentioned at all or played a secondary 
role. Often these cases did not involve the use of comparator cases at all but instead focused on 
Gladue and Ipeelee – or the leading provincial cases interpreting their application – to assess how 
the criminal justice system should deal with the offender as an Indigenous offender. These first 
principles’ cases focused heavily on the needs of the individual and the community rather than 
abstract discussions of society and the necessity of the legal system to condemn the actions of the 
offenders. These were the closest thing to a truly distinct method of sentencing Indigenous 
offenders that appeared in these cases.  
A case that exemplifies the type of sentencing procedures found in first principles’ 
decisions is Holmes.40 Barbara Elizabeth Holmes killed her intimate partner in what was described 
as a frenzied attack with a knife, stabbing him 17 times. It was a difficult relationship and there 
were suggestions that she had been the victim of domestic violence but these were not examined 
in depth as aggravating and mitigating factors as would be expected with a more traditional 
approach. Justice Langston of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, sitting in Lethbridge, instead 
engaged in a lengthy discussion of Ms. Holmes, what the process meant to her and what beneficial 
outcomes could possibly come from sending her to prison.  
                                               
40 2018 ABQB 916 [Holmes]. 
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There was no Gladue Report submitted nor were the particulars of her life connected 
explicitly to any analysis of the Gladue provisions. While he ultimately felt constrained by the 
submissions of counsel, Justice Langston made no reference to the cases offered to support those 
positions. Instead he looked to the offender as an Indigenous person and attempted to justify how 
imprisonment would serve to further the ends of justice. He wrote of the limitations of the criminal 
justice system to address the needs of Ms. Holmes and of the Gladue provisions to offer real 
alternatives, remarking: 
 
…I’m limited to some degree by the numbers game. Counsel for the accused 
recognizes this, as does the Crown. So how many years is appropriate for this 
woman to stay in jail, to stay isolated, locked up, away from her family, away from 
her community, away from the support mechanisms which we all recognize would 
be advantageous to her?... if I were to ask everyone in this room, if there were police 
who investigated this charge and the Crown who is prosecuting, is this woman 
likely to go out and commit another crime like this, I am sure the overwhelming 
response would be no. This was a singular, aberrant, inexcusable, unexplainable 
act, but yet we will send this woman to jail to deter others who find themselves in 
that inexcusable, unexplained situation. Will anyone in this community, apart from 
those that the press tells, have any inkling about this woman or her history or why 
she got the number of years which I will impose? I would think that they would be 
unlikely to be interested. 
 
If denunciation and deterrence truly worked, then those societies and countries that 
indulge in sending great percentages of their population to jail would surely be 
expected to be the safest places on Earth. The reality is that just isn’t the fact. We 
in my criminal justice system yearn to find better solutions for antisocial conduct, 
and some of that, fortunately, has come from the Aboriginal world, where we take 
a more holistic view of how we deal with antisocial behaviour. But as today 
illustrates, their input is restricted by the largess of the Supreme Court when they 
annunciate the rules in Gladue, cautiously encouraging judges to take an Aboriginal 
offender’s background into the equation of sentencing yet recognizing that 
probably there aren’t many because, after all, we have to deal with deterrence and 
denunciation.41 
 
In the end, the offender was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment resulting in slightly less than 
two years after accounting for remand time and ordering no probation. Justice Langston 
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recommended that she be placed in a healing lodge and that culturally-relevant supports from her 
community be provided to her while she was incarcerated. Though Barbara Holmes would 
ultimately have to serve time in prison, she was nonetheless given the lowest sentence that the 
judge felt he was able to give and the focus of her sentencing and its outcomes was geared toward 
her Indigenous heritage. No principles of sentencing were offered in support of this position, with 
the exception of section 718.2(e), and no cases were cited as justification for the sentence. Barbara 
Holmes was the sole focus of the hearing that sentenced her for manslaughter.  
Despite the fact that submissions of counsel were seen as a controlling factor in sentence 
outcome by the court, this case still involved a different methodology than what is found in the 
traditional sentencing process. The fact that the court felt constrained by the submissions of 
counsel with respect to sentence suggests that the role played by counsel, in particular the Crown, 
is an important one in allowing the provisions to impact upon sentence. Where the Crown 
continues to suggest sentences that are in line with those for non-Indigenous offenders, the courts 
will have to deal with those submissions and may feel obliged to respect them. 
Evident in this decision and others like it is a palpable sense of frustration with the tools 
supplied to sentencing judges to deal with Indigenous offenders in cases of serious and violent 
crime. This decision could be quoted in its entirely but the excerpt above provides a clear 
illustration of the conclusions reached in first principles’ cases. Though Barbara Holmes was not 
given a suspended sentence, the final outcome was not reached through a traditional analysis but 
through an attempt to conduct a sentencing focused on the offender as an Indigenous person rather 
than as an offender who is Indigenous. The first principles’ cases were not always this direct in 
their indictment of the sentencing regime nor did they always include judicial recognition of their 
own limitations with respect to the positions of the parties, but they had in common an approach 
that viewed the traditional methods of sentencing as having little relevance to Indigenous offenders 
and minimizing their consideration. The outcomes of these cases varied but the tendency to 
emphasize the offender as an individual and an Indigenous person remained their central focus. 
 
D. Methodologies vs. Outcomes 
 The differences between methodologies are fine distinctions but they are important ones. 
Neither of these processes nor the traditional sentencing model were consistent with crafting 
sentences where the Gladue provisions ultimately impacted upon sentence. A judge who sentenced 
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an Indigenous person from the first principles of Gladue might still conclude that the offender 
must be imprisoned for a prolonged period for their own sake or that of the public. A judge who 
undertook a textbook traditional sentencing might equally find that the offender was best served 
by spending a bare minimum of time in prison and engaging instead with a restorative justice 
process. No particular methodology was the handmaiden of any outcome. However, not all 
outcomes are created equal. A judge who determined the quantum of sentence and then deducted 
six months or a year from that figure for Gladue, while they were fulfilling their remedial duty to 
reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous people, had not really considered the directive to 
sentence Indigenous offenders differently. Such a judge would be following the letter of the law 
but not the spirit of the different methodology imagined in Wells.  
In those cases, of which there were several, there was doubtless an impact on the sentence 
in practice but it was formalistic rather than fundamental. By the same token, some first principles 
analyses of an offender resulted in a lengthy term of imprisonment. While this would not be 
understood as a remedial application of the provisions, in that the sentence was not noticeably 
different from what it might have been for a non-Indigenous offender, it did comprise a different 
methodology. The question of methodology and sentence impact were therefore treated as separate 
ones and while they were found together in some cases, they were not symbiotic. 
The intention here is to engage in a qualitative evaluation of the operation of the provisions 
in order to classify them. The individualization of the sentencing process renders it more art than 
science, and the alchemy of sentencing does not lend itself easily to having its constituent elements 
examined. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, even in the rare situation where all those 
parts are visible, as such the divisions between methodologies were not as clean where those 
decisions depended on Indigenous comparator cases rather than a first principles’ approach. This 
paper discusses both the impact or lack of impact on sentence outcomes separately from the 
approaches taken in sentencing by the courts. Therefore, a first principles’ case did not necessarily 
equate to an application of the Gladue provisions nor a traditional methodology to their rejection. 
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5. Gladue’s Impact on Sentence Outcome 
As noted in chapter one,42 it was assumed at the outset of this study that the Gladue 
provisions were likely to manifest in cases involving the sentencing of offenders for serious and 
violent crime as a reduction in sentence rather than as alternatives to imprisonment. This is not to 
say that there would not be situations where the offender served no time in prison, however, this 
would remain a sentence reduction in the broadest sense. Even a decision that did not see the 
offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment but to a suspended sentence with probation – of 
which there was one among these cases43 - still constitutes a reduction in sentence compared to the 
body of manslaughter offenders examined here. A sentence reduction for the purposes of this paper 
was therefore a reduction in the length of sentence compared to a comparable offender in 
comparable circumstances who was found not to have been affected by the systemic and 
background factors. Because of the wide variety of sentences available for manslaughter, such a 
reduction had to be substantial to qualify or would have to have been explicitly identified as such 
by the presiding judge. A sentence reduction that could be attributed to the provisions was one 
possible indicator suggesting that the provisions had impacted upon sentence but it was not 
analogous to a different methodology. 
Much of the Gladue analysis was conducted in a unspoken fashion. This is not merely 
because it is impossible to assign a numerical value to the suffering of individuals – let alone 
cultures – but because it is difficult to assign such a value to virtually any aspect of sentencing, 
though that is the final form the product takes. This, combined with the potentially slippery 
problem of public reaction to applying discounted sentencing to Indigenous people, means that the 
impact on the provisions upon the final sentence was often not explicit but could be ascertained by 
comparing such decisions to one another and to the comparative data between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous offenders discussed in the preceding chapter.  
These cases have been divided into two broad categories based on the manner in which the 
Gladue provisions were found to have impacted upon sentence or not. The remaining few cases 
were decisions where it was difficult to ascertain whether or not any form was given to the 
provisions. There were cases where the impact of the provisions were made explicit by the judge 
who stated that a particular action was being taken with respect to the offender as a direct result of 
                                               
42 See page 3. 
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the operation of the provisions. Some of these cases focused on restorative justice, either in the 
form of a suspended sentence44 or reformatory time plus probation,45 others included an explicit 
reduction in sentence attributed to Gladue.46 Some viewed Gladue as being satisfied either in the 
submissions of counsel47 or through a joint submission to the court,48 while others attributed a 
refusal to impose a period of parole ineligibility to the operation of the provisions.49 Judges 
sometimes decided that the impact of Gladue must manifest in the form of a prison sentence 
because they believed that prison was the best place for the offender to receive culturally-relevant 
programming that might serve them in their rehabilitation and that prison was therefore necessary 
for the good of the offender.50 
In other cases the impact on sentence was not outlined explicitly by the trial judge but was 
nonetheless still apparent. These decisions fell into two categories. The first involved judges noting 
that Gladue had informed the sentence handed down by the court but it was not stated how nor 
was it always readily apparent. In the second category, offenders received sentences that were 
clearly lower than those in line with jurisdictional averages. These decisions often, but not always, 
involved reformatory time and probation, though this was frequently a result of long periods spent 
on remand. Over 90% of Indigenous offenders examined in this study were not released on bail at 
any time between their arrest and sentencing and so there was no clear connection between long 
periods on remand and reformatory sentences. It should be noted with respect to bail, that the same 
was true for non-Indigenous offenders. While non-Indigenous offenders were slightly more likely 
to have been released on bail at some point leading up to sentencing, they were not released at all 
in around 87% of cases. As a point of interest, a total of 41 offenders, both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous, received net prison sentences of two years or less – including suspended sentences 
and those sentenced to time served – which accounted for around a quarter of Indigenous offenders 
and a fifth of non-Indigenous offenders. 
There were a variety of justifications provided by judges for why the provisions would not 
have an impact on sentence for an offender. Some judges determined that the Gladue factors had 
                                               
44 Ibid. 
45 R v Taniskyhayinew, 2018 BCSC 296; R v Okewmow, 2016 MBQB 240. 
46 R v Mitchell, Mearo and Jocko, 2016 ONSC 5339; R v David, 2017 BCSC 877; R v Dick, 2014 MBQB 187. 
47 R v Abraham, 2014 MBQB 242. 
48 R v Brerrton, 2013 BCSC 1029. 
49 R v Halkett, 2013 SKQB 41; R v Fiddler, 2018 SKQB 197. 
50 R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615. 
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a limited effect on the life of the offender51 while others noted that there could be no impact 
because counsel had failed to make submissions connecting the Gladue factors to the offender.52 
The most common reasoning provided by judges was that the circumstances of the offence were 
such that that this was precisely the sort of case envisioned by the Supreme Court when they 
cautioned that there will be cases where the sentence would be the same for an Indigenous offender 
as for a non-Indigenous one.53 Some cases saw the court determine there would be no impact on 
the basis that both counsel had proposed a term of imprisonment and the judge felt constrained by 
those submissions.54 Related to this, some decisions determined there would be no impact based 
on the need to protect Indigenous victims of crime or from a need to tailor the sentence to reflect 
local conditions in order to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.55 
Cases in which the judge did not explicitly state that there would be no impact followed 
many of the same forms as those in which the judge’s reasoning was stated explicitly but without 
the court taking the step of officially declining to do so. There were cases waived by counsel,56 
suggestions that prison would be necessary for the offender,57 or statements that the sentence had 
been determined by a joint submission or submissions of counsel.58 The remainder of cases 
contained no substantive discussion of the second stage of Gladue and moved on to the imposition 
of long sentences.  
Finally there were cases where the existence of a sentence in the mid-range and no explicit 
discussion of the impact or lack of impact of the provisions on sentence made it impossible to 
assess the judge’s reasoning with respect to the provisions.59 These cases were few, representing 
only three of the total. Unfortunately, not all sentencing decisions are written with academic 
analysis in mind and sometimes they are not as neatly divided as one might like. With that in mind, 
it is still possible to examine these divisions to come to some general conclusions about how the 
provisions did or did not impact sentence and to what types of manslaughter such impacts were 
being most frequently applied.  
                                               
51 R v Morris, 2018 BCSC 803. 
52 R v Decoine-Zuniga, 2014 ABQB 155. 
53 R v Wabason, 2016 ONSC 349; R v Langevin, 2018 ONSC 6020; R v Beaulieu, 2014 BCSC 2068; R v Woodford, 
2016 MBQB 72; R v Buggins, 2014 NWTSC 24; R v Padluq, 2016 NUCJ 22; R v Sateana, 2016 NUCJ 20. 
54 R v Laglace, 2013 BCSC 1044; R v Wesley, 2013 ONSC 7197. 
55 R v Peter, 2014 NUCJ 28; R v Geetah, 2015 NUCJ 10. 
56 R v Grenier, 2013 BCSC 1894. 
57 R v Nicholls, 2015 ONSC 8136. 
58 R v Neel, 2014 BCSC 1989. 
59 R v Bourque, 2015 NWTSC 48; R v Charles, 2013 SKQB 139; R v DSA, 2017 NWTSC 22. 
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A. Different Methodology Decisions 
 Of the 80 decisions involving Indigenous offenders, 24 were decided according to a 
different methodology. Nineteen of those offenders were convicted for a drug and alcohol 
manslaughter, four in connection with a near murder, and one for manslaughter involving arson. 
In total there were eight offenders classified as first principles’ cases, all of which were drug and 
alcohol manslaughters. Like all cases in this study, the manner in which Gladue impacted sentence 
or not varied greatly in both the different methodology categories and the similar methodology 
one. For those decisions involving a first principles’ consideration of Gladue, in only two cases 
did the provisions not appear to have an impact on sentence, in the remaining six the impact was 
discernible in the form of low sentences.  
 Sixteen offenders were sentenced in the Indigenous comparator cases category. Of these, 
11 were drug and alcohol manslaughters, four near murders, and one involved arson. One issue 
arising with the decisions from the Indigenous comparator cases, was that in those jurisdictions 
where there is a large Indigenous population it was difficult to establish if the offender was being 
sentenced in comparison to Indigenous offenders as a matter of methodology or whether the cases 
in the jurisdiction overwhelmingly involved Indigenous offenders. It is difficult to parse this 
question, though it may be an academic distinction in the end. Among these decisions, there were 
six cases in which the provisions were not found to have impacted the sentence, eight in which an 
appreciable impact on the outcome of sentence could be observed, and two in which no conclusion 
could be reached.   
 
Table 5.3 –Different Methodology - Gladue Impact on Sentence 
 Impact No Impact Unclear Impact % 
First Principles 6 2 - 75.00 
Comparator Cases 8 6 2 50.00 
All 14 8 2 58.33 
 
 Together, the cases sentenced according to a different methodology accounted for 30% of 
all Indigenous offenders in this study and represented the largest proportion of cases in 
Saskatchewan at 55% - the only jurisdiction in which a different methodology was employed for 
the majority of Indigenous offenders. That Saskatchewan is leading the way in its treatment of 
Indigenous offenders has been remarked upon by judges in Alberta, who have suggested that more 
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Indigenous people would benefit from the regime operating in that province.60 Different 
methodology cases accounted for half of those from the Northwest Territories and 40% from 
Alberta. Approximately one quarter of cases from British Columbia and Ontario were sentenced 
according to a different methodology, one third of those in Nunavut, and a single case from the 
eleven arising in Manitoba. 
 
Table 5.4 – Different Methodology – Jurisdiction 
 First Principles Comparator Cases All Percentage of Total 
Ontario 2 1 3 25.00 
British Columbia 3 4 7 25.92 
Alberta 1 1 2 40.00 
Saskatchewan - 5 5 55.55 
Manitoba - 1 1 09.09 
Yukon - - - - 
Northwest Territories 2 1 3 50.00 
Nunavut - 3 3 33.33 
All 8 16 24 30.00 
 
 
Table 5.5 – Different Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
Near Murder 2 2 - 50.00 
Drug/Alcohol 11 6 2 57.89 
Home/Robbery - - - - 
Arson 1 - - 100 
Unusual - - - - 
One Punch - - - - 
All 14 8 2 58.33 
 
i. First Principles’ Cases 
Distribution 
 These decisions represented the closest thing to an entirely different approach to the 
sentencing of Indigenous offenders. As a consequence they were rare, representing only one in ten 
Indigenous offenders. Notwithstanding their rarity, they were the category seeing the highest 
likelihood of the Gladue provisions impacting sentence outcome at 75%, compared to an average 
of 47.5% in decisions overall. Importantly, they were also made up entirely of drug and alcohol 
cases and accounted for nearly one in five of the Indigenous offenders in that category, twice their 
proportion among offenders Indigenous overall. They were not confined to any particular 
jurisdiction and were found in Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and the Northwest Territories. 
This is opposed to Indigenous offenders sentenced in the Indigenous comparator cases category 
which appeared in every jurisdiction except for the Yukon.  
  
                                               
60 R v Holmes, 2018 ABQB 916 at para 13. 
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Outcomes 
 In this category, there were only two cases in which the provisions clearly did not impact 
the outcome of the sentence. One involved a killing in which a young man in a state of extreme 
intoxication beat a 65-year-old elder to death who was suffering from cancer.61 Justice Fitzpatrick 
of the Ontario Superior Court, sitting in Thunder Bay, determined that the provisions could not be 
applied on the basis that both counsel had proposed terms of imprisonment and sentenced the 
offender, Mr. Wesley, to eight years’ imprisonment. In another decision from the Northwest 
Territories, a woman stabbed her common-law husband once in the back following an alcohol-
fueled argument.62 The judge decided that Gladue would not impact sentence outcome based on 
the need to protect Indigenous victims. Justice Charbonneau noted that Indigenous victims were 
no less worthy of protection than non-Indigenous ones and that the rights of both must be balanced 
to achieve a fit sentence. As a consequence, she endorsed the joint submission of five years’ 
imprisonment. This sentence accorded with the territorial average for drug and alcohol 
manslaughters in the Northwest Territories. 
 In the remaining six cases the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome was 
ascertainable. At no point in any of these decisions did the judge state that Gladue was being 
utilized to lower the sentence but it was clear in the final outcome that lower sentences were the 
result of an application of the provisions. Three cases involved the imposition of net sentences 
resulting in reformatory time.63 In another decision, the offender was given a sentence of two years 
to be served in a federal penitentiary followed by three-years’ probation.64 Finally, two offenders 
received sentences of imprisonment below what would be expected given the circumstances of the 
offence and the offender.65 Altogether, there was no impact on the final sentence in two cases in 
this category and there was an appreciable impact in the remaining six, for an overall impact rate 
of 75%. All cases in this category were drug and alcohol manslaughters.   
 
                                               
61 R v Wesley, 2013 ONSC 7197. 
62 R v Villeneuve, 2017 NWTSC 6. 
63 R v Smith, 2017 BCSC 2513; R v Holmes, 2018 ABQB 916; R v Thomas, 2016 ONSC 7944. 
64 R v Robinson, 2017 BCSC 681. 
65 R v Williams, 2013 BCSC 1082; R v Tetso, 2018 NWTSC 36. 
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ii. Indigenous Comparator Cases 
Distribution 
 These decisions were, after the first principles’ cases, the most likely to see the sentence 
impacted by the provisions, which occurred at a rate of 50%. Together they represented one fifth 
of all Indigenous offenders and, unlike the first principles’ cases, they were not limited to drug and 
alcohol manslaughters, but those represented nine of the total, along with four near murders, and 
a single case involving arson. These cases were found in every jurisdiction with the exception of 
the Yukon and were most common in Saskatchewan, where they accounted for more than half. 
Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba and the Northwest Territories each produced one case in this category, 
there were three from Nunavut, four from British Columbia, and five from Saskatchewan.  
 
Outcomes 
 In eight cases the provisions impacted the final sentence outcome. In one case the offender 
was sentenced to three years and eight month’s imprisonment which, after accounting for remand, 
resulted in a sentence of two years less a day and three-years’ probation.66 Justice Keyser of the 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, sitting in Winnipeg, justified this sentence on the basis that the 
offender would be best served by a sentence geared toward returning him to the community so he 
could reconnect with his Indigenous heritage while noting that the analysis must be holistic, and 
that there could not be an automatic reduction in sentence for an Indigenous person. 
In another case, the provisions were applied following the same rationale. The offender 
was sentenced to slightly more than three years and three months’ imprisonment, resulting in a 
sentence of two years less a day and three-years’ probation for the beating death of a man he 
discovered sexually assaulting an unconscious woman.67 Justice Baird of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court, sitting in Nanaimo, connected the probation order to the need to engage in a 
restorative justice process with the family of the victim but he did not link this directly to the 
Gladue provisions. In the remaining six cases, the impact of the provisions could be seen in the 
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form of sentences lower than might otherwise be expected. Three of the decisions were drug and 
alcohol killings,68 two were near murder cases,69 and one involved a death by arson.70 
Two decisions involving Indigenous comparator cases, one near murder and one drug and 
alcohol manslaughter, did not see an impact on sentence quantum but instead saw the judge tie 
prison time to the needs of the offender as an Indigenous person.  The court justified this on the 
basis that prison was necessary for the offender to rehabilitate and that they would be aided by the 
Indigenous-specific programming available in the federal correctional system.71 While it may not 
be satisfying to think of the need for prison as an impact of the Gladue provisions, this scenario 
remains one in which the judge has crafted a sentence they feel will be the most beneficial for the 
offender given their status as an Indigenous person.  
In four cases, the Gladue provisions clearly did not impact the final sentence. In two of 
these decisions, both drug and alcohol manslaughters, this was demonstrated by the imposition of 
long terms of imprisonment, albeit preceded by lip service to the importance of alternative 
sanctions for Indigenous offenders, albeit ones not permitted by the particular facts of those 
cases.72 Two other cases, one a near murder and the other a drug and alcohol manslaughter, also 
saw no impact as demonstrated by long sentences but the judges did not pay any heed to 
alternatives to incarceration and instead proceeded directly to sentencing.73 Finally, there were two 
drug and alcohol decisions in which it was not possible to come to any conclusion about whether 
or not the provisions were applied.74 In all, eight decisions involving Indigenous comparator cases 
saw the provisions impact sentence, six did not, and two were not sufficiently clear to make a 
determination resulting in an sentence impact rate of 50%. This impact rate was below that of the 
first principles’ cases but above those in the traditional methodology categories. 
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B. Traditional Methodology Cases 
Distribution 
 Decisions sentenced according to the traditional methodology made up the majority of 
cases involving Indigenous offenders, occurring in seven out of ten decisions. In 57% of cases 
involving drug and alcohol manslaughters and 85% of near murder cases, Indigenous offenders 
were sentenced according to the traditional methodology. These cases were found in all provinces 
and territories, and Manitoba led with nearly 82% of offenders sentenced in this manner. Ontario 
and British Columbia saw approximately 75% of Indigenous offenders sentenced according to the 
traditional methodology with Alberta and Saskatchewan slightly lower at 60% and 45%, 
respectively. This was also true of half of offenders in the Northwest Territories, two-thirds of 
those in Nunavut and of the single decision involving an Indigenous offender in the Yukon. 
 
Table 5.6 – Similar Methodology – Gladue Impact on Sentence 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
All 23 32 1 41.07 
 
Outcomes 
 Twenty-three decisions in this category saw the provisions impact sentence. One of those 
cases was a drug and alcohol manslaughter involving an already low sentence reduced to 
reformatory time and three-years’ probation.75 In that case, Justice Griffin of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court, sitting in Vancouver, imposed this sentence on the offender despite the fact that 
he considered the crime a particularly vicious and unnecessary killing. Still, he believed the 
offender would be better served by treatment programs related to her issues with alcohol. With 
four offenders, three in the drug and alcohol category and one involving a robbery, the judge 
explicitly applied the provisions as a sentencing discount. The two offenders in one of the drug 
and alcohol cases received a reduction of 5-months’ imprisonment bringing the total down to a 
reformatory sentence,76 the remaining drug and alcohol offender received a reduction in sentence 
of one year,77 as did the offender in the robbery manslaughter.78 Finally, in one near murder case, 
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the court decided that the offender would be better served by the programming available in the 
federal correctional system.79  
In two drug and alcohol cases involving a total of three offenders, the judge determined 
that the provisions had already been applied because the sentence proposed in the joint submission 
was low enough to have incorporated them.80 Finally, in one near murder and one drug and alcohol 
case arising in Saskatchewan, the judges refused to impose a period of parole ineligibility on the 
offenders in recognition of their status as Indigenous people.81 Eight of the ten cases in this 
category in which the judge stated explicitly that Gladue would impact sentence were drug and 
alcohol killings.  
 In one case, the offender was given a suspended sentence and three-years’ probation after 
stabbing his friend to death in a drunken fight in the home shared by their girlfriends.82 Though it 
was never stated outright, the final determination of sentence immediately followed the judge’s 
remarks that section 718.2(e) should form part of any consideration of sentence though he drew 
no direct connection. In seven cases, the judges remarked only that Gladue had been considered 
in crafting the ultimate disposition of the case. In some of these cases it was difficult to determine 
precisely what the impact on sentence had been. However, as the judge had explicitly stated that 
the provisions had been taken into account in crafting the sentence, they were counted as cases in 
which sentence outcome had been impacted by Gladue. Among these cases were a single arson in 
which five people were killed and for which the offender received a sentence of life 
imprisonment,83 a single drug and alcohol manslaughter,84 and five near murder offenders85-  with 
one case involving three offenders.86 Finally, one near murder and one drug and alcohol offender 
were each given net sentences involving reformatory terms and probation,87 while one drug and 
                                               
79 R v Nicholls, 2015 ONSC 8136. 
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alcohol offender,88 one home invasion offender89 and a single one-punch offender90 received 
sentences lower than might be expected in the circumstances.  
 A total of 32 offenders saw no appreciable impact on sentence outcome. In seven cases, 
the impact of the provisions were rejected explicitly on the basis that the sentence for those 
offenders would be the same as it would be for a non-Indigenous offender. Judges made this 
finding with respect to offenders in four drug and alcohol cases,91 two near murder cases,92 and 
one home invasion case.93 In a single near murder case, the judge declined to allow the provisions 
to impact sentence length as both counsel had proposed time in prison and he felt bound by those 
submissions.94  
In  three cases, the court decided that the circumstances of the offence and the offender 
were such that there must be prison time and therefore the provisions could not operate to lower 
the sentence. This occurred in one drug and alcohol case,95 one case involving unusual 
circumstances,96 and one involving arson.97 In one near murder case the judge refused to apply the 
provisions on the basis that local conditions, there the prevalence of gun violence in Nunavut, 
dictated that a prison sentence was necessary.98 In one near murder and one drug and alcohol 
decision, the judge declined to apply the provisions on the basis that the relevance of the Gladue 
factors to the life of the offender had not been explained by counsel and therefore they could not 
be considered.99 In a single one-punch manslaughter, the judge simply determined that the Gladue 
factors had a limited effect on the life of the offender and therefore it was not appropriate to 
consider them.100 
 In one near murder case and one drug and alcohol case, defence counsel waived the 
consideration of the provisions.101 In one drug and alcohol decision, the judge paid lip service to 
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the need to consider alternatives to incarceration before moving on to impose a sentence of 
considerable length.102 In two drug and alcohol cases103 and six near murder cases,104 the presence 
of a joint submission meant there was no discussion of the need to apply the provisions. In addition, 
in two drug and alcohol decisions105 and three near murder cases106 there was no suggestion of 
sentence impact by the judge and the offenders received long sentences. Finally, in one drug and 
alcohol case it was not clear if the provisions had impacted sentence.107 In all, 23 cases saw an 
impact on sentence resulting from the Gladue provisions, 32 involved no appreciable impact, and 
one was not sufficiently clear to make a determination. This produced an overall rate of sentence 
impact of 41% for offenders sentenced in accordance with a traditional methodology. 
 
6. Comparative Analysis of Outcomes Between Methodologies 
The manner of sentence impact varied considerably between offenders as did the rates of 
sentence impact between those decisions involving traditional and different methodologies and 
within those different methodologies. However, there were some patterns which could be 
discerned when examining this information, although some conclusions are necessarily limited by 
the small sample sizes involved in some jurisdictions, as was seen in discussions of sentence 
quantum in the preceding chapter.  
 Slightly over 58% of all cases sentenced according to a different methodology saw the 
Gladue provisions impact sentence in some fashion and in all jurisdictions with the exception of 
the Yukon and Saskatchewan. While the Northwest Territories, Manitoba and Alberta had a one 
hundred percent impact rate for different methodology cases, each of those jurisdictions only 
represented a single case. Nunavut had a 40% impact rate among five cases in the territory and 
Ontario had a rate of 66% among three cases in that jurisdiction. British Columbia, with the largest 
number of different methodology cases at seven, had an impact rate of 85%.  
The twenty-four cases involving different methodologies were so widely distributed 
between different provinces and territories and some jurisdictions produced so few cases that it 
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was not possible to make any definitive statements about the rates of application in those 
jurisdictions for cases employing a different methodology.108 In many of the jurisdictions 
examined, there were so few cases sentenced according to a different methodology it was not 
possible to make statements about the rate of sentence impact that would be statistically significant. 
Similarly, looking within and comparing the first principles’ and Indigenous comparator categories 
also does not yield enough cases to make definitive statements about their rate of sentence impact 
in a given province or territory, as only British Columbia and Saskatchewan had more than three 
offenders sentenced according to a different methodology. Notwithstanding this difficulty, within 
the different methodology cases from all provinces and territories considered together, there was 
a clear divide. First principles’ cases saw an impact rate of 75% and Indigenous comparator cases 
had an impact rate of only 50%.  
 
Table 5.7 – Different Methodology –Impact on Sentence – Jurisdiction 
 Impact on Sentence  No Impact Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
Ontario 2 1 - 66.66 
British Columbia 6 1 - 85.71 
Alberta 2 - - 100 
Saskatchewan - 4 1 00.00 
Manitoba 1 - - 100 
Yukon - - - - 
NWT 1 1 1 33.33 
Nunavut 2 1 - 66.66 
All 14 8 2 58.33 
 
 The number of cases sentenced according to a traditional methodology was large enough 
and sufficiently well distributed among jurisdictions that some conclusions could be drawn from 
intra-jurisdictional comparisons. The overall rate at which the Gladue provisions were found to 
impact sentence in some manner among the traditional methodology cases was approximately 
41%.  The nine cases in Ontario saw an impact rate of 33% and the twenty in British Columbia 
had a similar rate at 35%.  Likewise, the three cases in the Northwest Territories saw an impact 
rate of 33% and the six in Nunavut were half that rate at 16%. The only two provinces in which 
the impact rate exceeded half were the five cases in Saskatchewan at 60% and the nine cases in 
Manitoba at 89%. No traditional methodology cases in Alberta saw the provisions impact sentence 
outcome. While these were not large numbers of cases to deal with, they were sufficient to allow 
a slightly clearer picture within different provinces and territories than did cases from the different 
methodology categories. 
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Table 5.8 – Similar Methodology –Impact on Sentence – Jurisdiction 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage  
Ontario 3 6 - 33.33 
British Columbia 7 13 - 35.00 
Alberta - 3 - 00.00 
Saskatchewan 3 2 - 60.00 
Manitoba 8 1 - 88.88 
Yukon - 1 - 00.00 
NWT 1 1 1 33.33 
Nunavut 1 5 - 16.66 
All 23 32 1 41.07 
 
 It is fairly clear – even with the limited number of cases in the different methodology 
categories – that where these methodologies were employed, the Gladue provisions were more 
likely to impact sentence outcome on average at a rate of roughly 60%, against 40% for the 
traditional methodology. Where a different methodology was used, the impact of the Gladue 
provisions was more likely on average, however, it was unlikely in any given jurisdiction that a 
different methodology would be used to sentence Indigenous offenders. As noted in Table 5.4, the 
likelihood of a different methodology being employed to sentence an Indigenous offender was 
low, with only Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories reaching the halfway mark and the 
overall average brought down to 30% by the low numbers produced in Ontario, British Columbia 
and Manitoba. Therefore, while an Indigenous offender frequently fared better when sentenced 
according to a different methodology, the likelihood of that coming to pass was generally quite 
low.  
 
Table 5.9 - Proportion of Similar and Different Methodologies by Jurisdiction  
 Same Methodology Same Methodology 
Percentage 
Different Methodology Different Methodology 
Percentage 
Ontario 9/12 75.00 3/12 25.00 
British Columbia 20/27 74.07 7/27 25.92 
Alberta 3/5 60.00 2/5 40.00 
Saskatchewan 4/9 44.44 5/9 55.55 
Manitoba 9/11 81.81 2/11 18.18 
Yukon 1/1 100.0 0/1 - 
NWT 3/6 50.00 3/6 50.00 
Nunavut 6/9 66.66 3/9 33.33 
All 56/80 70 24/80 30 
 
 When examined across categories of manslaughter a similar pattern emerged to that seen 
in chapter three, showing an appreciable difference in the treatment of near murder and drug and 
alcohol cases. The robbery and home invasion, arson, unusual circumstance, and one-punch cases 
had too few incidents from which to draw any conclusions about sentencing patterns. What was 
immediately apparent about the near murder category is that in over 85% of those cases, a 
traditional  methodology was employed to sentence Indigenous offenders. By contrast, in drug and 
 
 
130 
 
alcohol killings, only 57% of cases were sentenced according to the traditional methodology used 
in sentencing non-Indigenous offenders. As with the lower average sentence quantum for 
Indigenous offenders in drug and alcohol manslaughters compared to non-Indigenous offenders, 
it is clear that among Indigenous offenders, drug and alcohol cases were also treated more 
favourably from the standpoint of Gladue application and impact than were near murder killings. 
 
Table 5.10 - Proportion of Similar and Different Methodologies by Category  
 Same Methodology Same Methodology 
Percentage 
Different Methodology Different Methodology 
Percentage 
Near Murder 23/27 85.18 4/27 14.81 
Drugs and Alcohol 25/44 56.81 19/44 43.18 
Home/Robbery 3/3 100.0 - - 
Arson 2/3 66.66 1/3 33.33 
Unusual Circumstances 1/1 100.0 - - 
One Punch 2/2 100.0 - - 
All 56/80 70.00 24/80 30.00 
 
Where a different methodology was employed in sentencing offenders for near murder 
cases, the Gladue provisions were likely to impact sentence in 50% of all cases, in drug and alcohol 
manslaughters this number was closer to 58%. Unfortunately, there were only four near murder 
decisions against which to compare the 19 drug and alcohol cases in the different methodology 
categories and therefore it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about sentence impact in 
near murder cases sentenced according to a different methodology. As noted, where the first 
principles’ approach was used, the rates of sentence impact for drug and alcohol manslaughters 
increased to 75%. 
 
Table 5.11 – Different Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
Near Murder 2 2 - 50.00 
Drug/Alcohol 11 6 2 57.89 
Home/Robbery - - - - 
Arson 1 - - 100 
Unusual - - - - 
One Punch - - - - 
All 14 8 2 58.33 
 
 The traditional methodology category had more cases and a greater geographical 
distribution and so a better comparison could be made between near murder and drug and alcohol 
categories here. The sample set of 23 near murder decisions using this methodology produced an 
average sentence impact rate of around 30%. By contrast, the 25 drug and alcohol decisions 
sentenced according to a traditional methodology saw the Gladue provisions impact sentence in 
48% of cases. This suggests, like the outcomes of sentencing examined in chapter 3, that drug and 
alcohol manslaughters were not only receiving lower sentences overall compared to near murder 
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manslaughter but they were also seeing the provisions impact sentence more frequently than near 
murders when sentenced according to the traditional methodology. The drug and alcohol cases 
also held a slight edge in sentence impact in the different methodology category overall and a 
demonstrably higher rate of impact where a first principles’ methodology was employed. 
 
Table 5.12 – Similar Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
Near Murder 7 16 - 30.43 
Drug/Alcohol 12 12 1 48.00 
Home/Robbery 2 1 - 66.66 
Arson 1 1 - 50.00 
Unusual - 1 - 100 
One Punch 1 1 - 50.00 
All 23 32 1 41.07 
 
 Every angle from which methodology used and impact on sentence of the Gladue 
provisions could be approached suggests that drug and alcohol cases were given more favourable 
treatment than near murder cases. This began with the Gladue Report, where nearly 40% of all 
drug and alcohol cases had a Gladue Report prepared, compared with slightly less than 30% of 
near murder cases. This pattern continued in the methodology utilized in sentencing offenders. 
With 43% of drug and alcohol cases sentenced according to a different methodology, such cases 
were three times more likely to receive that treatment than near murder cases which were sentenced 
according to a different methodology in only 15% of cases. Drug and alcohol cases represented 
nearly 80% of all cases sentenced according to a different methodology, as opposed to just under 
17% for near murders.  
This pattern of differential treatment between near murder and drug and alcohol 
manslaughters continued within the different methodology categories. Drug and alcohol cases 
represented close to 70% of all decisions in the Indigenous comparator cases category, compared 
to only 25% for near murder cases. Drug and alcohol cases also represented all cases in which the 
first principles’ methodology was employed. Among the combined cases sentenced according to 
a different methodology, drug and alcohol cases were slightly more likely to see the Gladue 
provisions impact sentence at 58%, compared to only 50% for near murder cases.  
 The preference for the provisions impacting sentence in drug and alcohol cases continued 
in decisions sentenced according to the traditional methodology. Here, the Gladue provisions 
impacted on sentence nearly 50% of the time for offenders sentenced for drug and alcohol 
manslaughters compared to 30% for offenders in the near murder category. Altogether, judges 
were substantially more likely to employ either of the different methodologies when sentencing 
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offenders facing a drug and alcohol manslaughter than a near murder. Finally, when considering 
all decisions together without reference to the methodology used, drug and alcohol manslaughters 
saw the Gladue provisions impact sentence in approximately 52% of cases compared to a 
comparable figure of 33% for near murder manslaughters. 
When the Gladue provisions impacted sentence, there was a greater likelihood that this 
would occur in drug and alcohol cases when a different methodology was used and there was a 
significantly greater likelihood that they would impact sentence in drug and alcohol cases rather 
than near murder cases where courts employed a traditional methodology. It appears that 
sentencing judges were more likely, in every respect, to treat drug and alcohol manslaughters not 
only as a category of manslaughter to which a different methodology should be utilized but equally 
as one in which the Gladue provisions would more frequently impact sentence outcome. This does 
not necessarily suggest that the courts were ignoring Gladue where drugs and alcohol were not 
involved but it does suggest that they were more likely to see how the provisions could impact 
sentence in these cases. 
 
7. Explanations for the difference 
What then is the cause of the evident difference in the treatment of drug and alcohol killings 
compared to near murder killings in both the methodologies used and the impact on sentence? At 
the conclusion of chapter 3 it was suggested that drug and alcohol killings were viewed by judges 
as a typically Indigenous form of manslaughter and that due to the role played by intoxication in 
these offences, they could be connected more readily to prevailing stereotypes around the social 
conditions affecting Indigenous peoples. It was also suggested that where manslaughters 
committed by Indigenous peoples departed from these patterns, the offenders in those cases lost 
the benefit of a sentence reduction that came from the operation of the Gladue provisions. The 
analysis conducted in this chapter with regard to methodology and differences in sentence impact 
reinforces that conclusion.  
As discussed above, the likelihood that a traditional methodology would be used to 
sentence a given Indigenous offender remained high in all categories of manslaughter. The 
difference between the rates of similar methodologies between drug and alcohol and near murder 
were clear. With 85% of near murder cases sentenced according to a traditional methodology and 
only 57% of drug and alcohol cases receiving the same treatment, some explanation for the 
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differentials in sentence quantum seen in chapter 3 becomes apparent, that is that Indigenous 
offenders received slightly lower sentences than non-Indigenous offenders for drug and alcohol 
killings but received higher sentences for near murder manslaughters. When comparing all 
methodologies of sentencing, drug and alcohol manslaughters saw an impact rate of slightly over 
half and near murders saw a rate of only one third.  What is clear from the divisions between drug 
and alcohol and near murder manslaughters is that once a given offender in the near murder 
category had passed the threshold into either of the different methodology categories, the rate of 
Gladue impact on sentence narrowed considerably compared with a drug and alcohol killing to 
58% and 50%.  
 
Table 5.13 – Rates of Impact – All Methodologies - All Categories of Manslaughter 
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage 
Near Murder 9 18 - 33.33 
Drug/Alcohol 23 18 3 52.27 
Home/Robbery 2 1 - 66.66 
Arson 2 1 - 66.66 
Unusual - 1 - 00.00 
One Punch 1 1 - 50.00 
All 37 40 3 46.25 
 
 
Table 5.14 – Rates of Impact – All Methodologies – All Jurisdictions  
 Impact on Sentence No Impact on Sentence Unclear Impact Percentage  
Ontario 5 7 - 41.67 
British Columbia 13 14 - 48.14 
Alberta 2 3 - 40.00 
Saskatchewan 3 6 1 30.00 
Manitoba 9 1 - 90.00 
Yukon - 1 - 00.00 
NWT 2 2 2 33.33 
Nunavut 3 6 - 33.33 
All 37 40 3 46.25 
 
In respect to both the methodology employed and the impact on sentence, drug and alcohol 
cases received a more favourable treatment under the Gladue regime. Once again, it appears that 
judges viewed acts of violence perpetrated by Indigenous offenders in the drug and alcohol 
category as fitting more closely with the conventional cultural image of Indigenous criminality as 
driven by alcohol consumption. Where judges could make this connection as well as trace the 
violence perpetrated by the offender back to the experiences of colonialism, family separation, and 
residential schools for example, they could more readily see their way to applying the Gladue 
provisions. Where the violence was perpetrated by a sober Indigenous offender, or at least one 
who was not heavily intoxicated, the explanations for the behaviour and the connections to the 
Gladue provisions were not made as readily. This was despite the fact that many individuals who 
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were sentenced according to the traditional methodology or who did not see an impact on sentence 
resulting from the Gladue provisions, had led lives every bit as traumatizing and in line with 
prevailing stereotypes as their counterparts.  
One potential explanation for the disproportionate number of drug and alcohol cases 
finding themselves in the different methodology categories as well as greater Gladue impact rates, 
is the existence of large numbers of Indigenous comparator cases in the drug and alcohol category 
dealing with Indigenous offenders. As noted in chapter three, more than eight in ten drug and 
alcohol manslaughters examined involved Indigenous offenders. If these numbers hold nationwide 
and over time, this would explain why cases in that category were more likely to find themselves 
sentenced under the Indigenous comparator cases methodology. As was discussed in chapter 3, 
Indigenous offenders tended to receive somewhat lower sentences in those categories when 
compared with non-Indigenous offenders so this may also be the result of the use of Indigenous 
comparator cases.  
Even if this holds true, it still represents a substantial problem for the application of Gladue 
to manslaughter sentencing. If offenders in drug and alcohol killings were being treated more 
favourably under the Gladue regime because of the circumstances of the offence, it would appear 
that more is required for the operation of Gladue in manslaughter sentencing than merely being 
affected by the background and systemic factors. It suggests that the circumstances of the offence 
itself has to align with how Indigenous people are viewed by the courts. While this is clearly 
beneficial for those offenders who stand convicted of drug and alcohol killings, it does not accord 
with Gladue’s focus on the individual as an Indigenous offender if they are not also seen as having 
committed an Indigenous offence.  
The Gladue provisions were being applied, both in methodology and in sentence impact, 
to a significant proportion of the cases examined in this paper. However, besides the divide 
between drug and alcohol manslaughters and near murder killings, there did not appear to be a 
consistent pattern to this application. Much of it appears to result from the judge deciding the case 
and to counsel arguing sentence. The concluding remarks in the final chapter of this paper offer 
suggestions for how the parties involved in the sentencing process can work toward a more even-
handed application of the provisions to manslaughter and perhaps to sentencing offenders for 
serious and violent crime more widely.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction  
This research started with the question of how the Gladue provisions were being applied 
to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes and what impact that application was 
having on sentence. It was stated at the beginning of this paper that from the outset of the research 
it was assumed that where there was an application of the provisions to a sentence of manslaughter, 
it would likely manifest as a reduction in sentence. There were some cases where, in reference to 
Gladue, judges determined that prison would best serve the needs of the offender in the long term, 
either through generalized or Indigenous-specific programming, sentences that resulted in 
reformatory time and probation, and in very few cases in time served. Despite this, more often than 
not where an impact was evident, it was in the form of a reduced sentence compared to a 
comparable non-Indigenous offender.  
 The fact that the impact of the provisions most often manifested as a reduction in sentence 
is not the lip service and discount that was initially feared by supporters and detractors of the 
provisions alike. What emerges from the decisions examined for this paper is a more nuanced 
landscape. While there were no truly innovative responses to crafting sentences for Indigenous 
offenders convicted of manslaughter, given the gravity the offence, such outcomes were always 
unlikely. What does emerge from this research is a sense that some judges are attempting to 
approach the sentencing of offenders differently and that this different approach will more often 
impact the final sentence quantum than instances in which a traditional sentencing methodology 
is used. In the end, lower sentences for Indigenous offenders may be the best outcome that can be 
expected for the application of the Gladue provisions to an offence like manslaughter. 
 
2. Summary of Findings  
 The perpetrators of manslaughter examined for this study were broadly similar to one 
another whether Indigenous or non-Indigenous. Most offenders were relatively young men with 
prior criminal records who were charged with the murder of someone they knew personally, the 
majority of whom subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Despite these similarities, 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders differed in one important respect. On average, 
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Indigenous offenders received sentences for manslaughter that were some six months shorter than 
those handed down to non-Indigenous offenders. 
This simple difference in sentence outcome, when examined closely, suggests a much more 
substantial divide between the two groups. The difference in overall sentence does not account for 
the fact that the majority of each group of offenders found themselves convicted of different 
categories of manslaughter. The majority of non-Indigenous offenders were convicted of 
manslaughter fitting the near murder category. They represented some 72% of offenders in that 
category and 72% of non-Indigenous offenders overall. The majority of Indigenous offenders were 
convicted of drug and alcohol manslaughters, representing 83% of offenders in that category and 
more half of Indigenous offenders overall.  
It was the shorter average sentences for drug and alcohol manslaughters that accounted for 
the overall lower sentences received by Indigenous offenders when compared with non-Indigenous 
ones. Within the drug and alcohol category, Indigenous offenders received sentences that were an 
average of five months lower than non-Indigenous offenders. This was despite the greater 
incidence of criminal records and records with violence for Indigenous offenders in that category. 
For Indigenous offenders who were convicted of near murder manslaughters by contrast, the 
average sentence was 20 months longer than those for non-Indigenous offenders. This was true 
despite no appreciable difference in criminal records or records with violence between the two 
groups and the increased instances of Indigenous offenders pleading guilty. Taken as an average 
of all manslaughter offenders sentenced during the period 2013-2018, Indigenous offenders 
received lower sentences. However, this conceals the fact that Indigenous offenders were most 
likely to be sentenced in a category of manslaughter that generally resulted in lower average 
sentences. While Indigenous offenders also received somewhat lower sentences on average than 
non-Indigenous offenders within the drug and alcohol category, they received longer sentences in 
the other categories. Therefore, the lower sentences for Indigenous offenders overall were almost 
entirely the result of the category of manslaughter in which most were convicted and the treatment 
that those offenders and that particular subset of manslaughter received from trial judges. Those 
Indigenous offenders who were not in that category were treated more severely by the sentencing 
courts than similarly-situated non-Indigenous offenders. 
 The conclusion drawn from these apparent contradictions is that sentencing judges could 
more readily connect Indigenous offending  to the Gladue provisions where the circumstances of 
 
 
137 
 
the offence were aligned with the prevailing stereotypes about Indigenous people, substance abuse 
and criminality. The circumstances of the offence in the drug and alcohol category dovetailed with 
the view of violent Indigenous offending as indelibly linked with alcohol abuse. The circumstances 
of the offence arising in near murder manslaughters by contrast, were not aligned with those views 
and so Indigenous offenders were not able to avail themselves of the benefits of the Gladue 
provisions as frequently in that category. The courts could more readily understand the 
applicability of the provisions where the circumstances of the offence could be connected with 
substance abuse. 
 The differential treatment of manslaughters involving drugs and alcohol continued when 
comparing Indigenous offenders convicted in different categories of manslaughter to one another. 
Gladue Reports were more prevalent among drug and alcohol cases than near murder cases, 
appearing in nearly 40% of the former compared with less than 30% of the latter. The difference 
between these two categories was also apparent in the application of the Gladue provisions to 
sentencing both with respect to the methodologies employed to sentence Indigenous offenders and 
to the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome. This research identified two distinct types of 
different methodologies employed in sentencing Indigenous offenders. These were the first 
principles’ methodology, involving the sentencing of an Indigenous offender in a manner 
concerned principally with their Indigenous heritage rather than the traditional purposes and 
principles of sentencing, and the Indigenous comparator case methodology, which involved 
sentencing Indigenous offenders with reference primarily to cases involving similarly-situated 
Indigenous offenders.  
Of the 80 Indigenous offenders in this study, 24 were sentenced according to a different 
methodology. Eight of these were sentenced according to the first principles’ methodology, all of 
which were drug and alcohol killings. Sixteen were sentenced following the Indigenous 
comparator cases methodology, of which 11 were drug and alcohol offenders. Only 15% of 
Indigenous offenders in the near murder category were sentenced according to a different 
methodology compared with over 40% of offenders in the drug and alcohol category. Drug and 
alcohol cases represented almost four in five of those sentenced according to a different 
methodology, while accounting for slightly more than half of all Indigenous offenders in total. 
Within the categories of different methodologies, the first principles’ methodology was entirely 
composed of drug and alcohol killings as were 70% of the Indigenous comparator cases. Once a 
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case was sentenced according to one of the two different methodologies, the likelihood that the 
Gladue provisions would impact on the final sentence outcome increased relative to the traditional 
methodology. 
When considering the impact on sentence outcome attributable to the Gladue provisions, 
the drug and alcohol cases were once again more likely to be given a favourable treatment. In drug 
and alcohol manslaughters overall, greater than half of offenders saw the Gladue provisions impact 
on the final sentence outcome. For offenders in the near murder category Gladue’s impact on 
sentence was only seen in a third of cases.  Sentencing judges were more likely to see both how a 
different methodology could be employed and that an impact on sentence would be appropriate 
for Indigenous offenders convicted in the drug and alcohol category than the near murder category.  
It appeared that where judges were able to connect the circumstances of the offence to 
cultural preconceptions surrounding Indigenous substance abuse and criminality they could more 
readily see their way both to utilizing a different methodology in sentencing those offenders and 
in having the Gladue provisions impact upon the final sentence outcome. The circumstances of 
the offence weighed heavily in judicial consideration of the application of Gladue despite the 
similarities in lived experience between those offenders in the drug and alcohol and near murder 
categories. The influence of alcohol on the commission of serious and violent offences perpetrated 
by Indigenous offenders facilitated the application of Gladue at all stages from the preparation of 
Gladue Reports to the choice of methodology in sentencing and finally to whether or not the 
provisions would ultimately impact upon sentence.  
 If there are real innovative solutions to the problem of Gladue and the sentencing of 
offenders for serious and violent crimes they appear to have escaped the courts as much as they 
have the author of this paper. This does not mean that Gladue has no role to play in sentencing 
offenders for serious and violent crimes. Evidence drawn from this research suggests that in 
manslaughter sentencing, some judges are finding a way to connect the Gladue provisions to the 
sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime and allowing them to impact on sentence. If 
different methodologies can develop more fully in the trial courts and receive endorsement from 
the courts of appeal then it is possible that solutions may develop in the future. Such innovations 
in sentencing practice will need to be coupled with additional resources at every stage of the 
process from the provision of Gladue Reports to the programming available in the prison system 
to supports provided to offenders once they have been released. Each of these areas requires more 
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effort and greater resources to ensure that the application of Gladue to the sentencing of offenders 
for serious and violent crimes can manifest as more than just a reduction in sentence in those cases 
where the courts deem this appropriate. Long-term solutions to the overincarceration of Indigenous 
offenders cannot simply proceed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
3. Counsel  
 The Crown has a critical role to play in ensuring that the Gladue provisions are applied to 
Indigenous offenders sentenced for serious and violent crime. This role begins at the policy level 
with the provincial attorneys general and federal and provincial directors of public prosecutions. 
At present, among the PPSC and the provincial Crowns surveyed for this research, only Ontario 
had a substantive practice directive dealing with the prosecution of Indigenous peoples. However, 
Ontario’s direction remains light on details and does not address itself to sentencing. It is 
incumbent on those organizations that prosecute Indigenous offenders in Canada to begin the 
consideration of the Gladue provisions before the formal sentencing process has begun. This 
should begin with clear policy directions that govern the sentencing of Indigenous offenders and 
provide frontline Crown counsel with clear guidelines to ensure their operation. It is insufficient 
for the Crown to rely on judges to find an appropriate sentence that takes into account an 
Indigenous offender’s heritage. Their sentencing submissions should be tailored to reflect that as 
well.  
 Equipped with guidelines from senior management, Crown counsel can approach the 
sentencing of Indigenous offenders differently. At sentencing itself, Crown counsel’s 
responsibilities should be two-fold. First, they should exercise restraint in making sentencing 
submissions for Indigenous offenders. Rather than approaching Indigenous offenders in an 
undifferentiated manner from non-Indigenous ones, the Crown should request sentences that take 
into account the remedial intentions of the Gladue provisions. Where it is appropriate to ask for a 
lower sentence than might otherwise be submitted were the offender not Indigenous, the Crown 
should make efforts to do so. This is not innovative, this is already the practice where offenders 
suffer from a mental illness. This is not to suggest that the Gladue considerations are akin to mental 
illness but it does reflect the reduced moral blameworthiness that the effects of colonialism and 
cultural and familial dislocation have had on many Indigenous offenders.  
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Second, the Crown should attempt wherever possible to utilize cases involving Indigenous 
offenders. In their submissions, the Crown effectively sets the upper end of the sentencing range 
for consideration by the judge. Evidence from this research suggests that sentence ranges proposed 
by the Crown for manslaughter in cases involving Indigenous offenders do not tend to differ 
considerably from those proposed by the Crown for non-Indigenous offenders except in the drug 
and alcohol category. The leading cases on manslaughter in most jurisdictions deal with non-
Indigenous offenders and these set the standard for sentencing submissions. Crown counsel should 
make efforts to submit cases to the court that involve the sentencing of Indigenous offenders 
wherever possible and temper their proposed sentence ranges. This is a crucial step in creating an 
Indigenous-specific sentencing jurisprudence for use by the trial courts. 
 Crown counsel can also endeavour to take into account the Indigenous heritage of  
offenders in plea negotiations. Evidence suggests that Indigenous offenders are more likely to 
plead guilty than non-Indigenous ones. This affords an opportunity for the application of the 
Gladue provisions by Crown and defence counsel. Crown counsel can negotiate sentences that 
take into account the remedial aims of the Gladue provisions where there has been a guilty plea. 
There is no requirement that such considerations be taken into account in the process but given the 
degree of deference afforded to joint submissions by trial judges, this is fertile ground for the 
application of Gladue to sentence. In this way, the Crown can aid in ensuring that Parliament’s 
directive to reduce the overincarceration of Indigenous peoples is carried out.  
 Defence counsel are restrained to a certain degree by the actions of the Crown. If the Crown 
is proposing a lengthy penitentiary term for an offender, defence counsel may feel bound to 
propose a sentence that is closer to that proposed by the Crown in order for their proposal to  appear 
more reasonable. Defence counsel and the Crown should make efforts to propose cases for 
consideration that involve other Indigenous offenders. If the defence concentrates on tying the 
lower sentences they propose to the Indigenous heritage of the offenders, they can advance the 
creation of Indigenous-specific bodies of jurisprudence for manslaughter and other serious and 
violent crimes in their jurisdictions.  
 Unfortunately, there is no shortage of cases involving Indigenous offenders sentenced for 
manslaughter and other serious and violent crimes in virtually all jurisdictions in Canada. Both 
Crown and defence counsel have access to wide bodies of cases dealing with Indigenous offenders 
many of whom are likely to have lived lives substantially similar to the offender being sentenced. 
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Both in submissions before the court and in plea negotiations, counsel on both sides can make 
efforts to ensure that an Indigenous-focused jurisprudence begins to emerge. After all, it is most 
often counsel that supplies the cases upon which the judge will ultimately base their determination 
of sentence.  
 
4. Trial Courts 
 The judiciary represents the indispensable avenue for ensuring that the Gladue provisions 
are applied in practice. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court has directed judges to ensure that 
the provisions are applied. As suggested above, counsel on both sides should make efforts to 
propose sentences that reflect the Indigenous heritage of an offender and to focus on comparator 
cases dealing with other Indigenous offenders. Even without those tools, judges can be more 
mindful of an offender’s Indigenous status. Trial judges should avoid reflexively resorting to the 
notion that the offender and offence before them are precisely the sort to which the Supreme Court 
referred when it remarked that some Indigenous offenders will receive sentences that are closer to 
or the same as non-Indigenous offenders. Most judges have moved beyond this idea but some 
continue to resort to it, perhaps as much from frustration caused by a lack of real alternatives as an 
opposition to what might be seen as discounted sentencing.  
 Likewise, judges should not feel bound by the submissions of counsel. The determination 
of a just sanction for the offender and offence before the court is the prerogative of the presiding 
justice. Submissions of counsel serve to guide the judge in their determination but judges are 
ultimately free to impose the sentence they determine to be appropriate. For a judge to suggest 
that, but for the submissions of counsel, they would impose a more lenient sentence on an offender 
is, with respect, a pretext. Where a sentencing judge believes that the submissions of counsel do 
not reflect the appropriate sentence for the offence, they should make that clear. The judge may 
decide on the appropriate sentence themselves or they may call upon counsel to provide additional 
cases. Such a scenario could afford an opportunity for a sentencing judge to suggest to counsel 
that they provide the court with cases dealing with other Indigenous offenders so they can craft a 
sentence that properly accounts for this. 
As this research has indicated, the impact of Gladue upon sentence will not necessarily be 
a reduction in length. Some judges have pointed to the supports available in prison as the best 
means of ensuring that offenders are given the tools necessary to avoid reoffending. More often 
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than not, it was suggested by the courts that those resources are to be found in the federal 
correctional system as opposed to the provincial or territorial ones. Even if no satisfactory 
approach impacting upon sentence outcome can be found, trial judges can nonetheless attempt to 
approach the sentencing of Indigenous offenders using a different methodology. This paper has 
suggested that there were two distinct variations of a different methodology that were used by trial 
courts in Canada. While the first principles’ approach may not be appropriate for all offenders to 
whom the provisions have been found to apply,  the use of Indigenous comparator cases frequently 
will be. Trial judges should encourage counsel to provide them with cases that speak to the 
Indigenous heritage of the offender in order to make their determination on sentence. The more 
frequently that the trial courts use such cases, the more frequently they will make their way before 
the courts of appeal. 
 
5. Courts of Appeal 
Most jurisdictions examined in this study had some ranges established for manslaughter by 
their courts of appeal. However, British Columbia was alone in having an established range for 
Indigenous offenders convicted for manslaughter, specifically younger Indigenous offenders.1 
Appeal courts should concentrate on developing a body of jurisprudence that deals with Indigenous 
offenders and work to establish sentencing ranges that reflect a body of Indigenous comparator 
cases. Courts of appeal have shown a willingness to establish sentencing ranges that take into 
account aggravating factors in manslaughter, such as spousal violence, they should also entertain 
a willingness to take into account the Gladue factors in determining appropriate ranges for 
Indigenous offenders. Developing such a jurisprudence would serve to guide trial courts in their 
attempts to identify appropriate sentencing considerations for those Indigenous offenders that 
come before them. These ranges may be substantially similar to or the same as those employed to 
sentence non-Indigenous offenders but they could be crafted in such a way that they take into 
account the unique circumstances that so frequently affect Indigenous offenders that come before 
the courts.  
Given the striking similarities between offences and offenders that are frequently found in 
manslaughter cases involving Indigenous offenders, developing an Indigenous-specific 
                                               
1 R v Pop, 2013 BCCA 160. 
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jurisprudence would not prove an insurmountable obstacle for appeal courts. There remains a 
concern, as there has always been with the Gladue provisions, that such a practice runs the risk of 
creating controversy with the public. Despite these concerns, there is a solid legal foundation for 
doing so in the decisions of the Supreme Court. The directive of the Court in Wells to sentence 
Indigenous offenders according to a different methodology would allow the development of bodies 
of case law dealing with Indigenous offenders in particular categories of crime. Even if the courts 
of appeal and the trial courts manage to produce such a body of cases, the resources available to 
sentencing judges remain limited.  
 
6. Governments 
 On paper the federal correctional system has made strides to establish programs in 
penitentiaries designed to aid Indigenous offenders with their healing and rehabilitation. However, 
the Correctional Service of Canada itself admits that these programs are chronically underfunded 
and understaffed. As noted in chapter two, the elders program of Corrections Canada has trouble 
maintaining staffing levels and healing lodges are few and far between. The correctional system 
requires more resources to ensure that those programs that have been established to aid Indigenous 
offenders are more widely available and receive adequate funding and resources.  
 The same will be necessary within the provincial and territorial correctional systems. This 
research dealt with some cases in which the judge handed down a sentence that lay on the federal 
side of the two-year divide because the resources geared toward Indigenous offenders, limited 
though they are, were at least present in the federal correctional system in a way they are not in 
many provinces. Provincial correctional institutions should take measures to provide Indigenous-
specific programming wherever possible in order to allow judges to send Indigenous offenders to 
those institutions with the knowledge that they will have the option of participating in culturally-
relevant programming.  
 Both levels of government will need to make increased funding available in order to 
provide programming that is suitable for Indigenous prisoners and to further fund institutions like 
healing lodges to give sentencing judges more options in crafting sentences geared towards the 
Indigenous heritage of offenders. Along with increased funding, both levels of government will 
need to build relationships and provide resources to Indigenous communities, rural and urban, to 
ensure that the provision of services continues after Indigenous offenders are released. It was 
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vanishingly rare in the decisions examined for this paper to find judicial reference to particular 
programs and services available to offenders upon release. One reason for this is the limited nature 
of these programs, an issue exacerbated by the underfunding of the Department of Justice 
Aboriginal Justice Strategy. Where such programs exist, they are not provided sufficient funding 
to offer comprehensive programming and the uncertainty of funding limits the ability of those 
organizations to plan for the future and to build their capacities. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 Without investing money in the correctional system and post-release support infrastructure, 
reduced sentences arising from the impact of Gladue will only serve to limit the time an Indigenous 
offender serves in prison for the crime for which they were sentenced. It will not necessarily 
provide that offender with the tools they require to prevent them from falling back into the patterns 
of behaviour that landed them before the courts in the first place. The Gladue provisions were 
never meant to serve as a panacea for the crisis of overrepresentation in the prison system. Despite 
this, the provisions continue to be asked to do much of the heavy lifting in this respect and receive 
considerable criticism for their failure to alleviate the crisis. 
 Each stage of the sentencing process requires that greater efforts be made by the actors 
involved from Crown and defence counsel, to trial judges and the courts of appeal, to the 
correctional system itself. Such efforts should be geared first towards the development of 
Indigenous-specific sentencing methodologies for offenders. By treating Indigenous offenders in 
the same manner as non-Indigenous offenders, the Gladue provisions risk becoming at best another 
mitigating factor to be considered when determining sentence. Developing distinctive sentencing 
methodologies for Indigenous offenders is not a guarantee that previously unimagined approaches 
to sentencing will arise, however, it does provide a first step in the process of changing how the 
criminal justice system treats Indigenous offenders. If courts can begin to view Indigenous 
offenders as a distinct category requiring distinct approaches, it is possible that the jurisprudence 
can begin to develop more fruitfully. Without a concerted effort to do so, we continue to risk 
having the provisions founder.  
 In order to allow the Gladue provisions to have an effect on as many offenders as possible, 
it is essential that trial judges see their way to applying them more broadly, both with respect to 
methodology and to sentence impact.  If the Gladue provisions are understood as applying only to 
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those offenders whose crimes are seen to fit the model of an Indigenous offence, that is one defined 
by the abuse of alcohol, then there is little hope that they will fulfill the remedial mandate 
envisioned by Parliament. The courts must recognize that most Indigenous people who come 
before the criminal courts in Canada have been affected to one degree or another by the Gladue 
factors. The experiences of colonialism, residential schools and the intergenerational trauma 
produced by both serve to mark the lives of a great many Indigenous people in this country. Where 
the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime is concerned, the circumstances of the 
offence cannot weigh too heavily in the calculus of Gladue application to the exclusion of those 
of the offender. The provisions exist to govern the sentencing of Indigenous offenders, not merely 
those Indigenous offenders who have acted under the influence of alcohol.  
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